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3 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The original complaint in this action was filed Aug-
ust 18, 1937. Ten persons were named as plaintiffs; two 
corporations and four individuals personally and doing 
business under an assumed name were named as defend-
ants. Each plaintiff claimed a cause of action against 
each defendant. 
The demurrer filed by this appellant was overruled, 
(Tr. 176) and defendant answered. This answer was 
filed November 15, 1938. Thereafter and on the 2~d day 
of March, 1939, an amended complaint was filed (Abs. 2), 
with twelve plaintiffs joined, each alleging a separate 
and distinct cause of action against each of said defend-
ants. This appellant demurred to the amended complaint 
(Abs. 15) and after the overruling of said demurrer by 
the Court (Abs. 23) filed its answer to the amended 
complaint on March 27, 1939 (Abs. 23). 
After the case had been tried on its merits, a memo-
randum decision was filed (see Abs. 259) dismissing the 
action as to three plaintiffs and all of the defendants, 
except only the appellant. Injunctive relief was denied 
the remaining plaintiffs but the Court retained jurisdic-
tion over the remaining plaintiffs, nine in number, and 
permitted them to further amend their complaint. There-
after and on June 22, 1939, a supplemental complaint was 
filed (Abs. 27) in which there were the nine remaining 
plaintiffs joined, together with two of the former plain-
tiffs against whom the action had been dismissed, against 
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4 
the appellant as the only defendant. (see Abs. 259). De-
murrer (Abs. 39) was likewise filed to the supplemental 
complaint and overruled (Abs. 46) and a motion to strike 
the paragraphs of the supplemental complaint relating 
to the two plaintiffs against whom the action had pre-
viously been dismissed (Abs. 45) was denied {Abs. 46) 
and an answer to the supplemental complaint was filed 
on July 3, 1939. ( Abs. 47). 
After the trial on the supplemental complaint, the 
action of Edward M. Beck, otherwise known as Reed 
Beck, was dismissed for the second time (Abs. 402), and 
judgment was rendered in favor of the remaining ten 
plaintiffs, including the plaintiff Maylan Carter, against 
whom the action had previously been dismissed. 
The complaint as filed ( Abs. 2) alleges that the 
plaintiffs are the owners in severalty of ''homes, yards 
and farms'' situate in a locality ''distant from general 
traffic and industrial manufacture where the inhabitants 
are chiefly engaged in farming and agricultural pur-
suits,'' and at a distance of from five rods to half a 
mile from the property of the defendant; that ''this lo-
cality has for more than fifty years last past been dis-
tinguished as a residential and farming section''; ''that 
said locality is especially valuable for residential pur-
poses.'' 
It is then alleged in the complaint that the defendant 
manufactures fertilizing materials and other animal by-
products, from which operations odors float over the 
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5 
property of plaintiffs and into their homes, rendering 
the same unfit for residential purposes, thereby dimin-
ishing the market value of the homes and land of the 
plaintiffs. The prayer is for an injunction. 
The appellant~s answer (Abs. 23) denied the mater-
ial allegations of plaintiffs' complaint and alleged (Abs. 
26) that because of the nature of the community, the de-
fendant's rendering plant was a necessary aid to the 
comfort of the community in disposing of carcasses and 
offal that was exposed on the surface and permitted to 
rot; that the lands of the plaintiffs and defendant are 
industrial rather than residential properties; that they 
are contiguous to the main line of the Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company, in a location where there are a pea 
vinery, a sugar factory, and feed yards for live stock; 
that the defendant had operated its rendering plant for 
five years prior to a fire, and rebuilt it after the fire in 
the same location; that the plaintiffs' actions are barred 
by laches and the statute of limitations ;(Par. 11 answer of 
def. trans. p. 53) (Par. 9 answer to amend complaint Abs. 
27) ; that some of the plaintiffs moved upon the lands 
in the vicinity of the plant and constructed homes 
thereon since the defendant commenced operations. Ap-
pellant further alleged that there is a misjoinder of par-
ties plaintiff and a misjoinder of causes of action, and 
that there is a defect in parties plaintiff, because there 
are many persons other than the plaintiffs directly inter-
ested in the ownership of the properties alleged to be 
affected. 
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The case came on for trial on the 3rd day of April, 
1939 (Abs. 49). On the 7th of June, 1939 (Abs. 384), 
the Court made its memorandum decision in which the 
Court found, made and entered findings of fact and con-
clusions of law ( Abs. 392), wherein the Court concludes 
that the plaintiffs are not entitled to have the defendant 
enjoined from operating the plant, but plaintiffs should 
be entitled to recover damage for loss or injury suffered 
and to be suffered by them as owners of the homes or 
lands adjacent to defendant's plant. The Court retained 
jurisdiction and permitted the parties to amend their 
pleadings (Abs. 259, 393), and to put in additional evi-
dence upon the question of damages to which plaintiffs 
might be entitled. 
On the 17th of October, 1939, the cause came on for 
hearing on the supplemental pleadings, and additional 
evidence on the question of damage was adduced (Abs. 
260). 
Whereupon the Court adopted its findings and con-
clusions of June 7, 1939 (Abs. 393), and then entered 
findings with reference to damage in each of the ten 
separate cases. 
Appellant will now discuss each of the ten causes 
of action separately. 
THOMAS LUDLOW testified (Abs. 57): 
His occupation is farming, cattle and sheep; 
his home is located 200 rods west and 10 rods 
north of defendant's plant; he has 40 acres with 
a home, garage, three chicken coops, barn and 
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wash house; the fair, reasonable market value 
of his lands "yith improvements is $10,000 (Abs. 
58). 
(It is alleged in the complaint that his property is 
worth $12,000 ( Abs. 4, 29). 
He gets the odors from the plant maybe 
two days a week (Abs. 58); it is an unpleasant 
smell; none of his family has b~en sick from it 
(Abs. 59); he has manure on his farm (Abs. 94); 
the house is forty years old ( Abs. 95), worth $2,-
500 ; the barns, chicken coops, etc. $1,500; the barn 
is probably 150 feet from the house; part of the 
barn yard is between the house and the barn ; 
cows are kept in the barn yard; the manure is 
cleaned out t\vice a year and hauled away once 
a year; Exhibit 4 is a part of his yard (Abs. 96); 
dead sheep are burned on his place and dead 
horses and cows go to defendant's plant; he has 
pelted as high as 50 sheep in one or two days; 
defendant's Exhibit 3 looks like a place on the 
ranch ; there are dry bones from three head of 
sheep~ Exhibit 11 pictures the improvements 
around his horne (Abs. 97) ; Exhibit 12 shows his 
barn; there could be dead sheep in the corral; 
the odor of manure is not offensive to him (Abs. 
98); Earl Ludlow's yard, Exhibit 10, is 40 rods 
from his house; he hauled 426 tons of beets last 
year; he takes all the pulp from the sugar fac-
tory; the beet pulp has an unpleasant odor; it 
bothers people a little; it doesn't bother him; the 
defendant's plant used to be a brick yard; the 
brick yard and the sugar factory were running at 
the same time (Abs. 99); the center of population 
of Benjamin is one-half mile south and a mile 
west from his home ; he sold carcasses to the 
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defendant; neighbors' animals are picked up as 
soon as they are dead and hauled over to the de-
fendant (Abs. 100); the last two years he has 
sold the defendant three horses, a cow, and a calf 
and has disposed of sheep which died in the last 
two n1onths (Abs 101); the beet pulp is beneficial 
to him; all the beef feeders feed it ( Abs. 102) ; he 
has 200 loads of manure on his place at one time; 
he feeds 2,000 head of sheep, 40 head of beef; hii 
business is feeding live stock ( Abs. 253). 
On this evidence of the plaintiff the Court awarded 
this plaintiff $1,360 (Abs. 396), more than 50% of the 
original value of the home which is more than 40 years 
old. 
EARL LUDLOW testified: 
He feeds stock; his home is 200 rods north-
west from defendant's plant; he has 20 acres 
(Abs. 130); the odors from the plant occur eve.ry 
time they get a breeze from the east (Abs. 131); 
Exhibit 10 is a picture of his barn yard; the stuff 
in the foreground is manure; he has sold ap-
pellant a few pelts; he has bought three sacks 
of tankage and fed it to his pigs, 300 feet from 
his house; where they feed this tankage it smells 
( Abs. 132) ; he gave $6,000 for this farm of 20 
acres fourteen years ago to his father; he thinks 
it is now worth $9,500; his four children, his wife 
and liimself are healthy; they have never called a 
doctor on account of the smell; he paid his father 
at the rate of $300 an acre for this land (Abs. 133). 
In the complaint it is alleged that his property is 
worth $7,000 (Abs. 7, 30). On this testimony the Court 
allowed Earl Ludlow $920.00 (Abs. 397}. 
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EDWIN B. (or Ed,vard) SELENE testified: 
He is a forn1er e1nployee of defendant, and 
worked in defendant's plant (Abs. 73); is now 
'vorking for ~Ir. Greer, likewise a forn1er em-
ployee of the con1pany (Abs. 49), in a competi-
tive business ( ..... \bs. 54, 55); acquired the property 
in 1931 ; the deed stated a consideration of $3,000; 
he paid $7,000 but this included water from the 
Stra-,vberry Reservoir (Abs. 72); 17.69 acres; his 
land is 30 rods from defendant's plant; he is 
bothered by the odor and by the rats (Abs. 70); 
values his house at $2,000 and his farm at $200 an 
acre; his chicken coops, granary and barn are 
worth fifteen or sixteen hundred dollars (Abs. 74); 
eight shares of water worth $100 a share; his 
present occupation is selling and handling pelts 
and hides; he maintains a pelt house in Salem; 
Exhibit 8 and 9 are pictures of his premises as 
now located (Abs. 75); he never called a doctor 
into his home on account of the odors (Abs. 73). 
The Court awarded this plaintiff $2,176 damage 
(Abs. 397) which represents more than one hundred per 
cent of the value of his home as fixed by himself ( Abs. 
74). Not the slightest damage was shown to his land or 
to his farm improvements. His farm is contiguous to 
the railroad right of way. When he moved away tem-
porarily he had no difficulty in renting it. He testified 
his land grew just as large and abundant crops now as it 
did before the plant was there (Abs. 74). 
The cause of action of Mr. Selene is essentially 
different from the cause of action of either of the Lud-
lows. Mr. Selene worked for the defendant and helped 
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build up its business as an employee in its present loca-
tion in close proximity to his home. He is estopped not 
only from claiming the right to enjoin the business, but 
from claiming any damages at law on the business which, 
as an employee, he helped to establish. 
Mr. Selene, as the principal agitator of this law 
suit, brought into the case his employer, Mr. Greer, and 
relied upon his testimony. 
MR. GREER testified: 
That he built the original plant for the de-
fendant; he bought the land from the people who 
owned and operated it previously as a brick yard 
(Abs. 49); he helped build the defendant's plant 
in 1933; the plant continued until the fire (Abs. 
50). 
It was stipulated that the date of the fire was April 
8, 1937 (Abs. 76). 
The construction of the old plant was corru-
gated iron and cement; the new plant is brick and 
concrete; the cookers are the same kind of cookers 
as in the old plant and he thinks about the same 
capacity; the defendant has added en trail wash-
ers; outside of that the machinery and equipment 
is practically all the same ; these odors arise from 
the cooking (Abs. 52) ; from 1934 to 1938 he 
bought pelts anywhere in the State of Utah he 
could and stored them in Salem; he worked six 
or seven years for defendant in a rendering plant 
before he came to Spanish Fork; after six years' 
experience as an employee of this defendant he 
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selected this old brick yard as a suitable site for 
the defendant to begin doing business (Abs. 54) ; 
within a year and a half after they started opera-
tions they actually started rendering carcasses in 
the Spanish Fork rendering plant ( Abs. 55) ; Ed-
win Selene is working for him now on a com-
mission basis ( Abs. 56) ; the pea vinery is closer 
to the center of Benjamin than this defendant's 
plant; when he selected this site 'he personally 
took into consideration where the population of 
Benjan1in was; it was in April, 1933 that he went 
there to locate this site ( Abs. 57). 
It is a singular thing that this first "\Vitness upon 
which the plaintiffs rely should have selected the site as 
a suitable site for the business of the defendant, and that 
all of the plaintiffs should have stood by from April, 
1933 until the commencement of this action and rendered 
no complaint against the plant until two of the former 
employees of the plant should find themselves in compe-
tition with the appellant, one of them becoming the lead-
ing plaintiff and the other the leading witness. It is cer-
tainly to be inferred and to be argued that they would 
have no difficulty in inducing the rest of the plaintiffs 
to join them in this action when they held out the possi-
bility of collecting damages against the defendant for 
something which had not otherwise bothered them all 
these years, arising out of the operation of a business 
which naturally adapted itself to the stock-feeding car-
ried on in the neighborhood, and in part as an incident to 
the sugar factory and the pea vinery which produced the 
feed for the animals to be fed in the yards of the plain-
tiffs. Certainly the lower court erred in giving to the 
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plaintiff Edwin Selene more than one hundred percent 
of the value of the home, as fixed by the plaintiff himself, 
in damages, when the evidence of the plaintiff himself 
shows that the plaintiff was able to lease the home imme-
diately upon his vacating the same (Abs. 73), with the 
plant present and in operation. Some value must be 
attributed to the home on account of this evidence alone, 
to say nothing of the evidence of the experts of the de-
fendant as well as the plaintiffs. 
The only possible conclusion that can be drawn from 
the amount of damage allowed by the Court to this 
plaintiff is that the Court allowed damages to the land, 
the chicken coops, the barn, pig pen and other outbuild-
ings incident to the maintenance of the place as a farm 
in an industrial center, namely, a center for the feeding 
of live stock. 
To allow damages to the land or any improvements 
other than the home is contrary to the evidence of the 
plaintiff himself. It is clear, therefore, that the damages 
allowed by the Court to this plaintiff were excessive and 
unreasonable, even were we to assume the right of this 
plaintiff to recover damages at all. 
MARGARET D. HANSEN: 
Heber Eugene Hansen, the son of the plain-
tiff, testified (Abs. 123) that there are nineteen 
and a fraction acres in this plaintiff's name and 
the remaining sixteen acres in the estate of Heber 
J. Hansen, deceased, not a party plaintiff. He 
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lives on this 35 acres and is now farming it; he 
is not a party to this action. The home is approx~ 
imately eighty rods southwest fro1n defendant's 
plant; the hon1e is t"~enty eight years old; there 
is a barn, chicken coop, garage, coal shed, grain 
bins, thousand bushel granary, corrals and sheds; 
he has a full "\Yater right. He couldn't say how 
many shares of water belongs to his father's es-
tate. The value of the lands and improvements 
is $10,000 (.A .. bs. 123). The odors come into his 
home; . neither he nor his wife or children have 
been made sick by it; they are all well; it is in-
termittent and it is disagreeable (Abs. 124); he 
is bothered by rats and flies (Abs. 125); he pur-
chases tankage from the defendant plant and 
feeds it to his hogs; he has sold an animal to the 
plant to be killed for fox feed. The home is worth 
$5,000; the farm improvements $2,100; the water 
$3,000 (Abs. 126). He has been in the plant to 
use the scales of the defendant; from his home he 
smells the odor of the plant, and not the sump 
near the plant (Abs. 127). Exhibit 5 is a picture 
of the home; there is manure in the foreground 
(Abs. 128); his cattle have access to his whole 
yard at present; his pig pen is approximately 
five rods south of the water; the house is 200 
feet from the corral and 300 feet from the pig 
pen; the pigs have access to the water in the 
corral shown in Exhibit 5; Exhibit 6 is a picture 
of the same corral; Exhibit 2 is the interior of 
the defendant's plant. Odors from the barn yard 
and pig pen never bother him; he has seen rat 
nests around his place ( Abs. 129). 
The Court allowed this plaintiff $1,124.40 damage 
(Abs. 398). It is impossible to ascertain either from the 
findings or the decree what portion of this damage was 
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due to damage to the home, to the farm improvements, 
to the water rights, or to the land. This home of the 
plaintiff is about as far away from the plant as the home 
of Ludlow. In the Ludlow case the Court allowed more 
than 50% of the value of the home, and in this Hansen 
case the Court has allowed a little more than 20% of the 
value of the home, if we charge the entire amount of 
damage to the home itself. 
If there is any difference in these two causes of ac-
tion, it would seem that the advantage should go to the 
Hansen case rather than the Ludlow, because in the Lud-
low case the plaintiff was really operating an industry 
of feeding more than 2,000 head of sheep and 40 head of 
cattle as a feed yard immediately adjoining his home. 
While it is true that the Hansens are raising live stock 
on their place, they have only twenty five acres, as 
against 40 acres of T. E. Ludlow, and could not accom-
modate as many cattle, but nevertheless their property 
is located within the same industrial area in which the 
feeding of live stock is the principal industry, operated 
in connection with the pea vinery, the sugar factory and 
the railroad. 
The supplemental complaint describes 25.80 acres. 
The testimony of the son is that there are nineteen and 
a fraction acres belonging to the mother and sixteen 
acres to the father's estate. The Court makes no finding 
of fact as to how many acres there are upon which dam-
ages are allowed. In Finding of Fact No. 10 (Abs. 398), 
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the Court simply says that at the time of the trial of this 
case the value of the 25.80 acres of land etc. would be 
$7,94!. The Court no doubt took into consideration the 
value the son placed upon the thirty five acres, as well 
as the values placed upon the 'vhole farm by the various 
witnesses testifying as to values. It cannot be deter-
tnined from the findings upon what the damages of 
$1124.40 are found to exist, or which of the thirty five 
acres the 25.80 acres are. Certainly under the evidence 
as it stands, the Court could not have awarded damage 
to the plaintiff on more than nineteen and a fraction 
acres. If the estate is to recover any damages on the 
sixteen acres, it would have had to be made a party to 
the suit. Living on the property the son suffered the 
injury the mother is awarded the damage. The son could 
still sue. 
JOHN ANGUS testified: 
He lives less than half a mile west of the de-
fendant's plant; he has eight acres and rents 
eight acres; he has rented the eight acres adjoin-
ing the plant of the defendant for three years; he 
has a home, two chicken coops, granary, garage 
and blacksmith shop, a barn, and flowing wells. 
This is farming land; he grows hay, grain, sugar 
beets. The value runs from $2,500 to $3,000 
(Abs. 87). 
He purchased the property either in 1929 or 
1930, paid $535 for the land, 7.82 acres. Since 
1933 at the time of the commencement of defend-
ant's business he has built two chicken coops and 
a well on the property; they are now worth $400 ; 
he did most of the building; the original lumber 
bill was $300; the blacksmith shop was moved 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
onto the place four or five years ago ; its present 
value is $30 or $50. 
He started building a home in 1930; the home 
when it was completed had cost him $1,250; it 
cost him $350 to drive a well; electric lights cost 
$120; there is nothing else to speak of (Abs. 89). 
He has five children, ages 24 to 9 ; they are all 
healthy; his wife and he are healthy. The rats in 
this vicinity breed in the grain fields around Ben-
jamin; they are the kind of rats you see every-
where; the odor fro1n the plant is stronger when 
they are cooking (Abs. 90); the smell which comes 
from the plant is a cooked smell (Abs. 91). 
They had flies before the plant came; the 
flies are worse now; he has lived all of these years 
that this plant has been in operation and made 
these improvements; his family has continued to 
live there and grow up and be healthy (Abs. 93). 
This plaintiff was awarded $824.00 damage (Abs. 
398). Although the plaintiff in his complaint alleges 
the total value of his property at $3,000 ( Abs. 5, 31), and 
himself testifies that the value of his property runs 
around $2,500 or $3,000, the Court in its eleventh finding 
of fact finds the value to be $3,568.50 (Abs. 398), $568.50 
more than the highest amount claimed by the plaintiff 
and a like amount higher than the amount alleged in the 
complaint. The damage of $824 represents substantially 
more than fifty percent of the cost of the home, namely, 
$1,250, or $1,370 with electric lights. 
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JOHN ANDERSON testified: 
He lives about thirty rods north of defend-
ant's plant; he started to build in 1934 after the 
defendant's plant was built; his wife and five 
children have lived with hin1 at this place ever 
since he built it; he owns five and one-half acres 
of land (Abs. 108) with a water right; improve-
ments are a home, chicken coop, shed, barn, pig 
pen, granary; the present value of the place is 
$3,000. 
He worked at the plant until April1937, at the 
time the old plant burned down; he worked in the 
construction of the new plant whenever they 
needed an extra man. 
They get odors whenever the cooker is in 
operation; it has never really made him sick 
(Abs. 109); they have flies and rats at their home; 
he got accustomed to the smell when he worked 
for the defendant; he didn't hesitate to accept 
employment from the plant from time to time 
whenever there was employment; he accepted the 
defendant's money for his services; he lived in 
his home while he was working at the plant; he 
built it there after the plant was established; when 
he worked at the plant he did some of the cooking 
(Abs. 110); the new plant is no worse than the old 
one he operated; he has used the new cookers; he 
doesn't know the difference in the construction 
of the present plant over the old one ; he thinks 
they have some new machinery; the only smell he 
smelled was made while he was cooking; the rat 
situation has not improved or got worse since 
1934; he helped build this new plant and saw the 
kind of construction it was ; he thinks the building 
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is rat proof; the bone pile is where the rats are; 
the bone pile is no different now from what it 
was when he first moved there (Abs. 111); the 
flies get into his house the same as other people's. 
There are no more flies there now than there were 
before the old plant burned down (Abs. 112); 
there are meats on the inside of the plant that 
gather the flies; on the outside there are manure 
and bones; the cooking of fresh meat will have 
just as bad odor as the cooking of the dead meat; 
he lived at this place from the time he built the 
home until !{arch, 1939, without instituting any 
suit for the removal of the plant; he didn't com-
plain to the defendant company or any of its man-
agement while he was working at the plant or 
living in his home about their maintaining this 
plant there, and he didn't make any complaint to 
the owner when they' hired him to help rebuild it 
after the fire. 
His five and a half acres are worth $200 an 
acre with the water; it is good land and raises 
good crops, just as good now as when he bought 
it, and produces just as much produce. Chicken 
coops, sheds, etc. are worth $210 (Abs 113); four 
and a half acre feet of Strawberry water are worth 
$100 a share; and four and a half shares of river 
water worth $100 a share; they get drinking water 
from the well that is located on defendant's pro-
perty; they have the permission of the manager 
to use the drinking water. None of this property 
stands in his name; it is in his wife's name. (Abs. 
114). 
This is the testimony of this witness. His wife is not 
a party to the suit. In spite of this testimony the Court 
finds, Finding No. 12 (Abs. 398), that at the time of the 
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trial of this case the value of the five acres of land de-
scribed in the supplemental complaint as belonging to 
John Anderson, including improvements thereon, would 
be $2,200; that said lands and improvements of John 
Anderson will be depreciated in market value to the 
extent of $1,050 and said plaintiff will be damaged in 
said sum if defendant's plant continues to operate. There 
is a finding of fact that John Anderson is the owner, but 
the evidence is conclusive to the effect that John An-
derson was not the owner of the property and had no 
right to collect any damage. His wife was the proper 
party plaintiff, and if this judgment were allowed to 
stand and defendant were compelled to pay it, there 
would be nothing to prevent the wife of this plaintiff 
from suing to recover on a cause of action which is hers 
and which is in no wise satisfied by the findings, conclu-
sions or decree herein entered. Furthermore, it is to be 
noted that the plaintiff's own evidence shows that the 
total value of his property is $3,000, $1,100 of which is 
land, $900 of which is water, $210 of which is farm im-
provements (Abs. 113), leaving only a balance of $790 
for the value of the home. The amount of damage allowed 
Mr. Anderson, an employee of the defendant company, 
and who assisted the defendant in building even the new 
plant, is substantially more than the total value of the 
home. This home of the plaintiff, built since the plant 
was constructed, is dependent upon the industrial prop-
erty which was purchased by the defendant from the 
brick yard for industrial purposes; this plaintiff gets 
his culinary supply of water from this industrial source 
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and continues so to do while suing the defendant for the 
maintenance of the industry which gives him his culinary 
water. 
It would appear that the Court had increased the 
damage in this case because of the fact that the house 
was built after the plant was established, whereas we 
will endeavor to show that in purchasing this property 
and building upon it after the establishment of the. plant, 
and while he was employed by the plant, he defeats any 
possible claim he might have for damages resulting from 
the operation of the plant, even if he, rather than some-
one else, were the owner of the property. It is to be 
noted here that this is not a suit for the temporary in-
convenience of this plaintiff as a mere resident upon 
these premises, but is a suit to reimburse the owner of 
the premises for the difference in value of the premises 
with the plant operating and with the plant eliminated. 
This is a cause of action that can belong only to the 
owner of the land, if at all. 
This action was dismissed as to Maylan Carter, 
Edward M. Beck and James Albert West, original plain-
tiffs in this action (Abs. 259). Thereafter, and without 
leave of Court, Maylan Carter and Edward M. Beck were 
included in the supplemental complaint. With the prin-
cipal action dismissed as to these two plaintiffs, it is 
impossible to see how the Court could ultimately award 
tnem judgment on the basis of the supplemental com-
plaint without having first reinstated them as plaintiffs 
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in the original action. To what was their complaint sup-
plemental~ 
All of the evidence in the original proceedings is 
relied upon by the Court in avvarding these two plaintiffs 
in the supplemental complaint the judgment allowed 
them. Furthermore, each of these plaintiffs claims 
to be the owner of real estate upon which there are no 
improvements. 
MAYLAN CARTER testified: 
That he owns a tract of land across the rail-
road tracks from the plant (Abs. 320); he paid 
$225 per acre straight through; he has received 
the same rental from this property for the past 
fifteen years ; he hasn't lost any money on the land 
since the plant came there; he has received just 
as much income from it since as before; he can 
continue leasing his property for as much now 
as before the plant came; that he figured when 
he bought it it was worth $225 an acre as farm 
land; it is not the best residential property in the 
world next to the railroad; it is good farm land 
but poor residential land; he didn't remember 
whether the brick yard was there when he bought 
the land or not (Abs. 323). 
For this the Court allowed Mr. Carter $646.60 dam-
age (Abs. 399). The allowance of such a damage, even 
if the right to damage were established, would be con-
trary to the evidence of this plaintiff himself, in which 
he says that he bought the land for farm land and as 
such it has not been damaged. 
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EDWARD LUDLOW testified: 
He is a butter maker; lives in Benjamin and 
owns ten acres adjacent to the plant immediately 
on the south; the ground around there is worth 
$300 to $500 an acre; he farmed it himself until 
the last three years; the last three years he has 
rented it; the land has a water right (Abs. 134); 
the rats, squirrels and gophers are bad there 
(Abs. 135); he doesn't know whether the odors 
come from the plant or its surroundings; the 
record title in these ten acres is not in him; it 
hasn't been for about two years; it hasn't been 
since this law suit started. Sometimes the bone 
pile is at the plant and sometimes it is gone; 
Exhibit 10 would be a pretty good place to find 
rats (Abs. 137), and Exhibit 8 would be a pretty 
good place for them to breed; the situation in 
Exhibit 9 would be conducive to rat breeding, and 
Exhibit 6 shows another such place; he would say 
rats would breed in places like that on Exhibit 5; 
Exhibit 14 would be a good place for rats to live; 
he has leased his farm for the last three years 
and received rent for it; he wouldn't trade it for 
Thomas Ludlow's (Abs. 138); he paid $250 an 
acre in 1918; he is Thomas Ludlow's cousin; 
second cousin to Earl Ludlow; his land is fer-
tilized; there is a smell to it; it is the same kind of 
barnyard manure that they have at the defend-
ant's plant that he puts on his land and farm 
(Abs. 139); the smell of manure from his barn 
yard bothers him; he doesn't like the smell; that 
is the smell that is objectionable to him on his 
land; he wouldn't want a condition to exist like 
that in Exhibit 10 in his own back door yard; he 
aims to keep his yard cleaned up ; he doesn't want 
to say there is no smell comes from the situation 
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in Exhibit 9; doesn't want to say there is not 
enough smell to get to the house shown in that 
picture; he knows there would be; the flies have 
al,vays been bad in farn1 communities in this 
county and their cities too, as far as that is con-
cerned; he had just as 1nany flies at his home 
before the plant came as he has now (Abs 140); 
every year you would have an increase of the 
number of manure piles and barn yards in Benja-
min; with every extra barn yard he would expect 
to find a few extra manure piles, a few extra flies 
and rats; he has done business with this plant, 
bought fertilizer and sold them dead animals; he 
thinks it better to burn his animals up than to 
bury them; he has had experience of rats getting 
into dead animals; the recent tendency in this 
county has been to take care of dead animals by 
rendering them; this plant has served a useful 
purpose (Abs. 141) in this county in getting rid of 
dead animals ; the pea vinery is in Benjamin ; 
there are some disagreeable odors emanate from 
the pea vinery; he felt like closing his car window 
as he went by it; he doesn't like that any more 
than he likes the smell from the rendering plant; 
there are some odors and some offensive odors 
from the sugar factory; all of them go to make up 
the community with its industrial life; all of the 
industries that they have in Benjamin are really 
an incident to farming and live stock business, 
including this defendant's plant. This ten acres 
gives him as good a return as anything else he 
invested in; this property has never been for 
sale in 21 years; it produces a fair return on $300 
an acre (Abs. 142). 
This piece of property has no home or improve-
ments upon it and is in the same position as the Maylan 
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Carter property. The Court allowed $427.87 damage 
to this 8.15 acres of land because of the presence of the 
plant. This damage is allowed to the father as plaintiff, 
although the record title is admittedly in the son who is 
not a party plaintiff. The land continues to be worth as 
much as it was before, as farm land, and to produce as 
many crops, and to bring in a fair return on $3000, when 
the plaintiff only paid $2,037.50 for it. It is the best 
investment he has. 
There is no finding of fact and no evidence sustain-
ing a finding of fact on which to allow an estimate of 
damage on either the Maylan Carter or Edward Ludlow 
case. The Court found this land to be worth $1,711.50 
(Abs. 399). 
RUFUS ANDERSON testified: 
He lives 40 rods southwest of defendant's 
plant (Abs. 117) with his wife and six children; 
has 19.53 acres with full water right; the land is 
under cultivation; improvements are chicken 
coops, barn, pig pen, granary, garage and home; 
he values the home and land at $7,000; experiences 
the same odor in the new plant as with the old 
(Abs. 118); he had rats there before the plant 
came ; his chicken coops cost him $350 ; were built 
in 1936, after the plant was built; his barn cost him 
$75 or $175 and the granary $75; the garage, $50 
(Abs. 119); he remodeled his home in 1935; it cost 
him $1,200 in money; he judged he did $300 work 
on it himself; he started remodeling in July and 
finished in October, 1935; he rebuilt his home from 
the foundation; he never tore out the old founda-
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tion; it 'vas built fron1 the old foundation up with 
new foundation added on; the remodeling of the 
house cost $1,400; he has 20 shares of water right 
for his land 'vorth $50 a share ; the odor of the 
plant woke him up fron1 his sleep last October; 
since last October he hasn't been bothered at 
nights 'vith the odor from the plant (Abs. 120) ; it 
is the s1nell of the cookers that he smells; he may 
get the odor for only a few minutes during the 
whole day; he gets no odor from the sump (Abs. 
121) ; he smells the pea vinery; it is the odor of de-
caying peas; he gets the odor of the beet pulp as it 
is hauled along the highway; he feeds pulp to his 
animals, so that he has it around him for certain 
periods of the year quite a bit; he doesn't mind the 
odor; he has ten pigs; he feeds garbage to his pigs, 
throws it into an open trough 25 rods from his 
house; he has never seen any rats on the land of 
the defendant (Abs. 122). 
In the 15th finding of fact (Abs. 400) the Court 
makes a more detailed finding than in the previous find-
ings pertaining to the other plaintiffs. In this finding 
the Court finds that the value of the land, exclusive of 
improvements, is $4,296.60, and the value of the improve-
ments $3,100; that at the time the plant was built Rufus 
Anderson's improvements were worth $1,200; that the 
value of the land is depreciated twenty per cent by de-
fendant's plant and the improvements forty per cent, 
giving to Rufus Anderson $2,099.32 damage. This forty 
per cent is based upon all of the improvements located on 
the land at present, and the Court includes the value of 
the improvements built since the defendant commenced 
operations~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
Although Rufus Anderson alleges in his complaint 
that the total value of his property is $7,000 (Abs. 5, 30), 
and although he testifies in the case that the value of 
Iris home and the land at the present time is $7,000 (Abs. 
118), the Court finds his property to be worth $7,396.60. 
This forty per cent depreciation on the $3,100 value 
placed upon all of this plaintiff's improvements gives 
the same depreciation to the barn, the granary, the 
garage, the chicken coops, the pig pen and the shed as 
to the house. There is no contention in the pleadings and 
no evidence which would justify forty per cent deprecia-
tion upon chicken coops and pig pens in which there are 
fed the products of the cooker in defendant's plant to 
the chickens and the pigs, and which carries with it the 
smell which is so objectionable to these plaintiffs. There 
is only one possible element of damage, even on plain-
tiffs' theory of the case, and that is the disagreeableness 
of the odor. So far as flies and rats are concerned, the 
evidence is almost conclusive that that condition could 
not be attributed any more to the defendant's plant than 
to the conditions that exist around the plaintiffs' barn-
yards and premises. Many of the plaintiffs so testify, 
as we have heretofore pointed out. This smell cannot 
affect the value of anything other than the home. In 
this 15th finding of fact ( Abs. 400), there is no way of 
determining what portion of $3,100 represents the home 
and what represents farm outbuildings. This is the first 
instance in the findings in which the Court has revealed 
even in part, the basis upon which the damage awarded 
has been computed. The same can be said about the 
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twenty per cent depreciation of the land. So far as the 
evidence shows, the land is just as valuable now with the 
plant there as it would be with the plant removed. In 
all of the other findings it is impossible to determine 
what portion of the damage was allowed for damage 
to the land. 
PAUL E. SWARTZ testified: 
His home is 130 or 140 rods north of the de-
fendant's plant. He lives there with his wife and 
four children ; has 30 acres of land, house, chicken 
coops, garage, coal house and sheep corrals ; the 
smell affects his sleeping and eating on occasions 
(Abs. 103) ; he has sold the defendant a little wool 
and maybe a calf hide or two; all the people who 
live around the plant are engaged in farming, in 
the poultry business and in dairying (Abs. 104); 
it is his signature on Exhibit 13; he sold a cow to 
the company on February 24, 1939; the cow was 
not his; he lives close to the railroad track (Abs. 
106) ; the smoke from the engines doesn't bother 
him; he figures his 30 acres worth $6000 ; he has 
30 shares of water worth $3,000; his land pro-
duces just as many crops as it ever produced; he 
doesn't claim the odor from the plant or the 
smoke from the plant injures the crops (Abs. 
107); the chicken coop is as valuable now as it 
was before; chicken coops are worth $2,000; his 
shop is worth $60; he hasn't placed any value on 
the corrals ; live stock consists of horses, cows, 
pigs, a few sheep ; none of them died from the 
odor (Abs. 108). 
Mr. Swartz' property in the complaint is alleged to 
be of the value of $10,000 (Abs. 6, 31) yet the Court, in 
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Finding No. 16 (Abs. 401) finds its value to be $10,252.40 
-$252.40 more than that claimed by the plaintiff. It is 
impossible from the finding of the Court to tell whether 
or not in the valuation of $5,252.40 placed on the land 
without improvements the Court took into consideration 
the $3,000 worth of water. This water is transferable to 
other lands and could not under any circumstances be 
damaged by the operation of the defendant's plant. Cer-
tainly there is no evidence to show any damage to the 
value of the water. Although this plaintiff expressly 
states that his land has not been injured in any way, the 
Court allows twelve per cent of the value placed on the 
land, which evidently includes the water, as damages, 
and depreciates all of the improvements upon the land 
twenty per cent as damages, when the plaintiff expressly 
stated that his chicken coops are just as valuable now as 
before. The Court has included twenty per cent of this 
$2,000 in damages; in other words, the corrals of the 
plaintiff, used in the business of feeding life stock, and 
the chicken coops were damaged as badly as the home, 
so far as the Court's finding is concerned. The Court 
awarded the plaintiff Swartz $1,230 damage (Abs. 401). 
It is interesting to compare the Court's fifteenth 
and sixteenth findings of fact (Abs. 400, 401). From 
these two findings it is clear that the Court allowed 
damage for improvements placed upon the land between 
the time the defendant originally began its operations 
and the time it reconstructed this plant after the fire in 
April, 1937, but has allowed no damages for improve-
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ments placed upon the lands of the plaintiff since the 
fire in 1937. It is appellant's contention that no such 
distinction can be drawn either in law or from the 
facts; that if the rule of law applies to improvements 
placed since the rebuilding of the plant immediately 
after the fire, it "\Vouid likewise apply, and particularly 
so in the case of Rufus Anderson, to improvements 
which were placed on the land after the defendant began 
operations in the beginning. 
On the question of values, the evidence of the plain-
tiffs was supplemented by the following witnesses for 
the plaintiff: P. P. Thomas (Abs. 260) ; C. E. Hawkins 
(Abs. 287); L. M. Anderson (Abs. 306); and L. Johnson 
(Abs. 324). · 
The testimony of these men was all given upon the 
theory that this farm land was to be considered of pri-
mary value for homes and residences. No evidence was 
given other than the evidence of plaintiffs themselves 
with reference to the values of the lands in controversy 
as industrial farm lands. 
The witness for the defendant, C~ S. Woodward 
(Abs. 183) and the witnesses T. H. Heal (Abs. 350), 
Henry Jeppson (Abs. 366) and William Parry (Abs. 365) 
who made a joint appraisal, found no damage to the 
lands of plaintiffs· whose primary value was for indus ... 
trial agricultural purposes. 
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SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS RELIED 
UPON FOR REVERSAL OF 
JUDGMENT 
1. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1 to 44, INCLU-
SIVE (Abs. 414-424). Errors in overruling general and 
special demurrer of defendant to amended and supple-
mental cornplaints of plaintiff. 
2. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 45 and 47 (Abs. 
436, 437). Court's error in failing to grant defendant's 
motion to strike the causes of action of Maylan Carter 
and Edward Ludlow. These two causes of action in-
volved lands with no improvements upon them. 
3. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 48 (Abs. 437). The 
Court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the 
supplemental complaint of the plaintiffs. 
4. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 46 AND 49 TO 
76, INCLUSIVE. (Abs. 437-445). Errors assigned to rul-
ings upon evidence. 
(a) Assignment of Error 46 (Abs. 437). The Court 
erred in refusing the defendant the right to examine 
into the sicknesses of the family of Paul Swartz to de-
termine what, if any, relationship they bore to the odors 
from defendant's plant. 
(b)_ Assignment of Error 49 (Abs. 437). Court's 
refusal to receive in evidence defendant's Exhibits 18 
and 18-A, exact copies of records contained in the office 
of the County Assessor of Utah County, prepared and 
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filed in that office by the Utah State Tax Commission 
(Tr. 638), Exhibit 18 detailing the improvements upon 
the property of Heber J. Hansen and Exhibit 18-A clas-
sifying the farm land. These exhibits were offered for 
the purpose of showing one of the bases upon which Mr. 
Woodward made his appraisal. 
(c) Assignment of Error 50 (Abs. 437). Court's 
refusal to receive in evidence defendant's Exhibits 102 
to 112 ( Abs. 371-2), copies of records of the Utah State 
Tax Commission containing the appraisal of properties, 
description of improvements, classification of lands, all 
based on fair market value as made by the State Tax 
Commission for the years 1933 and 1934, showing that in 
arriving at the value of improvements they took the 
replacement or reproduction value as shown in the ex-
hibits and deducted therefrom for their age. These are 
part of the records made for the purpose of equalizing 
the assessment of land in the various counties, and in-
cludes part of a state-wide survey, all based on fair 
market value. 
(d) Assignments of Error 51 and 52 ( Abs. 438). 
The Court erred in refusing the evidence defendant of-
fered to show the sanitary condition of the plant. (Abs. 
220.) 
(e) Assignment of Error 59 (Abs. 439). The Court 
erred in denying defendant the right to cross examine 
plaintiff's expert witness as to values T. M. Anderson, 
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as to what he took into consideration In making his 
appraisal. 
(f) Assignments of Error 65 to 74, inclusive (Abs. 
441-444). The Court erred in denying defendant the 
right to offer evidence pertaining to the industrial nature 
of the community in which defendant's plant is located. 
(g) Assignments of Error 75 and 76 (Abs. 444-
445). The Court erred in refusing defendant's offer to 
prove 1929 to 1939 assessed valuation of plaintiffs' lands 
and improvements. 
5. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 77 TO 92, IN-
CLUSIVE (Abs. 445 to 450). Errors in findings of fact: 
(a) Assignment of Error 77 (Abs. 445): 
1. The Court erred in that it found the plaintiffs, 
with the exception of Maylan Carter, to be the owners 
of homes and farms. 
2. The Court erred in finding that the operation 
of defendant's plant and the use of its land as a place of 
deposit of drainage from the plant causes noxious odors 
to be discharged into the surrounding atmosphere. 
3. The Court erred in iinding that the area occu-
pied by defendant's plant cannot be classed as an indus-
trial area. 
4. The Court erred in finding that the odors ema-
nating from defendant's plant injure plaintiffs by mak-
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ing their homes substantially less desirable as dwelling 
places and by making their lands less attractive to tenants 
and prospective purchasers of home sites. 
(b) Assignment of Error 79 (Abs. 447). That the 
Court erred in its fourth finding of fact (Abs. 395) that 
the market value of lands of the plaintiffs has been de-
preciated by reason of the odors of the defendant's plant, 
and that they have been made less desirable for home 
sites. 
(c) Assignment of Error 80 (Abs. 447). That the 
Court erred in its fifth finding of fact ( Abs. 395) in find-
ing that the lands of the plaintiffs are substantially less 
desirable as dwelling places and substantially less at~ 
tractive to tenants and prospective purchasers of farms 
or home sites on account of the odors. 
(d) Assignment of Error 81 (Abs. 447). That the 
Court erred in its sixth finding of fact in finding that 
purchasers of such land as plaintiffs' are usually desir-
ous of acquiring lands upon which homes can be main-
tained; that the odors from defendant's plant depreciate 
the market value of farm lands adjacent to said plant. 
(e) Assignments of Error 82 to 91, inclusive (Abs. 
448-450). The Court erred in finding ownership, value, 
damage, in the case of each of the ten plaintiffs. 
(f) Assignment of Error 92 (Abs. 450). The Court 
erred in its 17th Finding of Fact in finding that there 
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was no difference in valuation of plaintiffs' properties 
from the time defendant commenced operating its present 
plant, and erred in failing to find the value at the time 
defendant originally instituted its plant. 
6. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 93 TO 95, IN-
CLUSIVE (Abs. 451, 452). Errors in the Court's Con-
clusions of Law : 
(a) Assignment of Error 93 (Abs. 451). That the 
plant as operated and maintained constitutes a nuisance. 
(Conclusion No. 1, Abs. 402.) 
(b) Assignment of Error 94 (Abs. 451). That the 
plaintiffs are entitled to recover damage in the amounts 
set opposite their names. (Conclusion No. 3, Abs. 402.) 
(c) Assignment of Error 95 (Abs. 452). That plain-
tiffs are entitled to an injunction unless damages are 
paid in sixty days. (Conclusion of Law No.4, Abs. 403.) 
7. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 96, 97, 98 (Abs. 
452, 453). The Court erred in rendering the decree filed 
herein. 
8. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 99 (Abs. 454). The 
Court failed to find on material issues: 
(a) That the plant has benefited the health and 
comfort of the community by the removal of exposed 
carcasses and offal. 
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(b) That since the operation of defendant's plant 
Edward B. Selene has built improvements on his prop-
erty; John Anderson has built his home; Rufus Ander-
son has entirely rebuilt his home from the foundation; 
Paul E. Swartz has remodeled, rebuilt and added onto 
his home. 
(c) That plaintiffs have derived profit from the 
building and operation of defendant's plant, purchased 
products from defendant's plant for use on plaintiffs' 
property in feeding cattle; that some of the plaintiffs 
have helped reconstruct defendant's plant, and others 
were employees of the defendant's plant. 
(d) That the depression or sump complained of 
was produced by the brick manufactory operating an 
industry upon the property prior to defendant. 
(e) That defendant operates the plant in a san-
itary manner. 
(f) That the action was dismissed as to Maylan 
Carter. 
(g) That non-condensable gases produced by de-
fendant's plant are consumed by the fire of the boiler 
and do not go into the atmosphere. 
(h) That screens have been installed in defend-
ant's plant since the filing of the complaint. 
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(i) That the value of plaintiffs' lands has not been 
depreciated by defendant's plant. 
(j) That the market value of plaintiff's improve-
ments has not been depreciated by defendant's plant. 
(k) That defendant's plant is located and operated 
in an industrial area. 
(l) That the defendant's plant is built in an area 
heretofore used for beet loading and wool loading sta-
tions, located on the main line of the Union Pacific Rail-
road Company. 
9. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 100 (Abs. 456). 
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for new 
trial. ( Abs. 409, 410.) 
ARGUMENT 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 9 - DENIAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
The first ground of appellant's motion for new trial 
{Abs. 409) is that the damages are excessive and appear 
to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
For the Court's convenience we have prepared Ex-
hibit A which we have printed and which appears in the 
appendix to this brief. This exhibit gives in: 
Column 1, the name of each plaintiff; 
Column 2, the number of acres of farm land, as 
taken from the findings of fact of the Court; 
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Cohtmn 3, the distance of the plaintiffs' homes from 
defendant's plant, as taken from the Court's findings; 
Column 4, the value of the properties of the plain-
tiffs, as alleged in the complaint; 
Column 5, the damages alleged in the complaint; 
Column 6, plaintiffs' testimony as to value ; 
Column 7, the appraised value of the lands shown on 
Exhibits 17 to 17-H, made by the State Tax Commission 
in its state-wide re-appraisal, taken from the County 
Assessor's office, appearing in the appendix to the 
abstract; 
Column 8, the value as fixed by the Findings of the 
Court; 
Column 9, damages awarded by the Court; 
Column 10, percent of Court's value allowed as 
damages; 
Column 11, the appraised value made by defendant's 
witness, Charles S. Woodward; (Mr. Woodward ap-
praised no damage, taking the position that the estab-
lishment of an industry in an industrial section tended to 
increase the demand for homes for industrial workers, 
and that the presence of this plant would enhance, 
rather than detract from, the value of the real estate.) 
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Column 12, appraisals of Heal, Parry and Jeppson, 
the three appraisers selected by the defendant and whose 
appraisals were given jointly. (They, like Mr. Wood-
ward, appraised no damage.) 
Column 13, appraised values of P. P. Thomas; 
Column 14, appraised damages of P. P. Thomas; 
Column 15, percent damages allowed by Thomas; 
Column 16, appraised values of Hawkins; 
Column 17, appraised damages of Hawkins; 
Column 18, percent damages allowed by Hawkins; 
Column 19, appraised values of Thomas Anderson; 
Column 20, appraised damages of Thomas Anderson; 
Column 21, percent damages of Anderson; 
Column 22, appraised values of Lawrence Johnson; 
Column 23, appraised damages of Lawrence John-
son. Mr. Johnson appraised only the real estate. 
Column 24, percent damages allowed by Lawrence 
Johnson. 
THOMAS LUDLOW 
It will appear from this exhibit that Thomas E. 
Ludlow testified his properties were worth $10,000, al-
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though the complaint alleged $12,000. The Court finds 
his property to be worth $10,400, $400 in excess of the 
value placed upon the land by the plaintiff himself, and 
on that value awarded Thomas E. Ludlow $1,360, which 
is 13.2% of the value found by the Court. This is two-
tenths of a percent higher than the damages as appraised 
by ~Ir. P. P. Thomas, the banker for many of the plain-
tiffs. In arriving at his appraisals, Mr. Thomas on 
cross exanrination says: 
He has experienced the odors from this plant 
for eight or ten years; he is not familiar enough 
with the odors to say whether over the ten-year 
period there has been any change or not; he 
frankly admits, ''I don't know as I know very 
much about it. I have only experienced them from 
a distance (Abs. 264), and still I have based these 
estimated damages which I have made on the 
odors.'' 
He knew there was a stink there that varies 
from day to day, probably could vary from year 
to year; he would say the smell is some kind of 
animal; he can't tell what, "something, I certain-
ly don't know just what I did smell.'' He does 
not know how many hours during the day or 
how many days during the week or ho'v many 
months during the year the smell would be pres-
ent; he didn't base his estimate on how many 
hours a day, how many days a week, or how many 
months a year it is there; he based it on his 
judgment; in his judgment it was a very bad 
smell (Abs. 265); he doesn't think he has stopped 
at the plant; he was on Reed Beck's farm when 
he remembers last smelling it; that was about a 
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year ago; that is the last time he has smelled this 
smell on any of these men's lands; he has smelled 
the pea vinery from the highway; he would con-
sider the pea vinery an industrial activity in that 
community located near the railroad; there are 
other industries in the community; there is the 
sugar factory, that is on the railroad; the pea 
vinery, the packing plant they call it, the flour 
mills ; he doesn't think they are all on the rail-
road; they are not more than a quarter of a 
mile away; he remembers the brick yard where 
the defendant's plant is located; that was an 
industry carried on in the community for many 
years ; there used to lie an alfalfa mill there ; he 
thinks that was on the railroad; from his experi-
ence in this county, most all the industries named 
would be located on or near the railroad. (Abs. 
266.) 
The witness was then asked the question, 
''It is your opinion, is it not, when a railroad 
goes through a certain section of land, it pretty 
much makes that land industrial~'' 
to which question the Court sustained on objection of the 
plaintiff, to which defendant duly excepted, and the 
principle of which is covered by Assignments of Error 
65 to 74, inclusive (Abs. 441-444). 
The community has been served by the Union 
Pacific, and the Rio Grande Railroad is about 
14 mile away. In arriving at his damage he did 
not take into consideration the railroad being 
there; he considered the railroad an asset rather 
than a detriment; he didn't think that trains pass-
ing daily emitting smoke, making a noise, would 
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be an elen1ent to take into consideration in in-
creasing rather than decreasing the value of the 
land imn1ediately adjoining the railroad right 
of "~ay: he thought it would decrease the lands on 
account of the railroad. His appraised values 
were given \Yithout consideration of the presence 
of the railroad; no\v that the railroad was called 
to his attention it may or 1nay not require some 
reduction in the value on account of the presence 
of the railroad ( Abs. 267) ; that he didn't take 
into consideration the pea vinery; he didn't think 
about it; if he were building a home he would 
prefer to be farther removed than nearer to the 
pea vinery; he has not at any time in any of his 
calculations given to the Court taken into consid-
eration the presence of the railroad or the pea 
vinery; his valuations were based on a continuous, 
rather than an intermittent smell (Abs. 268); he 
has one of these plants right against his fence 
and ''I don't like it;'' he never thought anything 
about this damage until day before yesterday; he 
has given it his superficial attention in the last 
few days as to the valuation of these properties; 
he has known the plaintiffs all his life ( Abs. 269) ; 
that the land would continue to produce as many 
and as bounteous crops in spite of the defendant's 
plant, the pea vinery (Abs. 270), the sugar factory 
or the railroad; a man's income would be the san1e 
from the land whether the plant was there or 
not; that they don't generally locate brick yards 
in the most fertile sections of farm land; the brick 
yard wouldn't affect the fertility of the surround-
ing farms; he has no more objection to the brick 
yard than the railroad; that so far as the intrinsic 
value of the land is concerned, there would be 
no difference; it is an advantage for men who are 
feeding livestock like many of these plaintiffs 
(Abs. 271) to have the pulp close at hand and to 
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have a railroad in the back yard and a pea vinery 
and rendering plant near by; it is essential to 
have some industry in connection with agricul-
ture ; the brick yard was an essential industry; 
if there were more industries in the community 
it would be even more prosperous; the value of 
the land has something to do with the prosperity 
of the community; if the industrial activities were 
doubled he thinks the values of the land in the 
vicinity of this plant would increase (Abs. 272); 
the steel plant at Springville is decidedly obnox-
ious; he wouldn't say the institution of that plant 
had decreased the value of property at Spring-
ville; he thinks it has helped Springville; the 
steel plant is about ten miles from defendant's 
plant; he has smelled the fumes from the steel 
plant a mile or so ; the sugar factory was built 
in Benjamin twenty years ago; the pea vinery 
four or five, he guesses; he didn't want s1noke 
from a brickyard in his back yard ; there are 
some disagreeable features to a brick yard (Abs. 
273) ; he doesn't like the smell of those industries 
{Abs. 274). 
Mr. Hawkins, another appraiser for the plaintiffs, 
appraised the damages at 14.7% of the appraised value 
that he placed on the property, and the appraiser An-
derson, for the plaintiffs (a brother of Rufus Anderson, 
one of the plaintiffs) appraised the damage at 13.2% 
of the appraised value, the same percentage as that 
used by the Court. The appraiser Johnson for the 
plaintiffs depreciated the land of Thomas Ludlow 10%, 
3.2% less than the Court. 
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The fact that the damages allowed by the Court are 
excessive appears certain when the evidence is con-
sidered, showing that the Court's damage exceeded the 
percentage of depreciation allowed by two of the plain-
tiffs' appraisers. It equalled a third. The values of the 
property upon 'vhich this percentage of damage oper-
ated, as found by the Court, exceeded plaintiff's own 
appraisal by $400, and amounted to three times the 
appraisal placed upon the property by the Tax Com-
mission. This damage was allowed in spite of the fact 
that the land will bring to its owner the same income 
with the plant there as with the plant removed. The 
$1,360 damage was awarded with no damage shown 
and with the use to which this plaintiff puts his property 
resulting in odors as offensive to some as the odors re-
sulting from defendant's operations. In any event, this 
plaintiff utilizes his property for industrial purposes, 
namely, stock feeding, and has acquiesced in and consent-
ed to the operation of defendant's plant from the begin-
ning by utilizing the services offered by defendant's 
plant in disposal of the animals which die on his land 
while feeding them there, and by purchasing by-pro-
ducts of the defendant's plant for the feeding of livestock 
upon his premises. 
In arriving at this result, the Court entirely ignored 
all of the evidence of the defendant introduced by four 
totally disinterested appraisers who made a careful and 
detailed study of the situation, taking into consideration 
all of the circumstances surrounding the community. 
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Let us look further into the evidence of the expert 
witnesses who testified for the plaintiffs. We have already 
discussed Mr. Thomas' testimony. Mr. Hawkins testi-
fied: 
He is engaged in farming and the live stock 
business in Benjamin; he was formerly county 
assessor of Utah County for ten years (Abs. 287); 
he has made some appraisals for the purpose of 
loans ; the only general experience he has had was 
as county assessor; he knows of no sales between 
individuals that didn't involve foreclosures in 
that community; he has had no experience with 
the sale of property in that community or else-
where (Abs. 289); he is different from many of 
the plaintiffs ; he couldn't work in the plant; the 
values which he gave were the percentage of 
depreciation which he would place upon the land 
because of his feelings toward the odor of de-
fendant's plant ( Abs. 292) ; the entire community 
is a cattle and farm land community; some of 
the pastures and lands of the plaintiffs are used 
largely in different parts of the year as stock 
yards and feed lots for the owners of cattle; he 
made no difference in the values he placed between 
lands used for stock yards and lands used purely 
for the growing of crops; he thinks chicken coops 
would be depreciated on account of the smell just 
as much as a home; he didn't take into consider-
ation the fact that in many instances (Abs. 299) 
the products of defendant's plant are used for 
chicken and cattle feed by the plaintiffs; he didn't 
take into consideration the fact that the defend-
ant's plant is a benefit to the community; there 
used to be a stock loading chute three-fourths of 
a mile away from the plant; a beet loading or beet 
storai'e arrangement on the Union Pacific tracks 
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was located on the san1e property as the plant; 
beets "'"ere stored there, cleaned and hauled on 
cars; that industry continued for a long time; 
there 'vas a wool loading platform there; the 
brick yard 'vas there for t\venty years; during 
that time the property of the defendant was used 
for industrial purposes; the sugar factory is with-
in a mile and a half; there are three features he 
considered in depreciating the property: odor, 
disease and obnoxious condition of flies (Abs. 
300). 
It will be noted that there is no evidence to sustain 
any danger from disease, and the evidence shows that 
the fly situation is the situation common throughout the 
county. The Court made no specific finding on anything 
but odor. It is difficult to see how much weight could 
be placed upon Mr. Hawkins' testimony when his tes-
timony is predicated upon such assumptions. Further-
more, he is the neighbor of the plaintiffs in Benjamin. 
The witness Thomas M. Anderson, as heretofore 
stated, is a brother of Rufus Anderson, one of the plain-
tiffs in this action. He testified: 
He never made appraisals in the district or 
in the vicinity of defendant's plant; his only ex-
perience is making appraisals as a member of the 
Spanish Fork Farm Loan Association; he never 
made any appraisals by himself; no one has ever 
acted on his judgment alone as to the value of 
lands (Abs. 307); he has never gone into the 
question of cost of building or replacement values ; 
he has only been interested in seeing that they 
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had adequate security for the loans which they 
make (Abs. 309). 
We call the Court's attention especially to his cross 
examination appearing at Abs. p. 316. It is apparent 
from his cross examination that the results reached in his 
appraisals on the various farms of the plaintiffs are not 
consistent, one with the other. 
The other expert witness, Lawrence C. Johnson, tes-
tified: (Abs. 331.) (He appraised land only.) 
He never had any experience with any other 
industrial plant depreciating property; he knows 
there are other industrial plants in Benjamin; he 
doesn't think the pea vinery depreciates Rufus 
Anderson's home; there would be no depreciation 
on account of the pea vinery, no matter how close 
the house was to it; there would be depreciation 
to land for living purposes close to a sugar fac-
tory; there is no depreciation in the value of the 
land for farming purposes; if there is any depre-
ciation it is for living purposes; he bought land 
in 1929 and 1930 and some in 1925 a mile from the 
plant; he owns quite a bit of land and he is in-
terested in keeping up the value of the land; he 
is looking to the time when he may sell his land; 
his mind is centered on doing everything he can 
to keep the price of that land up; he doesn't 
know much about the real estate business (Abs. 
331); he farms, that is all; except for a sale along 
about 1930 of two acres with a four room brick 
house on it, that is the only sale he has had with 
other people ; he doesn't recall any other sale ; the 
State Tax Commission re-appraised all the land 
in Benjamin about 1936; he took that appraisal 
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into consideration; they appraised lands as A, 
B, and C land; he doesn't remember how many 
acres he gave Rufus Anderson in Class A; he has 
an idea 60% ; he believes the rest would be Class 
B lands (Abs. 332). 
In connection with the further cross-examination of 
this witness, we call the Court's attention to the defend-
ant's proposed Exhibits 18 and 18-A, see Assignment 
of Error 49 (Abs. 437). These are the exhibits which 
indicate the State Tax Commission's classification and 
appraisal of these lands. This witness likewise admits 
that it is the ability of land to produce good crops which 
determines whether it is good or bad land. 
It was this last witness who depreciated T. E. Lud-
low's land only 10%, while the Court awarded damages 
to the extent of 13.2%. 
EARL LUDLOW 
The Court found Earl Ludlow's property to be worth 
$6,400 (Abs. 397). Earl Ludlow testified that he paid 
$6,000 for it fourteen years ago; he thinks it is now 
worth $9,500 (Abs. 133), but there is no evidence to show 
that prices of land were higher in 1938 than in 1924. 
Still the Court finds Earl Ludlow's property to be worth 
$400 more than he paid for it, with a forty year old 
house on it and no new improvements. Evidently the 
Court failed to depreciate the home in the last fourteen 
years in arriving at this excessive valuation. Based on 
that excessive valuation the Court allowed 14.8% damage. 
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It is difficult to understand why the property of 
Earl Ludlow, located 3300 feet west of the plant, should 
be allowed 14.8% damage, and his father, only 2915 feet 
northwest of the plant, should be allowed only 13.2%. 
Otherwise, the situation existing on both of these farms, 
as shown by the evidence, is substantially the same. They 
are both used primarily for stock feeding, and the pic .. 
tures attached to Exhibits 17-D and E, and Exhibits 
3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 indicate the nature of the property 
for which the Court has allowed thirteen and fourteen 
per cent depreciation on account of the presence of de-
fendant's plant. We call the Court's attention especially 
to the dead carcasses strewn throughout the feeding 
yards of Thomas Ludlow in Exhibit 3, the pile of burnt 
carcasses in Exhibit 4, the dead sheep in Exhibits 11 
and 12, and the condition of the stock yards of Earl Lud-
low in Exhibit 10. These exhibits, it is contended by 
defendant, indicate more eloquently than words the na-
ture of the community in which defendant's plant is lo-
cated, and the necessity in that community therefor. 
In viewing this damage it must be kept in mind that 
these places are more than half a mile away from the 
plant of the defendant. Mr. Thomas in his appraisal 
only allows 14.2% depreciation as against the Court's 
14.8%. Mr. Hawkins allows 17.3%, Mr. Anderson 
15.2% and Mr. Johnson 10% depreciation of the land. 
The Court allows 14.8%, in spite of the fact that defend-
ant's expert witnesses found no damage to this property, 
half a mile away. 
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EDWIN B. SELENE 
We pass to the case of Edwin (or Edward) B. 
Selene, with a 40-year old home occupied by Mr. Selene 
'vhile he "Torked for the defendant company as its em-
ployee .. A .. picture of this property is attached to Exhibit 
17-G. The plaintiff himself appraised this house at 
$2,000. The Court awarded this plaintiff $2,176 damage, 
$176 more than the total value of the home as fixed 
by the plaintiff himself. The condition of this property 
is shown on Exhibits 8 and 9. Note the close proximity 
of the stock yards to the home. 
The Court appraised this total property at $5,484.20 
(Abs. 397), and the damage at almost 40%. Mr. Thomas 
depreciated it 54%; ~fr. Hawkins 60%; Mr. Anderson 
59%. 1Ir. Anderson arrives at this 59% by taking 
30% depreciation on the land and 100% depreciation on 
the house and on the barn yard improvements. The Court 
outdid Mr. Anderson by allowing 40%. We respectfully 
submit that this must, under any view of the case, be 
taken as excessive. From a look at the pictures of the 
house and the improvements of the plaintiff Edwin B. 
Selene, Exhibits 8 and 9, and the further fact that Mr. 
Selene for some time was an employee of and is now 
a competitor of this very industry, it is difficult to see 
how there is any justification for any damage, much less 
40% allowed by the Court, or the 100% allowed on the 
house and improvements by the appraiser Anderson. 
Mr. Johnson allowed 33V3% on the land. 
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It should be born in mind that the properties shown 
In the exhibits last referred to with reference to the 
Selene and Ludlow properties were described in the sup-
plemental complaint of the plaintiff as a precinct ''dis-
tant from general traffic and industrial manufacture 
where the inhabitants are chiefly engaged in farming 
and agricultural pursuits; that on account of the situa-
tion and natural surroundings this locality has for more 
than fifty years last past been distinguished as a resi-
dential and farming section; that the principal and most 
valuable improvements in said precinct are rich farming 
lands, commodious and valuable hon1es surrounded by 
yards and gardens highly improved, ornamented and 
beautified; that on account of the repose, beauty and 
comfort of its situation and surroundings, said locality 
is peculiarly attractive and desirable as a farming com-
munity and is especially valuable for residential pur-
poses.'' This allegation of the complaint, of course, 
was never sustained by any proof, but entirely disproved 
by all the evidence and par_ticularly by the exhibits 
accurately portraying in photograph the exact nature 
of this locality. 
MARGARET D. HANSEN 
The property of Margaret D. Hansen is described 
in the complaint as 25.80 acres. Plaintiff's evidence is 
to the effect that the portion of their property on which 
the home is located and on which the son lives, is nine·. 
teen and a fraction acres; that this land stands in the 
name of his mother, Mrs. Margaret D. Hansen, otherwise 
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known as :nrrs. Heber Hansen, a plaintiff in this action, 
and the remaining sixteen acres in the estate of Heber 
Hansen, deceased. This would make a total of 35 acres. 
Whether the 25.80 acres described in the complaint is a 
part of this nineteen and sixteen acres is not disclosed 
in the evidence. ,~Vith the record in this condition as to 
title and ownership, the Court has taken into consider-
ation a value placed upon 25.80 acres and finds that 
acreage, together with the improvements, to be worth 
$7,944 (Abs. 398), and has depreciated that sum 14.2% 
allowing this plaintiff $1124.40 in damages. 
Plaintiff's testimony is that the total value of the 
property is $10,000, made up as follows: 26-year old 
home, $5,000; barns, pig-pens, etc, $2,100; and water, 
$3,000. This makes a total of $10,100 without any value 
placed on the land, in spite of the fact that the complaint 
alleges $10,000 as the total value of all, and the plaintiff's 
son testified that the entire property is worth $10,000. 
The Court in its findings finds the total value of all 
of the property would be $7,944. This must of necessity 
include the water, just as in the case of Edwin B. Selene 
there was $800 worth of water included and depreciated 
40% because of the presence of defendant's plant. In 
Mrs. Hansen's case we have $3,000 worth of water de-
preciated 14.2%. 
Why should the Court depreciate this property 
14.2%, only 1695 feet removed from defendant's 
plant, when it depreciates Earl Ludlow's 14.8%, nearly 
twice as far away, 3300 feet, and T. E. Ludlow 13.2%, 
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2915 feet away~ Mr. Thomas depreciates this same 
property the same percentage as the Court, 14.2%; Mr. 
Hawkins 19.6% and Mr. Anderson 21.4%. Mr. John-
son depreciates the land 20%. Exhibit 17-C and Exhibits 
6 and 14 are typical pictures of the industrial agricultural 
section in which these plaintiffs live, and not the exclu-
sive residential district pleaded. 
JOHN ANGUS 
The home of John Angus is 1875 feet away from 
the plant, roughly 200 feet farther than that of Mrs. 
Hansen. The Court awards Mrs. Hansen 14.2% damage 
and John Angus 23%. John Angus alleges in the com-
plaint that his property is worth $3,000; that his prop-
erty at the time defendant built its plant was worth 
$2,685, to which $400 has been added since, making a 
total of $3,085. His property is shown in Exhibit 17-B. 
For some unexplained reason the Court appraised this 
property at $3,568.50 (Abs. 398)-$900 more than the 
property was admittedly worth at the time the defend-
ant built its plant-and the damages are 23% of this 
excessive appraisal, whereas in the case of Mrs. Hansen, 
living closer to the plant, the Court's appraisal was more 
than $2,000 below hers, and only 14.2% of the lower 
appraisal was awarded her in damages. It is submitted 
that there is nothing in the evidence to justify 40% for 
E. B. Selene and only 13% for Thomas E. Ludlow except 
the difference in the distance of the property of the re-
spective plaintiffs from the plant, and that there is 
nothing to justify the greater percentages allowed the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
53 
more distant properties, as in the case of John Angus 
and as we have already pointed out in the Earl Ludlow 
case. 
Mr. Thomas, plaintiffs' appraiser, depreciated this 
property only 21%, 2% less than the Court, and his 
appraised value 'vas less than the Court's. He allowed 
in dollars and cents $7 40 damage, and the Court awarded 
$824. Hawkins awarded 39%, Anderson 30% and John ... 
son 20%. The Court is 3% higher than Johnson on 
Johnson's depreciation of the land. 
John Angus testified he owned $350 worth of water, 
23% of which he was awarded as damages, with no 
evidence whatsoever as to any depreciation or loss of 
value in the water; in fact, none is conceivable. Hawkins 
depreciated the property of John Angus 20%, Anderson 
15% and Johnson 20% on the land, whereas the Court 
depreciated the Angus property 23%, higher than any 
one of the four appraisers of the plaintiff, and on a 
basis of $900 more than the plaintiff testified the prop-
erty was worth. Here is a clear case in which the Court 
has exceeded, so far as the depreciation of the land is 
concerned, the appraisements of all of the witnesses, the 
plaintiff included, and has allowed, in addition, the dam-
age to the depreciation on the water. This is one of 
the numerous inevitable results of a misjoinder of eleven 
common law causes of action for damage in one action. 
Such an error on the part of the Court could not have 
been made, had there not been this misjoinder. This 
does, however, compel a reversal of the judgment of the 
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lower court, because this appraisal of damage is beyond 
any evidence offered in the case. 
We are basing these comparisons upon percentage 
rather than upon any other basis because, so far as can 
be ascertained from the findings of fact, the Court fig-
ured the damage on a percentage basis, as is definitely 
shown by the Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 15 and 16 
( Abs. 400, 401). This basis was also resorted to by the 
expert witnesses for the plaintiff. By careful analysis 
predicated upon a percentage basis, the excessiveness of 
the judgment is clearly demonstrated with mathematical 
exactness. 
JOHN ANDERSON 
The property shown in the name of the plaintiff 
John Anderson was depreciated 48% and he was given 
damages for that amount in the sum of $1,050, without 
having proved any title to the property. In fact, Mr. 
Anderson testified : ''None of this property stands in 
my name. It is in the wife's name." (Abs. 114.) The 
wife was not a party to the suit. With no other evidence 
concerning the title the Court allowed John Anderson 
damages. This, of course, is a prejudicial error to the 
defendant because this action would not bar the owner 
of the property bringing an action in her own right. 
John Anderson's home is farther away from the 
plant than that of Edwin B. Selene. Selene's property 
was depreciated 40% and John Anderson's, ten feet 
farther away from the plant, 635 feet, was depreciated 
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48%. The plaintiff testified the value of his home was 
$1,240. The amount of damage awarded, $1,050, is al-
most 100% of the value of the home. This item of damage 
carries ''ith it -±8% of $450 worth of water. It is the 
exact amount of damage in dollars and cents allowed by 
~lr. Thomas, representing 51% of the appraised value 
of ~Ir. Thon1as. ~Ir. Hawkins allowed 62lf2%, Mr. An-
derson 66%, and Johnson 331j3% on the land. To arrive 
at 66% ~fr. Anderson depreciated the house, the barn 
and other farm improvements 100% and the land 30%, 
18% less than the Court depreciated the land. Mr. Thom-
as depreciated the land 25%, the Court 48%. Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit B and Defendant's Exhibits 19 and 20 show the 
condition of this property. 
The John Anderson damage amounts to practically 
$200 an acre, and represents an amount equal to the 
total value of the land. Whatever improvements were 
placed upon this land were placed there after the plant 
was built. He testified (Abs. 108) that he started to build 
there in December 1934, a year and a half after the 
defendant located its plant there in April or May, 1933. 
(Abs. 57.) 
According to the rule of law for which we contend, 
it is the value of the property at the time the business 
was initiated that controls. (See p. 100 of this brief.) 
This would place John Anderson, if he were the owner, in 
the same position as Edward Ludlow and Maylan Car-
ter, with unimproved land, for which the Court has given 
him damages in excess of 100% of the value of the land. 
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This is another glaring result of not only a misjoinder 
but a confusion of causes of action. The machinery of 
the law is not set up to try ten separate and distinct 
common law actions for damage at one and the same 
tilne. 
RUFUS ANDERSON 
The home of Rufus Anderson, depicted in defend-
ant's Exhibit 17 -A, is 970 feet from the defendant's 
plant. The complaint alleges his property to be of a 
value of $7,000 (Abs. 5, 30). The plaintiff's testimony 
was to the same effect (Abs. 118), of which $7,000 
$1,000 was water (Abs. 120). The Court finds the value 
of this property (Abs. 400) to be $7,396.60, and awards 
the plaintiff 28.4% thereof in damages in the sum of 
$2,099.32. The value found by the ~ourt is more than 
four times the appraised value of land and improvements 
as found by the State Tax Commission. The home on 
this property is 25 years old. The Court finds, Finding 
15 (Abs. 400), that the land, exclusive of the improve-
ments, is worth $4,296.60; that the improvements as now 
constructed on the land are worth $3,100. 
At the time defendant commenced its operations the 
improvements on the land were $1,200. The additional 
improvements were added between the time defendant 
began its business and the time its plant burned down 
in 1937. The Court allowed 20% damage on the land 
and 40% on the improvements as they now are and as 
they were at the time the plant was rebuilt. The Court 
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does not find in any of these cases the value of the land 
at the time the defendant con1menced operations, name-
ly, Apri11933, but makes all of its findings with reference 
to land as of the date of the trial, which is not the con-
trolling date, as will specifically hereinafter appear (see 
p. 100 of this brief), and except for the improvements 
on the lands of Rufus Anderson and Paul E. Swartz, 
there is no finding as to what the value of the improve-
ments was at the time the defendant began its operations. 
In the cases of Rufus Anderson and Paul E. Swartz, 
even after n1aking this finding with reference to the 
value at the time of commencement of operations by de-
fendant, the Court does not use the figure thus found, 
but rather the value of the improvements at the time 
of the remodeling or rebuilding of the defendant's plant 
in 1937. This, it is contended, leaves the record with no 
evidence on which to predicate values as of the con-
trolling date, in the event the Court were to find that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to recover permanent rather than 
temporary damages. This being the case, the Court has 
awarded excessive damages to Anderson in any event to 
the extent of 40% of the difference between $1,200 and 
$3,100, and has likewise in this case included 40% of the 
$1,000 worth of water in the total value depreciated. 
Thomas depreciated the property 36.6%, Hawkins 
62%, Anderson depreciated his own brother's property 
57%, and Johnson depreciated the land 33V3%. But even 
depreciating his own brother's property, the appraiser 
Anderson only depreciated the lands of his brother 30%, 
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whereas the Court depreciated it 20%, with no evidence 
to sustain a finding of any injury to the land, its produc-
tivity, its fertility, or the income therefrom, its value hav-
ing, therefore, not in any wise been affected. by defend-
ant's plant. The Court depreciated the land as much as the 
plaintiffs' appraiser Thomas, that is, approximately 
20%. Rufus Anderson appraised his own 25 year old 
home at $2,600. The damage of $2,099.32 almost entirely 
wipes out the value of the house. 
PAUL E. SWARTZ 
According to the Court's finding, Paul E. Swartz 
lives 2335 feet from the plant. According to Exhibit 
17-H, it is 3960 feet, % of a mile. It was assumed 
throughout the trial that Swartz' home was the farthest 
away from the plant of any. If the 2335 feet figure of 
the Court is correct, then Earl Ludlow is the farthest 
removed. 
The Court depreciated this property an average of 
15%, based on a total value of $8,250.40 (Abs. 401), the 
value of the property at the time the defendant rebuilt 
the plant. This damage was actually arrived at by taking 
12% of the value of the land at the time of the trial and 
20% of the value of the improvements in 1937 at the 
time of the fire. The Court can certainly not be right 
in taking the value at both dates; either one date or the 
other 1nust control, and in the theory of defendant's 
case, neither time can control but we must go back to 1933 
when defendant began its operations. The temporary 
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break in operations during the rebuilding of the plant 
after the fire does not present a controlling date. The total 
value at the time of the trial was found by the Court to 
be $10,252.40. The plaintiff alleged a total value of 
$10,000 ( Abs. 6, 31), and in his oral testimony the 
plaintiff claimed $3,000 (_..<\_bs. 107) of that value was in 
water. 
Thomas depreciated the total property 14.6% as 
against the Court's 15%, Hawkins' 27.6%. This prop-
erty was not appraised by Anderson, and Johnson de-
preciated the land 20%. The value found by the Court 
is higher than the allegations of the complaint and the 
percentage of damage greater than that found by plain-
tiffs' appraiser Thomas. 
MA YLAN CARTER 
There was no finding by the Court as to the distance 
the land owned by Maylan Carter was removed from the 
plant. This 15.48 acres is unimproved property. The 
complaint alleges a total value of $2,500 (Abs. 5, 31). The 
Court found a total value of $2,786.40 (Abs. 399), $286.40 
more than the allegations of the complaint, and awarded 
23% of this $646.60 damages on this unimproved prop-
erty. The appraiser Thomas for the plaintiff appraised 
the damage at $619.20, substantially less than the Court, 
at 20.5% of Thomas' appraised value. Hawkins appraised 
the loss at 41%, Anderson at 30% and Johnson at 
33V3%. 
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There is no evidence of any damage to this land. 
There are no improvements on the land which could 
have been damaged. No one has ever lived on the land, 
so far as the evidence shows. Defendant contends there 
is no basis whatsoever for the allowance of damage in 
this case. 
This value of $2,786.40 includes a full water right, 
the value of which was not given in evidence. 
After both parties had rested, the Court dismissed 
the case as to Maylan Carter (Abs. 259), on motion of 
the defendant (Abs. 145), on the ground and for the 
reason that there was no evidence adduced by the plain-
tiff and no evidence before the Court in support of any 
allegation of the complaint of the plaintiff, so far as 
Maylan Carter was concerned. Thereafter, without any 
further proceedings, Maylan Carter appears as a plain-
tiff in the supplemental complaint. The original action 
was also dismissed as against Edward M. Beck and 
James Albert West. Edward M. Beck was likewise joined 
as a party to the supplemental complaint. The joinder 
of Beck and Carter was error, unless we proceed upon 
tlie assumption that after the case has been partially 
tried to the Court as an equity case and the Court makes 
and enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
as to certain of the plaintiffs, and dismisses the others 
from the equity case, retaining jurisdiction of the case 
so far as the remaining plaintiffs are concerned for 
further action at law, that anybody and everybody, 
strangers to the original equity proceedings, might then 
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be joined in a suit (in equity), along with the remaining 
plaintiffs, to have their legal causes of action determined 
by a court of equity rather than by a court of law, and 
be judged by evidence adduced at the main hearing 
before they became parties. The mere statement of such 
a proposition should cause it to fall by its own weight 
as being 'vholly unsound and depriving the defendant of 
its right of trial by jury. The cause of action alleged 
in the supplemental complaint in favor of Edward M. 
Beck was finally dismissed by the Court, but Carter was 
awarded his damages as indicated. 
EDWARD LUDLOW 
The Court awarded Edward Ludlow 25% damages 
on account of the injury to his 8.15 unimproved acres of 
land, although he testified: 
The record title in these ten acres is not in 
me. It hasn't been, I think, for two years. It 
hasn't been since this law suit started (Abs. 137). 
Thomas would have allowed him 331j3 %, Hawkins 
50%, Anderson 29.4% and Johnson 331j3%. There was 
no finding by the Court as to the distance of Ed Lud-
low's property from the plant. The Court depreciated 
plaintiff's water rights to make up damage allowed. 
Value of Water Rights 
This gave to the plaintiffs a total judgment of 
$11,868.19 against the defendant. We have the evidence 
of six plaintiffs as to the value of their water rights 
and the value of the water rights of the other four are 
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not shown by the evidence. $1992.50 of this $11,868.19 is 
represented by depreciation to the water of these plain-
tiffs. How much more than this we do not know. If the 
same_. proportion holds out for the other four that has 
for these six, this $1,992 might well be increased by two-
thirds, making roughly $3,320 damage on account of de-
preciation of water out of a total damage of $11,868.19. 
For such a result there is no legal justification. In order 
that there be no question as to how defendant arrives at 
the $1,992, the following figures are given: 
Value of 
Water 
E. B. Selene ________________ $800 
M. D. Hansen ____________ 3000 
John Angus ---------------- 350 
John Anderson __________ 900 
Rufus Anderson ________ 1000 
Paul E. Swartz __________ 3000 
Depreciation 
40 % 
14.2% 
23 % 
48 % 
28.4% 
15 % 
DEFENDANT'S APPRAISERS 
$320 
426 
80.50 
432 
284 
450 
$1992.50 
Throughout the foregoing discussion defendant has 
merely mentioned the fact that its expert appraisers 
found no damage in the value of the property on account 
of the operation of defendant's plant. Defendant's ap-
praisers were entirely disinterested. Charles S. Wood-
ward testified : 
His business is real estate; he lives in Salt 
Lake. He has been familiar with the town of 
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Benja1nin and surroundings since 1898. He knows 
the people 'vho live there and is related to most 
of them (Abs. 183). He had twenty years' ex-
perience with Ashton-Jenkins Company and Tor-
onto Company selling, buying and appraisin~ real 
estate. In his business with Ashton-Jenkins Com-
pany he had occasion to appraise property in Utah 
County and as far south in Utah as Cedar City. 
He has been familiar with property in and about 
Benjamin for the past eighteen years, and been 
a licensed realtor for twenty years. Hi5 apprais-
als as testified are contained in Exhibits 17 to 
17 -H, inclusive, set forth in the appendix to the 
abstract of record, and gives in each instance the 
basis of his appraisal (Abs. 184). 
This witness testified in the original trial when the 
only question before the Court was the granting of in-
junctive relief, and at a time when no damages were 
asked or sought by the plaintiffs. 
Mr. Heal, who made an appraisal together with 
William Parry of Springville and Henry Jeppson of 
Payson, testified: 
He lives at Provo. He has been in the real 
estate business exclusively for twenty-five years 
in Utah County. That has been his sole occupa-
tion. He is generally familiar with land values for 
agricultural, industrial and home purposes in and 
about Benjamin. At the request of the defend-
ant he made a survey and arrived at what he con-
sidered the fair market value of the plaintiff's 
property in the action (Abs. 351). 
Mr. Parry, of Springville, testified: 
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He has been in the real estate business for 
13 years and maintains an office in Springville; 
his real estate business involves transactions and 
listings in Spanish Fork down to Lake Shore, in-
cluding Benjamin; he is familiar with land values 
in Benjamin; he has purchased and sold property 
for his customers in Utah for 13 years (Abs. 365); 
he has a regular real estate dealer's license from 
the State of Utah (Abs. 366). 
Henry Jeppson, of Payson, testified: 
He has lived in that vicinity since 1909 and 
is intimately acquainted in Benjamin. He is a 
building contractor ( Abs. 366) and holds a gen-
eral builder's license from the State of Utah; he 
has been actively engaged in the contracting busi-
ness since 1928; there are very few people in the 
town of Benjamin he is not acquainted "\Vith; he is 
familiar with the location of defendant's plant 
and location of the pea vinery; the odors of the 
pea vinery ar~ so much worse than the plant that 
there is no comparison; the odors of the sugar 
factory are not so intense as the pea vinery; he 
has been present at the defendant's plant and 
on the premises of these plaintiffs at various 
times (Abs. 367); he had a conversation with 
practically every one of the plaintiffs as he made 
his survey; all made statements as to the density 
of the smell and called his attention to that fact; 
in making these appraisals he_ took into considera-
tion what was said by them, as well as his own 
observations (Abs. 368). 
The appraisers for the defendant found that the 
values they gave were the fair values of the property 
either with or without the plant, and testified, so far as 
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the Court would permit the1n so to testify that the section 
was industrial, and that the plant was located in a suit-
able place. 
There "\Yere introduced in this case Exhibits 21 
and 21-A to 21-G, inclusive. These pictures were taken 
from the roof of the defendant's plant, Clyde Hicken, 
manager of defendant's plant, testifying concerning them 
as follows: 
Exhibit 21 is a view of the Ed Selene property 
on the opposite side of the railroad and' spur 
track, leading to defendant's property. 21 is look-
ing north; 21-A represents a view immediately 
left of 21; 21-B a view left (Abs. 204) of 21-A. 
The camera is looking sort of to the northwest 
when 21-A was taken. 21-B you are looking west. 
21-B shows the homes of Thomas Ludlow, Earl 
Ludlo'v and Jack Angus. The Thomas Ludlow 
property is marked with circle (1). Circle (2) 
is Earl Ludlow's property, and (3) is Jack Angus' 
property. C is immediately left of B; the home 
of Rufus Anderson is shown in this picture at 
the left edge and across the tracks ( Abs. 205). 
This is the property on which the appraiser, Ander-
son, brother: of one of the plaintiffs, depreciated the 
home and farm buildings 100%, and that the Court de-
preciated 40%. 
21-D is immediately to the left of 21-C. The 
Hansen home is shown below the mark (1) in the 
circle. The home is located on the other side of 
the state highway. The old sump of the brick 
yard is shown in the foreground. You are looking 
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south in 21-D. 21-E is to the left of D and looking 
southeast; the property of Ed Ludlow is immedi .. 
ately between the road and the fence shown in 
the foreground and immediately adjoining the 
property of the defendant. Exhibit 21-F is to 
the left of E, shows the roof of the plant in the 
foreground and beyond that the su1np. The dis-
tance away from any homes on the east is readilY, 
noted. This is looking about east. Exhibit 21-G 
is to the left of F and to the right of Exhibit 21. 
On this exhibit the houses of the defendant and 
John Anderson's house are shown. The John 
Anderson house is in the background (Abs. 205). 
The witness, Clyde Hicken, lives in the house in the 
foreground belonging to the defendant, with his wife and 
one child, 300 feet from defendant's plant. He says: 
I have lived there a year and have not been 
bothered by the odors which emanate from this 
plant. It has not in any wise prevented me fro1n 
eating my meals regularly or affected my sleep 
or my health. My wife and child are in good 
health (Abs. 206). 
Appellant, in light of foregoing, should have been 
granted a new trial because of the excessiveness of the 
damages awarded, and this on the assumption that a 
cause of action for damages was proven, something ap-
pellant strongly urges was not done. 
Inasmuch as this case was tried and considered by 
the lower court as an equity case, it is proper for this 
Court to review both questions of law and fact, upon 
this appeal. 
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Although it is appellant's contention that from the 
plaintiffs' evidence alone it is apparent that the dam ... 
ages awarded by the Court are excessive, and that in fact 
no cause of action exists because of the nature of the 
community and the propriety of the location of defend-
ant's plant as located, appellant nevertheless feels justi-
fied in calling the Court's attention on this appeal speci-
fically to the evidence offered in behalf of the defend-
ant, which, to arrive at the result the lower Court did, 
had to be wholly ignored. 
Defendant's Exhibit 16 illustrates the locality sur-
rounding defendant's plant and the approximate dis-
tances to the lands of the plaintiffs and others from 
defendant's plant. This exhibit shows the relative loca-
tion of the railroad tracks and just how sparsely popu-
lated the land is around the plant. The one home nearest 
the plant belongs to the defendant. 
. .. 
After plaintiffs had rested and defendant began its 
case, plaintiffs' case was re-opened for the purpose of 
taking the testimony of Lloyd N. Farner, a licensed 
physician and surgeon (Abs. 153). He testified that he 
was a deputy state health commissioner. On cross exam-
ination (Abs. 156) his attention was called to defendant's 
Exhibits 3 to 14, consisting of pictures of plaintiffs' 
homes and surroundings. 
He stated in reference to Exhibit 3 that it 
presented an unsanitary condition which the lo-
cal authorities should see is cleaned up; that 
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Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, show unsanitary 
conditions from which odors emanate and per~ 
meate the homes that are shown in the pictures; 
that these pictures of the premises surrounding 
the homes of the plaintiffs show a condition con-
ducive to the breeding of flies and rats; that the 
plant of the defendant (Abs. 157) is the only 
rendering plant in the State he ever visited; 
(Abs. 159) that he particularly observed when he 
visited the plant that there were not very many 
live flies; he found some dead ones; outside of the 
plant he found a septic tank that took care of 
the contents from the plant (Abs. 160); that was 
a proper place to have them go (Abs. 161); Ex-
hibits 2 to 14, inclusive, show a community in 
which you would expect to find a lot of flies ( Abs. 
162) ; he didn't smell any odor from the defend-
ant's plant in any one of the homes of the plain-
tiffs; he thinks the odors from defendant's plant 
would be stronger and would carry farther in the 
atmosphere than the odors emanating from the 
corrals and barn yards in the vicinity of the 
plant (Abs. 163). 
Defendant's first witness was a man by the name 
of William Bona, who testified : 
He lives in Benjamin south of the plant; he 
rents the house directly across the road from 
Mrs. Hansen, one of the plaintiffs ; half a mile 
from defendant's plant and three-fourths of a 
mile from the pea vinery (Abs. 164); he didn't 
smell the odors from the plant as long as he 
has lived in the house ; before the plant came dead 
animals could be found in the · fields, very few 
were buried; since the plant came he has seen 
very few dead animals lying around like they 
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used to (Abs. 165) ; he has seen thirty head out 
in the field dead at the same time (Abs. 166). 
William Chambers (Abs. 166) next testified: 
That he had never had any connection with 
the plant or its employees or the owner; that he 
sa\v dead animals around before the plant started; 
that since the plant can1e he hasn't noticed any. 
Joseph Hughes, of Spanish Fork, a physician and 
surgeon of twenty-eight years' practice, and deputy 
county physician, the family physician of some of the 
plaintiffs, testified: (Abs. 168) 
That he has observed the odor at one of their 
homes; that it is his opinion defendant's plant 
is a sanitary method of disposing of dead ani-
mals and animal matter; that the plant serves 
a needed purpose in that community; that the 
community since the establishment of this plant 
with reference to dead animals and refuse is in a 
condition better than it was prior; that the odors 
emanating from the plant are not injurious, just 
disagreeable; they could not in any wise affect 
health (Abs. 170); odor from the pea vinery is 
just about as bad as the odor from the defend-
ant's plant; that disagreeable odor comes from 
the pulp dump at the beet factory; (Abs.175) that 
the odor is more pronounced at Mr. Anderson's 
home; the one that lives near the plant; that 
would all depend on the trend of the winds; that 
he hasn't smelled the odor of the plant in any of 
the homes of the other plaintiffs (Abs. 176); flies 
are not bred in this plant; they are generally 
bred around manure piles, pig pens and barn 
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yards; you don't have rats around cement floors; 
he was familiar with the fields of the plaintiffs 
prior to the coming of the plant '(Abs. 177); gen-
erally dead animals were left to decay in the 
open ; he has had to notify the marshal to see 
that they were buried; a scene of the kind shown 
in Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 14 were not uncommon 
in the Benjamin district; these pictures show 
places conducive to the breeding of flies and rats; 
they are not sanitary and not entirely inoffensive 
as far as odor is concerned ; these pictures show 
a situation worse than the defendant's plant. 
Why, in view of this statement of the plaintiffs' 
own family doctor, did the Court find that this plant 
is a nuisance to these plaintiffs in that community? Can 
they hold others up to a high standard of sanitation and 
require them to maintain an odorless business when their 
own business of feeding cattle in the same vicinity creates 
a worse situation~ How could the lower Court, in mak-
ing its findings and sitting as a court of equity, ignore 
the testimony of both Dr. Farner, produced by the plain-
tiffs as a witness, and Dr. Hughes, known by the Court 
to be the most eminent physician in that community? 
The doctor finally says (Abs. 180): 
That he knows enough about the odor of the 
pea vinery to know that it is worse than the odor 
coming from defendant's plant when you get up 
to it. 
Fred R. Taylor was next called and testified: (Abs. 
180). 
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That he is a physician and surgeon residing 
in Provo, with nineteen years' experience as a 
practitioner; that he gave the employees of the 
defendant's plant a physical examination and 
found them to be healthy and to be suffering 
from no ailment in any wise attributable to their 
employment in defendant's plant (Abs. 181); 
that the plant as maintained and operated is in a 
sanitary condition. 
Charles S. Woodward, the next witness, has lived 
in the community and has been acquainted with the com-
munity all his life. He likewise testified to the fact that 
animals were permitted to rot where they fell (Abs. 185); 
that the odors emanating from John Angus' place were 
such that he could not determine whether the odors came 
from his manure pile or defendant's plant (Abs. 186). 
Zora Warthen ( Abs. 192) lived in the same house 
as the witness Bona across the street from Mrs. Hansen 
for fifteen months, during which time she did not smell 
any odors from the defendant's plant, that far away. 
The witness, Ed C. Thomsen (Abs. 193) is engaged 
in cleaning out ditches around the community; he testi-
fied that before the plant came there were always dead 
animals lying along the ditch, dead cows, horses and 
sheep. Now he does not find them there. 
John W. Staker lives half a mile southeast of the 
plant (Abs. 194); has lived there thirty-three years; he 
thinks that the plant is a good thing for the community; 
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it gets rid of dead an'imals; that he had smelled the 
plant only once since February, during heavy winds. 
Clyde Hicken, manager for the defendant testified: 
(Abs. 197) 
That he has purchased for the defendant dead 
animals from Thomas Ludlow, Paul Swartz, Gene 
Hansen, Earl Ludlow, and they have purchased 
the products of the plant; he has sold them tank-
age, which consists of cooked meat and bones; 
it is the product of the cooker; it is used to fatten 
pigs; Exhibits 1 to 14 are further explained by 
this witness, pointing out specifically the dead 
animals shown in these pictures on the premises 
of plaintiffs ; these pictures were taken during the 
trial (Abs. 207) ; the operation of the plant was 
detailed by the witness. 
Dr. Maurice G. Taylor of Salt Lake City Board of 
Health investigates causes and sources of disease (Abs. 
213) ; stated that all germs are killed in the cooking pro-
cess of the defendant plant; he does not know of any 
disease present in Utah which could be carried by flies 
from defendant's plant; health agencies generally con-
sider dead animals should be disposed of by some heat-
Ing process. 
Warren E. Rasmussen (Abs. 219), a veterinarian 
duly licensed to practice his profession in this state stated 
that he is familiar with the rendering plants in other 
counties in Utah; that the Benjamin plant is maintained 
and operated in a sanitary condition. 
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R. W. Richter ( Abs. 221) testified: 
That he has been en1ployed by the Cudahy 
Packing Company for 22 years; is the supervisor 
of the by-products plant there; the Cudahy Pack-
ing Company maintains a similar plant to defend-
ant's plant under the same roof with their packing 
plant at Salt Lake City where fresh meat is packed 
for human consumption ; the rendering plant has 
been operated there for 22 years; the process 
being used by defendant is substantially the same 
as in the Cudahy plant; the defendant's plant is 
operated in a sanitary condition; he never saw 
any employee of the Cudahy Packing Company 
working in the rendering plant become ill because 
of his employment; the gases are condensed or 
burned and thus killed (Abs. 224); he knows of 
no better way to dispose of the gases of the 
cooker than by burning; there are homes within 
two blocks of the Cudahy plant; never heard of 
any people complaining about the odors from the 
rendering plant (Abs. 224); the Cudahy plant is 
in as much of a residential section as defendant's 
plant in Benjamin (Abs. 225); they take care of 
all of the dead animals from the stockyards in 
North Salt Lake and all animals that are found 
diseased through federal inspection and ordered 
killed are handled in their rendering plant. 
Clyde Hicken resumed his testimony concerning the 
operation of defendant's plant: (Abs. 227) 
90% of the animals handled by the defendant 
come from Utah County (Abs. 231); not one of 
the plaintiffs ever complained to him about the 
plant; he was employed before the old plant 
burned down; the old building was corrugated 
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tin; the floors were concrete and frame; the new 
building is all concrete and brick; they never had 
any condensers in the old plant ; then the steam 
and the odors from the cooker went straight into 
the air; Thomas Ludlow told him within the year 
the new plant was a great improvement over the 
old; that the plant was being kept in good condi-
tion. 
Iona Rigtrup, an employee of the defendant in Idaho 
Falls, and her sister, Lenore Hicken, the wife of de-
fendant's manager at Benjamin, testified they did not 
get the odors from the plant in their home and had never 
observed it in Clyde Hicken's home when they have 
visited there. 
P. H. Soble, general manager of the defendant tes-
tified: (Abs. 238) 
They operate twenty plants located in Texas, 
Colorado, Utah, and Idaho; in Utah they have 
rendering plants in Logan, Ogden, Spanish Fork 
and Heber City; in Salt Lake City they have a 
hide and fur house; the last plant to be built was 
the Spanish Fork or Benjamin plant, begun in 
1933 and operated continuously there ever since, 
even during the time they were burned down they 
operated as a receiving station (Abs. 239); the 
building as it now stands represents an investment 
of approximately $30,000; the plant is just east of 
the Union Pacific and west of the D. & R. G. (Abs. 
240) six-tenths of a mile from the pea vinery; 
two miles from the sugar factory ( Abs. 241) ; all 
the gases now enter underneath the grate and are 
positively burned; cannot get away (Abs. 242); 
the new plant is rat proof (Abs. 243); the only 
animals that they take are fresh; they kill 20% 
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of the animals themselves; much is fresh meat 
from the butchers; the fire box temperature is 
approximately 1350 degrees; the hydro1 carbon 
gases coming from the cookers are consumed at 
550 degrees temperature; the Ogden plant is with-
in the city limits of Ogden; homes are within 
2% blocks. 
It 'vas stipulated that Dr. Flescher, a graduate 
chemical engineer, residing in Salt Lake City, and Mr. 
Harrison, a graduate combustion engineer and consult-
ing engineer residing and practicing his profession in 
Salt Lake City (Abs. 258-9), would testify that the gases 
which come from the rendering of animal substances, as 
the non-condensable gases, are hydrocarbon gases, and 
hydrocarbon gases are entirely consumed at temperatures 
between 550 and 650 degrees, and that the temperatures 
to which these gases were previously subjected in de-
fendant's plant on occasions was as low as from 500 to 
600 degrees; that since lowering the point of injection of 
these gases in the furnace they are now compelled to 
pass through a temperature of from 1200 to 1350 de-
grees. This evidence stands uncontradicted. 
This judgment of $11,868.19 which the Court has 
awarded the plaintiffs is on the basis of damage to 189.15 
acres, or $62.75 per acre without water, almost as much 
as the land is worth. Damage to such an extent cannot 
under any circumstances be upheld as reasonable and 
not excessive, in light of all the evidence in this case. 
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SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 1 
Specification of error No. 1 is based upon errors 
arising out of the overruling of the general and special 
demurrers of the defendant to the amended and supple-
mental complaints of the plaintiffs. 
The demurrer and motion filed against the supple-
mental complaint of plaintiffs presents the question of 
the right of the plaintiffs, each claiming to own separate 
parcels of real estate, to amend their complaint to the 
extent of transforming the action into one for damages, 
when the original action was maintained by them jointly 
to obtain nothing but equitable relief, and when any 
equitable relief had been denied them by the Court. 
The basic fact, as we have pointed out, is that this 
plant, according to plaintiffs, is located in a residential 
district, and to locate such a plant in such a district 
made the plant a nuisance regardless of the careful man-
ner in which the plant may have been or might in the 
future be operated. The defendant contends that the 
plaintiffs cannot, at the conclusion of the equity case, 
amend their pleadings and, by means of a supplemental 
or new complaint, proceed upon a new theory and join 
eleven separate and distinct legal causes of action into 
one simply because they had previously been joined 
under the original complaint for the purpose of seeking 
equitable relief. This complaint is not an amended com-
plaint. It is a supplemental action and is exclusively 
legal in character. Defendant cannot by such a method 
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be deprived of its right of trial by jury. See State v. 
Hart, 26 Ut. 229. ~L\.. supplen1ental complaint serves 
the purpose of raising issues which do not exist at 
the time of filing the original complaint. If we 
treat this supplemental complaint as an amended com-
plaint, then the demurrer should still be sustained. Un-
der the authorities in this jurisdiction, had the alle-
gations of the supplemental complaint been incorporated 
in the original complaint, the defendant would have been 
entitled to have each cause of action separately stated 
and separately tried before a jury. Felt City Townsite 
Co. v. Felt Inv. Co., 50 Ut. 364. Plaintiffs cannot deprive 
defendant of this right by splitting this cause of action 
into an equitable action to be tried first and a legal 
one to be tried second . 
. Demurrer Should Have Been Sustained to 
Supplemental Complaint 
Causes of Action Split 
Courts have said and, in a way, still say that it 
must be established that there is a legal wrong before 
equity will interfere. Norback v. Board of Directors, 84 
Ut. 506. No court has ever said that a plaintiff should 
be required or permitted to establish, first, his equity 
right, and then thereafter proceed at law. Such a course 
of procedure is an absolute reversal of the order that 
was originally established. 
The plaintiffs in effect contend that they may split 
their causes of action and sue first for equitable relief, 
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and· failing in this they may thereafter pursue their 
right to damages at law in a court of equity. 
In order to properly appreciate the error contained 
in the contention of the plaintiffs we must ascertain the 
fundamental concept of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
and to do this we start with this provision contained in 
the Constitution of Utah which is common to all codes. 
It provides : 
''There shall be but one form of civil action, 
and law and equity may be administered in the 
same action. '' 
Sec. 19, Art. VIII, Utah Constitution. 
In the case of Naylor v. Jensen, 38 Ut. 310, 113 
Pac. 73, the Supreme Court used the following language: 
''The Constitution of this state in section 19 
of Article 8 provide 'there shall be but one form 
of action, and law and equity n1ay be administered 
in the same action.' No doubt the framers of the 
Constitution thereby intended to permit the par-
ties to actions to dispose of all questions whether 
legal or equitable, in one and the same action." 
Certainly neither the Constitution nor the Code 
intended that the parties should split up their causes 
of action and take part of those causes of action and 
join them together with parts of causes of action belong-
ing to other persons, and try the controversy by piece-
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meal or determine the problem upon a consideration of 
only fractional parts. 
Each of the plantiffs, if we assume the allegations 
of this complaint to be true for the purpose of demurrer, 
owns a separate and distinct tract of land. The owner-
ship and possession of this land gives rise to a primary 
right of quiet enjoyment, and in the last analysis every 
nuisance involves an interference with that right to the 
undisturbed enjoyment of one's premises which is in-
separable from the ownership or possession of realty. 
Such a diagnosis must apply to every true nuisance. 1 
Street's Foundations of Legal Liability, 212. 
Now, suppose the owner and possessor of a piece 
of real estate claims that a party defendant has done 
him a legal wrong by invading, disturbing and inter-
fering with this right of quiet enjoyment which is a nec-
essary incident to the ownership of any tract of land. 
If it is found that that wrong has been committed by 
the defendant, then, as we say in this brief, and as it 
is recognized in all the authorities, the Court may allow 
damages, or, if damages are founa to be inadequate, the 
Court may allow equitable relief by way of injunction. 
In some instances the Courts have allowed both kinds 
of relief, but the mere fact that the relief has a double 
aspect does not mean that there are two causes of action 
existing in behalf of the owner of any particular tract 
of land. 
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This is well illustrated by the case of Hahl v. Sugo, 
(1901) 169 N. Y. 101, 62 N. E. 135. In this case it was 
held that a previous recovery of legal relief bars a 
subsequent recovery of equitable relief based on the 
same cause of action. In this case the facts were as 
follows: the plaintiffs and defendant were the respective 
owners of adjoining lots in the City of Buffalo. De-
fendant, in erecting a brick house on her lot, encroached 
on plaintiffs' lot. In 1896 plaintiffs brought an action 
to recover the land thus encroached upon. Plaintiffs re-
covered in this action and upon a second trial recovered 
again, and, in 1898, judgment was entered in their favor, 
establishing their title in fee to the land in dispute. But 
when an execution was issued the sheriff found that the 
land was occupied by a portion of the stone foundation 
and brick wall of the defendant's house, and he could 
not remove the same. Finally, after failure to maintain 
an intervening motion in that action, the plantiffs 
brought a suit in equity to compel the defendants to 
remove said encroaching wall from their land. 
The Court of Appeals of New York, in reversing the 
judgment of the appellate division, said: 
"Let us now see whether the plantiffs have 
more than one cause of action arising out of the 
wrong of the defendant, and, if not, what that 
cause of action is. The plaintiffs are the owners 
of a strip of land upon which the defendant has 
wrongfully entered and erected a wall, which is 
a portion of her house. The facts alleged show 
one primary right of the plaintiffs and one wrong 
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done by the defendant which involves that right. 
Therefore the plaintiffs have stated but a single 
cause of action, no Inatter how many forn1s and 
kinds of relief they 1nay be entitled to. * * The 
plaintiffs· right is to recover possession of their 
land. The defendant's \\Trong consists in the entry 
upon and use of that land ·w·ithout the plaintiffs' 
consent. The particular nature of that wrong 
1nay require the application of different remedies 
for the enforcement of the right. But that does 
not change the nature of the cause of action, nor 
entitle the plaintiffs to split it into several 
causes of action. The complaint in the first actio11 
stated the facts upon 'vhich plaintiffs based 
their claim of title and right to possession. Under 
its allegations the title as well as the right to 
possession could be tested.'' (Citing authorities) 
''The right to possession involved the re1noval 
of the encroaching wall, for 'vithout such removal 
there could be no real transfer of possession. 
This in turn required equitable relief, which, un-
der proper pleadings and an appropriate method 
of trial, could have been granted' in the same 
action in which the title and right to possession 
were adjudicated." (Citing authorities) "The 
fact that plaintiffs' complaint lacked the aver-
ments which would have apprised the court of 
their right to equitable relief, and that the course 
of the trial furnished no indication that they in-
tended to claim such relief, is no excuse for the 
commencement of a separate and independent 
action upon the single cause involved in the first 
action. It would be novel practice, indeed, to 
permit the correction of errors in that summary 
and extra-judicial manner. '' 
As was said in Stoner v. Mau, 11 Wyo. 366, 72 Pac. 
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"It is too well settled to admit of controversy 
that, under the code procedure, a party may ask 
and obtain several kinds of relief in the same 
action.'' 
The opinion points out that both Mr. Phillip and 
Mr. Pomeroy agree that there is but one cause of action, 
and as Mr. Pomeroy expresses it, only the union of 
remedial rights flowing from one cause of action. 
In the Kinsman case, hereafter in this brief dis-
cussed in detail, it was said : 
''In the very nature of things, any noxious 
or offensive odors given off by defendant's plant 
would gradually diminish as the distance in-
creases, and the relief to plaintiffs, whose homes 
are near the gas plant, might and should differ 
from the relief which should be granted to those 
whose residences are at greater distances fron1 
defendant's plant.'' 
In other words, one of these plaintiffs might be 
entitled to injunctive relief; another might be entitled 
to damages, and another might not be entitled to any 
relief at all. In order to try the case properly, with the 
plaintiffs joined as they are, it would be necessary to 
set up the facts showing : 
1. The primary right of the owner or owners of 
each tract of land. 
2. The invasion of that primary right of quiet 
enjoyment by the defendant and the nature of the in-
vasion. 
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3. The amount of damage suffered by the owner 
of that tract of land. 
And if it was claimed that damages would not be 
adequate then the facts, not conclusions of law, must 
show the necessity and the equitable propriety for the 
granting of injunctive relief. 
If eleven different tracts of land, differently located 
and differently affected and separately and individually 
owned, are all to be dealt with in one complaint, it must 
of necessity follow that we have eleven different causes 
of action. To undertake to split each of these eleven 
causes of action and allow the owners of each of the 
causes of action to take the part that calls for equitable 
relief and join those equitable portions, if we may use 
that term, together, and then make one cause of action 
in one complaint, is to violate the fundamental spirit of 
the code. It violates the rule that a defendant shall not 
be subjected to more than one trial for the same wrong, 
and furthermore it involves the determination of the 
damage, if any, to each separate tract of land. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 2 
We have sufficiently discussed the assignments of 
error grouped in this specification in our statement of 
the facts of this case to call the Court's attention to the 
right of the defendant to have the causes of action of 
Maylan Carter and Edward Ludlow stricken from the 
supplemental complaint. These two causes of action, 
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improperly joined, involve land upon which there are 
no improvements, and upon which no one lives, thus 
basically differing from the other nine causes of action 
joined in the complaint. 
The element of damage pleaded in the complaint 
is the disturbance to plaintiffs as residents upon the 
land, residing in homes thereon. No such element of 
darnage is applicable to these two plaintiffs, and no other 
element of damage is pleaded and none proven by the 
evidence adduced under the amended complaint. This 
evidence clearly shows the impropriety of permitting 
these two plaintiffs to join in the cause of action, when 
their complaint presented no such damage as the damage 
alleged to be suffered by the other pl~intiffs. If there 
is any possible damage to be recovered by these two 
plaintiffs, the damage must of necessity be a permanent 
damage, and a permanent injury to the land. Such a 
damage was neither alleged nor proven before or after 
the inclusion of these plaintiffs in the supplemental com-
plaint. The damage, if any, recoverable by any of the 
plaintiffs under the pleadings and the evidence in this 
case, must be what is known as a temporary damage. If 
a cause of action for permanent damages had been 
pleaded rather than a cause of action for an injunction 
based upon recurring injuries in which no damage was 
sought, this defendant would have been entitled to have 
its plea of the Statute of Limitations declared a complete 
bar to this entire action. This cause of action if it is 
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pleaded as a cause of action to recover permanent dam-
ages, arose in 1933, by the plaintiffs' own evidence. 
Now in the case at bar the land of the plaintiffs 
has not been hurt, and yet apparently the plaintiffs seek 
by their amendment to recover the depreciation in the 
value of their land and at the same time to retain that 
land "~ithout its productive capacity being in the slight-
est respect affected. These damages of a temporary 
character 'vould at most relate merely to personal dis-
comfort and annoyance, and could not include the per-
sonal discomfort of any men1ber of the plaintiffs' fami-
lies. Each plaintiff or person injured would have an 
entirely different case from every other plaintiff or 
person injured, and by no possibility could the personal 
claim of any person injured be assigned to another. 
These observations are made for the purpose of 
illustrating to this Court the character of the cases and 
issues which the plaintiffs sought to present to the Trial 
Court. The matters involved cannot be tried in one suit 
because of their extensive range out into the domain 
even of actions for personal injuries. Instead of clari-
fying and tending to make simple, the clarification is 
merely on paper. The substance of the multiplicity is 
increased rather than decreased, with all the undesirable 
results of confusion. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO.3 
Specification of error No. 3 is based upon the 
Court's refusal to dismiss the supplemental complaint 
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of the plaintiffs as to all of the plaintiffs. Only by 
granting this motion of the defendant could the defend-
ant have secured the right of trial by jury to which it 
was entitled. By refusing this motion, the Court per-
mitted the action to continue as an action in equity, 
with all of the plaintiffs misjoined, and with their causes 
of action improperly united and not separately stated, 
and barred by the Statute of Limitations. See State v. 
Hart, 26 Ut. 229. 
Stockhausen v. Oehler, 186 Wis. 277, 201 N. W. 823 
(1925) par. 2 of the syllabi states: 
''Constitutional right to jury trial cannot, 
under rule that equity having assumed jurisdic-
tion will retain it, be defeated by mere allegation 
of equitable cause of action which in fact does not 
exist.'' 
Par. 3 of syllabi: 
''To warrant equity in retaining jurisdiction 
once assumed, and in granting legal relief, it is 
essential that an equitable cause of action grow-
ing out of transaction prior to the commencement 
of action exists, that equitable action was com-
menced in good faith, that equitable relief cannot 
be had or is impracticable, that constitutional 
right of trial by jury will not be denied, and that 
ends of justice will thereby be best served.'' 
In the opinion of Justice Crownhart appears the 
following: 
''In the McLennan case, supra, the court 
speaks of the fact that the practice of granting 
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relief 'in the interest of a speedy and economical 
settlement of controversy has been so progressive 
that it can no longer be properly said that where 
the facts of a case warrant only legal relief, and 
were known to the plaintiff when he commenced 
his action for equitable relief, the court will not, 
should not, or cannot afford the former.' But 
the court there carefully pointed out, as we have 
shown, the limits of that progress. Our consti-
tution provides that the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. And this court has held 
that that provision means the right of jury trial 
as it existed in the territory of Wisconsin, at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution. La Bowe 
v. Balthazor, 180 Wis. 419, 193 N. W. 244, 32 
A. L. R. 862. No progress in the law can be made 
by the courts beyond the limits of the Constitu-
tion, and none was intended by the language 
quoted. In some of the authorities from other 
states it will be found that statutes have extended 
equity jurisdiction beyond the limits permissible 
under our Constitution, and in some cases the 
courts, not restrained as here, have progressed 
in a similar degree in extending equitable juris-
diction.'' 
In Reynolds v. Warner, 258 N. W. 462, 97 A. L. R. 
1128 (Neb. 1935) the Supreme Court of Nebraska said: 
''When the trial court determined that the 
interveners were not entitled to equitable relief, 
the court was without power to determine the 
legal action without the intervention of a jury. 
It is a general rule that, where a court in the 
exercise of its equity powers acquires jurisdic-
tion for any purpose, its jurisdiction will con-
tinue for all purposes, and it will try all issues." 
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(Citing authorities.) ''But where there is no 
equitable relief granted, a court of equity will 
generally decline jurisdiction to enter a money 
judgment on a legal cause of action. This is 
especially true where such a course would operate 
to deprive a party of his constitutional right to 
a trial by jury. The constitutional right to a trial 
by jury cannot be defeated by an allegation of an 
equitable cause of action which does not exist." 
(Citing authorities.) "The interveners were not 
entitled to equitable relief in this case, and the 
parties did not waive their right to a jury trial 
upon the question of the amount, if any, due 
interveners.'' 
In the case of Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 105 N. Y. 
567, 12 N. E. 58 (1887) Mr. Justice Peckham said: 
''When a party alleges a cause of action of 
an equitable nature, he must prove one, so far 
as the question of a trial by jury is concerned; 
and he cannot escape such tribunal by alleging 
an equitable cause of action, and, while wholly fail-
ing to prove it, obtain a trial by the court of a 
common law action arising out of the trans-
action.'' 
In Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakey, 166 Ind. 427, 76 
N. E. 529 (1906) the Court said: . 
'' * * * under the code, where law and equity are 
administered in the same court, a plaintiff can-
not be permitted to deprive the defendant of the 
right to a jury trial by the making of allegations 
whereby an equitable issue is tendered, and then 
maintain the finding on the ground that sufficient 
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facts 'vere sho""ll to \\Tarrant a recovery in a court 
of la,v. '' 
In lyan .A.uken v. Damrneier, 27 Ore. 150, 40 Pac. 
89 (1895) the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Bean, 
said: 
"'"\!Jiere the rights of the several plaintiffs 
are purely legal, and in themselves perfectly 
distinct, so that each party's case depends upon 
its own peculiar circumstances, and the relief 
demanded is a separate money judgment in favor 
of each plaintiff and against the defendant, there 
is no 'practical necessity' for the interposition of 
a court of equity, and we can find no authority 
for holding that it will assume jurisdiction simply 
because the parties are numerous. A defendant 
is entitled to the constitutional right of trial by 
jury, of which he cannot be deprived because 
numerous parties are asserting claims against 
him, even though such claims may be founded 
upon the same questions of law and fact.'' 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 4 
A great many assignments of error based upon the 
lower Court's erroneous rulings upon evidence appear 
in the record. Under Specification No.4 we have grouped 
all of these assigned errors, and desire at this point to 
discuss specifically those to which the cases cited in this 
brief have special application, and indicate the serious-
ness of the lower Court's errors in prejudicing the 
rights of the defendant in the trial of the action: 
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(a) In the examination of Paul Swartz, it appeared 
that he had on occasions taken his family to the doctor. 
If we assume there was any damage which could have 
been allowed either under the pleadings or the proof in 
this case on account of any personal injury suffered by 
the plaintiffs because of the odors emanating from 
this plant, we contend that the defendant was entitled 
to inquire in detail into the actual causes of illness which 
required the attendance of a physician upon the family 
of Paul Swartz. If, on the other hand, as defendant 
very earnestly contends throughout this brief, the only 
element of damage pleaded was an injury to property, 
then of course the Court's ruling in this respect did not 
constitute prejudicial error. It is submitted, therefore, 
that this ruling for its validity depends in turn upon 
the view this appellate court takes in reviewing the law 
and the evidence in this case. 
(b) and (c) The evidence in this case discloses the 
fact that the Utah State Tax Commission in 1934 to 1936 
made a re-appraisal of all of the lands of Utah County 
in connection with similar appraisals throughout the 
State of Utah, to arrive at the actual value of property 
in the State, together with the actual replacement cost 
of improvements thereon, for the purpose of equalizing 
taxes throughout the State. It is submitted, to have 
denied the defendant the right of this evidence for pur-
poses of comparison was to deny a substantial right. 
The defendant was not only entitled to have this evi-
dence admitted, but to have the Court determine, as a 
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court of equity, the "reight to be given thereto, taking 
into consideration all of the facts and circumstances in 
connection therewith. 
Even one of the plaintiff's expert witnesses as to 
value, La,vrence C. Johnson (Abs. 332), testified that 
he helped make the State Tax Commission's re-appraise-
ment in Benjamin about 1936, and took it into considera-
tion in the appraisals he made. He further stated that 
the State Tax Commission appraised it from the stand-
point of what it would produce. He was one of those 
appointed to classify the real estate as ''A'', '' B'' and 
"C" land, but upon his cross-examination he couldn't 
tell what this classification was with reference to any 
of the lands of the plaintiffs. Had these Exhibits 18 and 
18A and similar exhibits with reference to each of the 
lands of the plaintiffs been a<lm:itted in evidence, this 
witness could have been thoroughly cross-examined con-
cerning the same, and caused to state his reasons, if 
any he had, why the appraisal he made for the State 
Tax Commission based upon what the land would pro-
duce did or did not constitute a reasonable market value 
therefor, and why it differed from his appraisals given 
on this trial. 
This presents essentially a different case than the 
case of placing in evidence the valuation assessed against 
the land by the County Assessor, upon which tax levies 
are based. There is no good reason why, in an 
equity case in which the Court is called upon to take into 
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consideration all of the facts and circumstances, the 
assessed value of the land as fixed by the County Asses-
sor for tax purposes should not be taken into considera-
tion for. comparative purposes, where there are eleven 
different tracts of land, all in the same vicinity, to be 
considered by the Court in a single action. The Court's 
error in refusing to permit the introduction of the asses-
sed valuations by the County _Assessor is covered by 
sub-division (g) of this specification of error, and it is 
submitted should be considered in connection with our 
present discussion. 
This case does not present the reasons for elimi-
nating this evidence that are present in an action in-
volving but a single tract of land, where the necessity 
for comparing the values is not to be found. These 
exhibits furthermore showed the farm land to be classi-
fied with reference to its fertility, and an appraisal was 
placed upon the value. of the various acreages found 
in the three classes, ''A'', '' B '' and '' C ''. Johnson, one 
of the very men who made this classification, comes into 
this case, and defendant is denied the right to place in 
evidence the classification which he himself made of 
these lands. The prejudicial error is the more apparent 
when it is appreciated that Mr. Johnson's appraised 
values given in this case made no classification of the 
land, and he testified that one acre was as valuable as 
another, and appraised all of them at the highest price. 
There are several other assignments of error in-
volving this same general principle which we will not 
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take the space to conunent on separately, but would 
appreciate the Court's consideration of them all in 
weighing the seriousness of this basic error. 
(d) The error covered by this sub-division may 
or may not be an important specification of error. The 
Court made no specific finding as to whether the plant 
was operated in a sanitary condition or not. If this 
Court, in reviewing the evidence, does not consider the 
sanitary condition of the plant an issue under the plead-
ings or under the evidence, then whether the defendant 
was permitted to offer evidence to show the sanitary 
condition of the plant by those competent through long 
experience to speak, would not be serious. If, however, 
the damage is in any wise predicated upon the manner 
in which the plant was operated or constructed, rather 
than upon the premise that it was illegal to operate the 
plant under any circumstances in its present location, 
denying to the defendant the right to show the plant was 
operated in a sanitary condition was an extremely pre-
judicial error, and went directly to a denial of the de-
fendant's right to mitigate damages which might have 
been or were adjudged against the defendant. Here, 
again, the question of just what issues were raised by 
the complaint is brought into question, and appellant's 
position is definitely to the effect that neither the plead-
ings nor the evidence discloses an issue as to the method 
of operating the plant, but is confined alone to whether 
such an industry could be operated under any circum-
stances in that locality. 
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(e) Defendant contends that it was entitled to 
show on cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert witness 
on value, T. M. Anderson, that Anderson did not take 
into consideration, in assessing the value of his brother 
Rufus Anderson's improvements at 100% loss, that 
these improvements, for the most part, were placed upon 
the land after defendant's plant began operations. 
In the first place, there would seem to be no reason 
why it should not be competent for defendant to show 
exactly what the expert appraiser took into considera-
tion and what he did not, in order that the proper esti-
mate or weight to be given to this testimony might be 
intelligently determined by the Court. By all of the 
authorities, an expert is entitled to be subjected to the 
most scrutinizing cross-examination to determine not 
only his knowledge and experience but the actual basis 
upon which he predicated his assessment, and to develop, 
if possible, essential elements which he failed to take 
into consideration. His is essentially opinion evidence. 
Furthermore, it is one thing for a man to say that his 
property is 100% depreciated by the presence of the 
defendant's plant when the plant came after his prop-
erty was improved. It is . essentially a different situa .. 
tion when the improvements are placed upon the prop-
erty after the plant is in operation, and it is submitted 
any fair appraisal would have to take this into con-
sideration. 
(f) If there is one issue in this case more con-
trolli~g than any other, it is the issue as to the nature 
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of this community. The Court in its findings says it is 
not industrial. This finding is contrary to all the evi-
dence. Counsel could not understand upon the trial of 
this action and cannot no"" understand what possible 
justification the lower Court could have had in denying 
to the defendant the right to offer evidence pertaining 
to the industrial nature of this community, even though 
the question in substance and form called for the con-
clusion of expert appraisers. Here, again, it was im-
portant to obtain the opinion of appraisers in deter-
mining their view point, and thus explaining their ap-
praisal. 
It was defendant's purpose to show that this de-
fendant's appraisers appraised said land as industrial 
and considered the coming of industry into that section 
a circumstance to increase rather than decrease the 
value of real estate. The values which they gave which 
appear in Column 11 and 12 of Exhibit 1 appearing in 
the appendix to this brief are the values of the property 
with or without the plant there. Defendant endeavored 
to show that this opinion was predicated in part upon 
the fact that the highest possible value obtainable for 
this land would be for industrial purposes, and that the 
value of farm lands for use strictly for residential pur-
poses would never amount to anything unless it were 
residences for industrial workers. To deny the defend-
ant the right to go into this question of the nature of 
the community in the light of this Court's decision in 
the Dahl case was not only erroneous but prejudicially 
so. 
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SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 5 
(a) 1. Elsewhere in this brief we have commented 
upon the fact that the evidence of the plaintiffs clearly 
showed that John Anderson, Ed Ludlow and Mrs. Han-
sen were not the owners of the property described in 
the supplemental complaint. In spite of this fact, the 
Court found, as we point out in sub-division (a-1) of 
this specification of error, that the plaintiffs were the 
owners of the lands and farms. No evidence as to title 
was introduced except the statement of the plaintiffs 
themselves, and when their testimony discloses a title 
vested elsewhere, there is nothing left upon which to 
predicate this finding by the Court. 
It is an essential element of the case, and without 
it these plaintiffs would not be entitled to the damage 
the Court awarded them. It would, therefore, conclu-
sively appear that regardless of the validity of any other 
contention of the defendant, the judgment of the Court 
including damages to these plaintiffs was erroneous and 
obviously prejudicial. 
(a) 2. That defendant's premises were far less 
objectionable than plaintiffs'; so far as manure and the 
drainage therefrom is concerned, is clearly established 
by the evidence. In this respect the defendant's plant 
was maintained in a far more sanitary and a much less 
objectionable condition than the very back yards of the 
plaintiffs, and, therefore, the Court grievously erred in 
finding that the surroundings of defendant's plant caused 
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noxious odors to be discharged into the surrounding 
atmosphere, and in failing to find that these ''noxious'' 
odors were the same identical odors emanating from 
each of the 1nanure piles, each of the barn yards, each of 
the pig pens and chicken coops of the plaintiffs. 
The lo\ver Court certainly did not use the word 
"noxious" advisedly, because there was no evidence 
throughout the trial that any odor of any kind emanat-
ing from defendant~s plant was a "noxious" odor. The 
definition of "noxious" would clearly indicate that the 
lower Court did not mean ''noxious'' as that term is 
properly understood, but rather intended simply '' ob-
jectionable'' or ''unpleasant'' odors, harmless to human 
beings, animal or plant life. If the Court intended more 
than this by the use of this term, then this use is clearly 
contrary to and not supported by any evidence in this 
case. 
The Court found as a fact that the deposit of 
manure on defendant's premises is partially covered 
with cinders (Abs. 182). Dr. Taylor testified that it 
was covered with lime and cinders (Abs. 371). Mr. 
Soble testified, ''We throw the waste matter on the 
premises and sprinkle it with fresh lime all the time." 
The Court might well have found the fact to be that the 
manure at defendant's plant was covered with lime, as 
well as cinders. We urge the Court, as a court of equity 
reviewing the facts as well as the law, to compare this 
method of treatment with the condition of the plaintiffs' 
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premises, as shown by the exhibits and the testimony of 
the doctors. 
(a} 3. This subdivision forms the basis of a good 
deal of discussion concerning the industrial nature of the 
community in which defendant located its plant. It is, 
therefore, at this point simply submitted that the Court 
erred in finding that this area was not industrial, and 
likewise erred in failing to find its true nature. It is 
furthermore urged that whether the community be clas-
sified as industrial or not, the Court does not find it was 
an improper community for the location of such a plant 
as the defendant's, and there is no law which justifies 
the conclusion that defendant's plant could not be built 
outside of an industrial area; in fact, its propriety in a 
section strictly agricultural, where the basic agricultural 
industry is stock raising, would seen1 to be too clear 
for argument. 
It is appellant's contention that the Dahl case, here-
after in this brief discussed in detail, controls in light 
of the evidence in this case, regardless of whether the 
community be called agricultural or industrial. The fact 
remains that this was a proper place for the location 
of this plant-proper when the plaintiffs' witness Greer 
located it there for the defendant ;-proper when the 
plaintiff Selene worked there ;-proper when the plaintiff 
John Anderson worked there before the fire ;-proper 
when the plaintiff John Anderson helped to rebuild the 
plant and worked there after the fire; and proper 
throughout its entire history as the various plaintiffs 
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came there with their dead animals to be disposed of, 
their live animals to be killed and disposed of, and to 
purchase the products of the plant for the feeding of 
their live stock in their own agricultural business. It was, 
moreover, a proper location for the establishment of: 
1. Union Pacific Railroad main line. 
2. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad main line. 
3. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. sugar factory. 
4. Pea vinery to handle local crops. 
5. Flour mill for local wheat. 
6. Brick yard for local building materials. 
7. Alfalfa mill for feed for local live stock. 
8. Cattle feed yards-local stock yards. 
9. Stock loading yards on both railroads. 
10. Beet storage and loading chutes on both railroads. 
11. W oolloading platforms and storage on railroads. 
12. Steel plant near by. 
13. Defendant's rendering plant for local use. 
(a) 4. This finding goes to the elements of damage. 
This finding is not supported by the evidence, in view of 
the conditions existing around these homes and on the 
premises of the plaintiffs themselves. Furthermore, the 
elements of damage therein found would only be properly 
found where the district was strictly a residential dis-
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trict, that is to say, a finding that the plant was located 
in an unreasonable and, therefore, improper or unlawful 
location. Such findings do not appear in the record, and, 
as contended throughout, none is justified by the evi-
dence. 
The damage allowed is permanent when temporary 
damages at best could be recovered. The damages allowed 
is to property; the damage proven is the personal dis-
comfort of plaintiffs. 
Temporary as Distinguished from Permanent Damages 
(Spec. of Error No. 5) 
(b), (c) and (d). In the case of Johnson v. Utah-
Idaho Cent. Ry. Co., 68 Ut. 309, in discussing the case of 
a railroad constructing a road along a street in the city 
of Ogden constituting a nuisance to the property owners 
whose residences fronted said street, the Court, quoting 
from Wood on Limitations, (3d Ed.) Sec. 180, says: 
''But while this is the rule as to nuisances of 
a transient rather than of a permanent character, 
yet when the original nuisance is of a permanent 
character so that the damage inflicted thereby is 
of a permanent character, and goes to the entire 
destruction of the estate affected- thereby or will 
be likely to continue for an indefinite period, and 
during its existence deprive the landowner of any 
beneficial use of that portion of his estate, a re-
covery not only may but must be had for the en-
tire damage in one action, as the damage is 
deemed to be original; and as the entire damage 
accrues from the time the nuisance is created and 
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only one recoYery can be had, the statute of lim-
itations begins to run fron1 the time of its erec-
tion against the tnvner of the estate or estates 
affected thereby.'' 
Again, in the case 0 'Neill v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. 
R. R. Co., 38 Ut. 475, 114 Pac. 127, the plaintiff sought to 
enjoin the Inaintenance of a spur track claimed to con-
stitute a nuisance. Our Court again in this case says: 
"True, in cases like the one at bar the dam-
ages must be recovered once for all in one action, 
and must be assessed as having occurred at the 
time when the first injury to the property arose 
because a con1plete cause or right of action then 
arose in favor of respondent. To this right noth-
ing could be added, since it was just as complete 
a cause or right of action after the first train 
passed the house and shook it and injured it to 
some extent as it was after a hundred trains had 
passed and had shaken it, and injured it more.'' 
See also 104-56-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
Under statutes such as 104-56-1 it is said in the 
note in 61 A. L. R. 937 : 
''Where there are statutory proVIsions for 
relief from a nuisance either by enjoining it or 
allowing damages to compensate for the injury 
ascribable to it, the court may consider the detri-
ment to the plaintiff from denying injunctive re-
lief and the hardship to the defendant by grant-
ing such relief, and, if the business or industry 
complained of is a lawful one, injunctive relief 
may be denied where to grant such relief would 
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subject the defendant to a loss much greater than 
any advantage to the plaintiff, and the latter will 
be left to pursue the statutory remedy for dam-
ages. Daniels v. Keokuk Waterworks (1883), 61 
Iowa 549, 16 N. W. 705; Madison v. Duckstown 
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. (1904), 113 Tenn. 231, 
83 S. W. 658; Union Planters' Bank & T. Co. v. 
lviemphis Hotel Co. ( 1911), 124 Tenn. 649, 39 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 580, 139 S. W. 715; Cowper v. 
Laidler (1903), 2 Ch. (Eng.) 337 referred to in 
annotation in 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899." 
Where a nuisance consists of the use of a structure 
which is lawful and not in itself a nuisance the relief 
should be by enjoining such use and not by destruction 
of the structure. There are nuisances of a permanent 
character and nuisances of a temporary character. Of 
course, where a single plaintiff is granted equitable re-
lief against a nuisance it is proper to award that plain-
tiff such damages as he has already suffered; but where 
there is a permanent nuisance a plaintiff cannot recover 
entire damages, past, present and prospective, and also 
obtain equitable relief. If the plaintiff wishes permanent 
damages he should elect to proceed to recover the same, 
and his election must be as between such damages or for 
a removal of the nuisance by means of an injunction. He 
cannot have both, and it is submitted that he cannot try 
first for one and then for the other and keep the door 
open so that he may thereafter elect to take that which 
is most beneficial to him. 
The doctrine of election requires a determination 
by the party who is required to exercise it at the time he 
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commences his first suit. It is not permissible even on 
the trial to change the theory upon which the suit was 
brought, and certainly it is not pern1issible to try the 
case out upon one theory and then have its determina-
tion held in abeyance, allowing the case to stand without 
final decree until the plaintiff tries out another incon-
sistent theory. See Cook v. Covey Ballard Motor Co., 
69 U t. 161, 253 Pac. 196. 
The finding of the Court here complained of 
:finds an element of permanent damage, whereas the evi-
dence discloses nothing but a temporary or intermittent 
damage, a subject which is thoroughly discussed in this 
brief. Furthermore, the element of damage is again 
predicated upon the existence in this vicinity of a strictly 
residential community, in which industry in its various 
phases would be unlawful. 
The alleged wrongs are intermittent and occasional. 
Permanent damages are not recoverable for such in-
juries. To allow a recovery for alleged depreciation of 
plaintiffs' properties would be contrary to and against 
the law, in that the same would not be the lawful meas-
ure of damage for any personal discomfort that has been 
suffered by any of the plaintiffs. The result of this con-
tention, if sound, requires a reversal of the judgment 
and a dismissal of the action. There is no proof of the 
extent of temporary damages suffered by any of these 
plaintiffs for or on account of personal discomfort. Plain-
tiffs have attempted to recover for an alleged decrease 
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in the value of their real estate. These are permanent 
da1nages. The Court so finds in its findings. 
Take the case of any one of the plaintiffs. If he re-
cover the judgment awarded him by the lower Court 
he retains the judgment and his property. Then, if the evi-
dence of the plaintiffs were true, if the plant discontinued 
operations or moved away, or its operations were enjoined 
by someone else, the plaintiffs' property would immediate-
ly rise in value in an amount equal to the judgment. The 
plaintiff would then have his property with its present 
value unimpaired, plus the amount of the judgment in cash. 
Certainly such a result cannot be authorized by law, and 
the courts do not permit the recovery of permanent 
damages under such circumstances. Permanent damages 
are barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
A clear distinction between the basis of dainages 
for a temporary nuisance and the basis for a permanent 
nuisance is drawn by the courts, and the use of the wrong 
basis is reversible error. For a temporary nuisance, the 
basis is a loss of use, or a depreciation in rental value; 
for a permanent nuisance, the basis is a depreciation in 
market value. The lower Court failed to make this dis-
tinction. In its findings (No. 13 of its Memorandum de-
cision as incorporated in Finding No. 1, Ab. p. 391) it 
found the odors sufficient to injure the plaintiffs by 
making their homes substantially less desirable as dwell-
ing places and by making their lands less attractive to 
tenants. It was error to give a judgment of a deprecia-
tion in market value which follows this finding of tem-
porary injury. 
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Vogt v. City of Gr-innell, (Iowa 1094), 98 N. W. 782. 
In this case the defendant discharged its sewer 
into the river opposite plaintiff's farm. A judgment for 
the plaintiff was reversed, the Supreme Court saying: 
"The mere fact that the city sewers 'vere of 
permanent construction did not render the nui-
sance occasioned by them permanent also, for the 
municipality had the right at any time to abate 
it. In this respect cases like the present one 
differ from Powers v. City of Council Bluffs, 45 
Iowa 652, 24 Am. Rep. 972, for there, as was ob-
served in Hunt v. Iowa Central Ry., 86 Iowa 15, 
52 N. W. 668, 41 Am. St. Rep. 473, 'the whole in-
jury was regarded as having occurred at one time, 
and, that time having been more than five years 
prior to the commencement of the suit, it was held 
to be barred. The injury was of such a character 
as to be beyond the defendant's power to rem-
edy. It would be compelled to go onto lands of 
others to erect barriers to prevent the damage. In 
this case, as is shown by the evidence, the remedy 
is in the defendant's own hands, by work done 
upon its own land.' Again, it was pointed out in 
Bennett v. City of Marion (Iowa), 93 N. W. 558, 
that the injury in the Powers Case was beyond the 
city's power to repair. 'The remedy to be applied 
there, if any, was the construction of a wall on 
plaintiff's premises, where defendant had no right 
to go. Here the remedy could be applied on de-
fendant's own premises, and there can be no 
doubt of its duty to abate the nuisance.' '' 
The Court continued : 
''The measure of damages flowing from a 
continuing nuisance is not, as suggested in the 
motion, the depreciation of the market value of 
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the land, for it may be abated some time, but 
ordinarily the loss in its use caused thereby, and 
such special damages as may result therefrom.'' 
The case of Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92 
W.Va. 445, ~15 S. E. 451, 27 A. L. R. 54 (1922), is both 
interesting and instructive. The judgment was for $15,-
500 in favor of a farmer owning and residing upon a 
tract of land containing about 137.5 acres, and was 
against a corporation owning and operating a large in-
dustrial plant situated on a 160 acre tract owned by it. 
In this plant the Chemical Company reduced zinc ores, 
and it was claimed that certain gases, smoke, dust and 
fumes coming from the furnaces of the chemical plant 
injured the agricultural, residential and market values 
of the farm. These fumes, gases and dust were carried 
over the land of the plaintiff by air currents and spread 
over it through the air. One of the deposits complained 
of was zinc oxide, which, having been deposited on vege-
tation on the farm and eaten by live stock proved to be 
deleterious and fatal in some instances. Another deposit 
was sulphur dioxide, and this caused an excessive acidity 
of the soil, resulting in diminution of its fertility and 
producing capacity. 
This brief statement, without going further, will 
illustrate that the damages were substantial. The Court 
pointed out in its opinion that it was an important fac-
tor in the determination of the character of an injury 
to real property to determine the character of the wrong 
itself. It said that the injury or wrong might be slight 
and readily compensable in damages. On the other hand, 
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it n1ight be of considerable 1nagnitude and yet not be 
continuous. There might be a continuing cause without 
a continuing injury. After such consideration the Court 
said: 
"There al'e son1e general propositions, ho"\v-
ever~ that can be asserted with safety, as to the 
requirements of a cause of action for original and 
pern1anent damages. The injury must be constant 
and continuous, not occasional, intermittent or 
recurrent. ' ' 
Later on it is pointed out that it was an important matter 
to determine whether the cause of the injury was tem-
porary or intermittent. If under certain circumstances 
the plant can be operated without doing any harm and 
yet under other circumstances it may do harm, then the 
injury is of a temporary character. Permanent damages 
are given on the theory that the cause of injury is fixed 
and interminable, and that the property injured must 
always remain subject to it. The Court then said: 
''This requisite element of permanency does 
not exist and cannot be found in those cases in 
which the structure, business or other agency of 
injury is unlawful and may be abated, at the in-
stance of the injured party. To make the cause 
of the injury permanent in the legal sense of the 
term, there must be legal right to maintain it in 
force or operation. If, against the will of him who 
has set it in force, it may be abated by legal pro-
cess, at the instance of the complaining party, it 
must necessarily be temporary and the damages 
temporary, and so the authorities say.'' 
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Now, to think, using John Anderson's property as 
an illustration, that Anderson could recover and collect 
a judgment for substantially fifty per cent of what the 
Court found to be the market value of his property, after 
he had actively participated as an employee of the de-
fendant in the operation of the old and the construction 
of the new plant, and then go on and enjoy that same 
property in its entirety, is indeed an extraordinary pe-
culiarity of the law, if such is the law. Would not every 
person owning property similarly situated to that of An-
derson have a like right to recover fifty per cent of 
the value of his property, or at least some percentage? 
If the judgment is awarded and paid it is on the theory 
that the property has been permanently damaged and 
that the owners of the plant have paid that permanent 
damage and have a continuing right to maintain and 
operate the plant, inasmuch as Anderson's property is 
concerned. This certainly could not bind some other per-
son who owned other property in the vicinity of the plant 
who has not recovered a judgment in this case, particu-
larly John Anderson's wife, in whom the title to the 
property vests. The other owners of property, including 
John Anderson's wife, might see fit to have the alleged 
nuisance removed and do away with the cause of the de-
preciation, and might also in another action succeed. The 
payment of all of the judgments which might ultimately 
be given against the defendant in this and in future suits 
might well bankrupt the defendant and thus compel de-
fendant to abandon its plant and business. Such an aban-
donment would immediately restore the value of plain-
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tiffs' properties to the values claimed for said properties 
in the absence of defendant's plant. Here again, the 
plaintiffs 'vould have their property without depreciation 
and the amount of the judgment also. 
The ''1 est \rirginia Court further said: (par. 5 of 
syllabi) 
''Damages to land, occasioned by emission of 
smoke, gases, dust, and fumes from smelting fur-
naces maintained and operated on an adjoining 
or neighboring tract of land, causing deposits or 
chemical substances which impair its enjoyment, 
productiveness, and value, are temporary in the 
legal sense of the term, and permanent damages 
are not recoverable for such an injury.'' 
In the case of Thackery v. U. P. Cement Co., 64 Ut. 
437, 231 Pac. 813, this Court cited this West Virginia 
case and seemed to approve of the distinction the West 
Virginia Court made between temporary and permanent 
damage. This Court says : 
"No good reason appears, therefore, why, if 
the parties so elect either by agreement or by 
acquiescence, the Court should not permit a re-
covery of compensation as for a permanent injury 
in one action.'' 
The Thackery case rests upon the fact that the rec-
ord shows an agreement or acquiescence of the parties 
plaintiff and defendant, for the Court to permit a recov-
ery of compensation as for a permanent injury. It was 
suggested by the defendant in the Thackery case that 
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the Court had no power to permit such a recovery, but 
the Supreme Court held that the trial court did have 
power, where both parties had acquiesced and agreed to 
the Court making an award as for a permanent injury. 
The difference between the Utah case and the West 
Virginia case cited by the Utah Court appears to be that 
the Utah Court permitted the parties to acquiesce in the 
recovery of permanent injuries, whereas, the West Vir-
ginia Court concluded that the case had been tried upon 
an altogether erroneous and untenable basis and disre-
garded the effect of acquiescence. 
There has been no agreement or acquiescence in this 
case. The appellant has at every step insisted there can be 
no recovery at all, and has specifically made its objec-
tion relying upon the distinction between temporary and 
permanent damages. It has said and now says that the 
wrong, if wrong there is, is merely a ten1porary one 
and can only be compensated for while it continues. If 
this defendant should in some manner acquire these prop-
erties that are owned by the plaintiffs, and all other 
properties similarly situated or affected, then it should 
not be required to pay damages as might be sustained 
or suffered by these properties after defendant became 
the owner thereof, or if the plant went out of business 
or was lawfully abated by injunction, the award made to 
the plaintiffs by the lower Court would be grossly unjust 
and excessive. It is submitted that under the facts and 
circumstances as they exist in this case, there is no cause 
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of action for per1nanent dan1ages, because the presence 
of the rendering plant inflicts or causes no such injury. 
The plaintiffs have proceeded on an erroneous and un-
tenable basis, and the lower Court has fallen into the 
same error. See Ehlert u. Galveston H. & S. A.. Ry. Co., 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 274 S. W. 172. 
In Theisen v. Pittmans & Dean Co., 162 N. W. 76, the 
Michigan Supreme Court said : 
''The case at bar was instituted for the pur-
pose of recovering the difference between the 
market value of the property at the time it was 
purchased by the plaintiff and the market value 
at the time he sold it upon the theory that the 
erection and maintenance of the structure in 
question constituted a permanent nuisance. The 
court at the close of the plaintiff's case directed 
a verdict in favor of the defendant upon the 
ground that under the facts of the case the nuis-
ance complained of was not permanent, and there-
fore that depreciation in the property itself could 
not be recovered, and, as plaintiff did not claim 
anything in this action on account of the deprecia-
tion of the usable or rental value, he could not 
recover. 
''The sole question presented by appellant's 
four assignments of error is whether the trial 
court was in error in directing a verdict for 
defendant upon the ground that the erection and 
maintenance of a barn on the premises adjacent to 
those of the plaintiff did not, under the author-
ities, constitute a permanent nuisance. 
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''Under the decisions of our own court, we are 
of opinion that the action of the learned trial 
judge was proper. . . . 
''Judgment is affirmed.' ' 
What is the true nature of the cause of action~ Is 
the action one for permanent damage~ Have permanent 
damages been established by the proof~ The damage is 
mere personal discomfort suffered for part of one day 
and perhaps not suffered again for several days. If a 
visitor or an employee of the plaintiffs suffers such per-
sonal discomfort which results in actionable injury, this 
visitor or employee cannot be compensated for the in-
convenience suffered by awarding the owner of the prop-
erty damage for its depreciation on that account. This 
would be giving to the owner a damage which he had not 
sustained, because he was not present when the visitor 
or employee endured this personal discomfort. The re-
covery of such a damage by the owner would not defeat 
the visitor's or the agent's cause of action. If it existed 
at all, it would continue to exist in spite of the award, 
and even the payment, of such damage to the owner of 
the land. The true nature of the cause of action, if any 
there be, is a temporary personal injury, and the plain-
tiffs, without any acquiescence on the part of defendant, 
have attempted to obtain damages which do not proceed 
or at all result from the injury complained of in the 
evidence. These plaintiffs have undertaken to prove per-
sonal injury of a temporary character, and then recover 
for a .permanent injury to real property. Surely the 
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lav~T will not permit such a recovery as permanent dam-
ages 'vhen the injury is at the very most only temporary 
and purely personal. This appellant seriously contends 
that there is no competent proof in this record of any 
da1nage or injury that has been done. 
In considering the "'-rest \Tirginia case the Court 
must keep in mind that the injuries done did affect and 
materially injure the land, and the crops that would ordi-
narily be grown thereon. There was strictly temporary 
damage to the land. In the Thackery case dust from the 
cement company's plant passed over and settled on the 
land. The Supreme Court held that this was ''a recur-
ring nuisance." There it was claimed that there was an 
injury to grown and growing crops and hay stored on the 
premises. It also held that even though the plaintiff had 
delayed in bringing his action for ten years, still it could 
not be said that the injury was a permanent one so as to 
bar the phtintiff 's right of action by lapse of time. The 
Court said that this nuisance was recurrent in its nature 
and not ''uninterruptedly continuing'' in its nature. If 
the nuisance had been a permanent one, as contradis-
tinguished from a temporary or recurrent one, the statute 
of limitations would have barred the plaintiff's right to 
recover. In both the West Virginia and the Utah Thack-
ery case there was a substantial injury to the property. 
In the case at bar there is no injury to the property. 
Personal discomfort complained of, if within the zone 
occupied by plaintiffs' property, would be just as great 
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to a person not owning property as to a person owning 
property. 
Paragraph 13 of the Court's original memorandum 
embodied in its Finding of Facts No. 1 (Abs. 391) spe-
cifically finds that the odors emanating from defendant's 
plant do not constantly permeate the homes of any of 
the plaintiffs, and the extent to which they permeate the 
homes of the plaintiffs is not the same in each instance, 
but rather depends upon the direction of the wind and 
the distances separating the plaintiffs' homes from de-
fendant's plant. The evidence further shows that some 
of plaintiffs complain of the odor of the manure pile in 
the defendant's yard, others the odors from the cooker 
only when the cooking operation is carried on. This i~ 
intermittent, some days longer than others and some 
days not at all. This is clearly a finding by the Court 
of a temporary injury rather than a permanent injury. 
The Court makes no conclusion of law as to whether the 
damages are permanent or temporary. 
In Cross v. Texas Military College, (Texas Civ. 
App.) 1933, 65 S~ W. (2d) 794, the plaintiff alleged that 
because of the odors of defendant's slaughtering pen 
the reasonable market value of plaintiff's premises was 
reduced to the extent of $300, and that by reason of the 
fact that plaintiff was forced to abandon his home and 
could not rent the premises to other parties, he was dam-
aged in the sum of $200. The Court said: 
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"It is e-vident that the nuisance alleged, and 
that "'"hich the testimony tends to establish, could 
have been abated, either voluntarily ren1oved or 
avoided by the aggrieved party, and the alleged 
value of appellant's property restored. In fact, 
the record sho\YS that the nuisance had been re-
Inoved at the time of the institution of this suit. 
It is well settled in this state that, in such cases, 
the depreciation in rentals and such consequential 
personal inconvenience and hurt as may be the 
nature and direct proximate result arising from 
such a nuisance are the elements of damage re-
coverable~ and not the depreciation in market val-
ue of such property. City of San Antonio v. 
Mackey·s Estate, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 54 S. W. 
33, 34; City of Paris v. Jenkins, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 
383, 122 S. W. 411; Baugh v. Railroad Co., 80 
Tex. 56, 15 S. W. 587; City of Honey Grove v. 
Jfills, (Tex. Civ. App.) 235 S. vV. 267. 
"In the case of City of San Antonio v. 
Mackey~·s Estate, supra, involving a cause of ac-
tion based on stenches and bad odors similar to 
the case at bar, the court said: 'Such being the 
case presented by the evidence, the depreciation 
in the market value of the land was not the meas-
ure of damages, and the judge presenting that 
issue to the jury can have no other tendency than 
that of misleading them. As to a nuisance cap-
able of abatement, the depreciation of the value 
of the property can have no applicability. The 
settled rule of damages in such cases is the dif-
ference in the rental value with and without the 
nuisance.' 
''In consonance with this holding, our Su-
preme Court, in Baugh v. Railroad Co., supra, 
announced the terse rule that: ' * * * When the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
116 
nuisances complained of are of a temporary char-
acter, such as may be voluntarily removed or 
avoided by the wrong-doer, or such as the injured 
party may cause to be abated, only such damages 
as have accrued up to the institution of the suit 
or (under our system) to the trial of the action can 
be recovered. For such damages depreciation in 
the value of the property affected by the injury 
is not a measure, and in such a suit the a1nount 
of such depreciation cannot be recovered.' 
''We conclude that the trial court did not err 
in sustaining appellee's motion for an instructed 
verdict.'' 
In Oates v. Algodon Manufacturing Company, 217 
N. C. 488, 8 S. E. (2d) 605 (1940), the plaintiff recovered 
damages for pollution of a stream across plaintiff's farm. 
The Court instructed the jury: 
'' 'and that damage would be the difference 
that you find between the value of his land imme-
diately prior to the pollution of the stream, if 
you find it was polluted, and the reasonable mar-
ketable value of his land immediately after it was 
polluted and in addition thereto, any inconveni-
ence and annoyance by way of odors suffered by 
him to his land, any damages by virtue of not 
being able to use the stream for the watering of 
his stock and any other usual use the stream 
could be put to during those dates.' Exception. 
''The trial court inadvertently fell into error 
in stating that the measure of damages would be 
the difference between the reasonable market 
value of the land immediately before and after 
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the injury·. 'In cases of this kind, 'vhen the dam-
age is due to a cause that may be removed or a 
nuisance that may be abated, the measure of dam-
age is not the difference in the market value of 
the land before and after the injury, but is esti-
mated by comparing its productiveness before 
and after the flooding. S pilnzan v. Roanoke N avi-
gation Co., 7 4 N. C. 675 (16 Am. & Eng. Enc. 984.' 
Adams v. Durham &!; N. R. Co., 110 N. C. 325, 
14 S. E. 857, 860 ~ Jones v. J( ramer & Bros. Co., 
133 N. C. 446, 45 S. E. 827; Garrett v. Board of 
Com·rs., 74 N. C. 388. 
"For the error, as indicated the appellant is 
entitled to a new trial. It is so ordered." 
In City of Ada v. Melberg, 160 N. W. 257 (Minn. 
1916), the plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the flow-
ing of sewage across his land and asked for damages. 
The Court said : 
''The court instructed the jury that they 
might assess the damages to the appellant by 
reason of the injury to his land, and that the 
measure of damages was the difference between 
the value of the land with the sewer on it and the 
value thereof without the sewer. The jury found 
for appellant. Respondent moved for a new trial, 
which was granted on the ground : 
'That the court erred in instructing 
the jury upon the question as to the meas-
ure of damages and in the admission of 
evidence with reference to damages.' 
"This appeal is taken from the order grant-
ing a ·new trial. 
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''The only question presented on this appeal 
is whether or not the court laid down the correct 
rule of damages. The trial court evidently sub-
mitted the case to the jury on the theory that the 
noxious odors, the noisome deposits, and the flow 
of tainted water from the sewer would continue 
permanently, and thus constitute a permanent 
injury to the land, leaving out of consideration 
appellant's right to cause the nuisance to be 
abated by injunction. Examination of the record 
leads us to the conclusion that this is a continuing 
nuisance, and that the learned trial court properly 
granted a new trial. It will not be presumed that 
the nuisance will be continued, or that the muni-
cipality will make no effort to abate it. Sloggy v. 
Dilworth, 38 ~finn. 179, 36 N. W. 451, 8 Am. St. 
Rep. 656; Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 86 ~[inn. 365, 
90 N. W. 767, 58 L. R. A. 735. It is very probable 
that this will be done. The attitude of the city 
officials at the trial justifies us in this assumption. 
"We cannot treat this action as in the nature 
of an assessment for damages in a condemna-
tion proceeding. It was not such a case, and no-
where in the record is the suggestion made that a 
verdict rendered in this action would give to the 
city of Ada any greater rights in appellant's land 
than it had before the action was brought. The 
case has resolved itself into an action for damages 
for the maintaining of a nuisance, and we may 
not, especially in the absence of statutory author-
ity, convert it into a condemnation proceeding. 
''That the action was begun by the respond-
ent as an equitable action for an injunction, and 
that the appellant in his answer sought equitable 
relief, have no material weight here. We have to 
do with substance rather than with form. The 
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remedy sought was merely pecuniary compensa-
tion for injuries to the appellant and his family, 
his personal property and his land, between the 
1st day of January, 1912, and the date of the trial. 
Nothing further was demanded, and, as we have 
already said, it is not to be presumed that the 
nuisance 'Yill be continued. 
~'It is urged that the structures and the sewer 
system being pern1anent, the injuries to appel-
lant's land must necessarily be permanent. But 
the test whether an injury to real estate is per-
manent is not necessarily the permanent character 
of the structure causing the injury, but-
'' ''vhether the "c-hole injury results from the 
original wrongful act, or from the "\Vrongful con-
tinuance of the state of facts produced by such 
act.' Bowers v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom 
Co., 78 Minn. 398, 81 N. W. 208, 79 Am. St. Rep. 
395; Heath v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 126 
~linn. 470, 474, 148 N. W. 311." 
In City of San Antonio v. Mackey's Estate, 54. S. W. 
33, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals emphasized the 
error that the court in the case before us committed. 
The case involved the recovery of damages for stenches 
arising from the deposits of garbage and filth by the de-
fendant city near plaintiff's home. The Court said: 
''The jury returned a verdict, not only for 
loss in rental value and care of premises, but for 
$3,732.55 for depreciation of property. The ver-
dict was clearly erroneous, and was in effect, 
allowing double damages, but it was in direct re-
sponse to an instruction to the effect that, in 
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, I 
case they found the injury permanent, the meas-
ure o.f damages, in addition to the rental value 
thereof, was the depreciation in the market value 
of the property. The loss of rental value is never 
made a part of the damages, where there is 
permanent damage to the value of the property, 
because full compensation is given by the recov-
ery of the loss in value of the land. In a case 
decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, 
cited by Sutherland in his work on Damages (sec-
tion 1042), it was said that 'damages for use must 
not represent in any part the damages for the 
permanent injury; it is the duty of the court to 
see that one does not overlap the other.' Seely 
v. Alden, 61 Pa. St. 302." 
See also Racine v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (Ill., 
1937), 8 N. E. (2) 210. 
The foregoing cases show how the lower court has 
committed error in granting damages based on the de-
preciation of market value: 
1. By basing its judgment for permanent damages 
partly upon findings of temporary damage-loss of rental 
and usable value. 
2. By using a basis of permanent damage for its 
judgment when the evidence shows that the odors are 
only intermittent and are abatable at any time by the 
defendant. 
3. By using a basis of permanent damage when 
the statute of limitations has run against permanent dam-
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age. Plaintiffs' evidence shows. that the defendant's 
plant 'vas established about September, 1933 (Abs. 50). 
The statute of lin1itations 'vas pleaded, and is urged. 
Plaintiffs are in a dilemn1a. Either the action was brought 
for permanent injuries, in which case the cause of action 
arose prior to 1934, and the statute has run, or the 
action was brought for a continuing nuisance, with tem-
porary damages, in which case the measure of damages 
was wrong. 
In either case there is reversible error. 
4. There is no evidence upon which to predi-
cate either a finding of fact or a conclusion of 
law as to what prospective purchasers might or might 
not take into consideration in arriving at a market 
value for this land. The element of damage here at-
tempted to be found is too speculative and remote, be-
yond any of the pleadings or the evidence in the case, 
and not in any wise directly attributable to or a proxi-
mate cause of the injury here complained of. 
Some future prospective buyers, in the light of all the 
evidence in this case, would undoubtedly look upon this as 
industrial property, as did the expert witnesses for the de-
fendant, who were men long experienced in the business. 
It would be more appropriate to speculate upon such a 
hypothesis than that assumed by the Court in this so-
called finding of fact. 
Specification of Error 5(d) (p. 55 herein) 
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The defendant Company is itself a potential prospec-
tive buyer for this property of the plaintiffs as homes for 
its employees in the future, the same as in the past. Its 
value for such purposes would in no wise be depreciated 
by the presence of the defendant's plant. It is the plant 
which would give it its value. 
Specification No. 5 (e) 
Value of Plaintiffs' Lands 
The value of plaintiffs' property as alleged in plain-
tiffs' amended and supplemental complaints is denied.by 
the answer of the defendant. The appraised valuation, 
as fixed by the State Tax Commission in its state-wide 
re-appraisal of lands, is specifically set forth in the appen-
dix to the abstract of recordandappellant'sExhibitAap-
pearing in the appendix to this brief. The total appraised 
value of fhe properties of the plaintiffs as fixed by the 
State Tax Commission's re-appraisal, is $18,648, exclu-
sive of Carter's. The total value alleged in the com-
plaint is $62,000, exclusive of Carter's. It is rather hard 
to believe that property reappraised for purposes of 
equalization at a total value of less than $19,000 can have 
at the same time a market value of $62,000. The damage 
of $11,868.19 represents more than 62% of this appraised 
value. 
There Is No Competent Evidence or Proper Measure 
of Damages Shown by the Evidence 
We have the testimony of expert witnesses Thomas, 
Hawkins, Anderson and Johnson upon the subject of 
values. These values relate to but two situations: 
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(1) \ ... alue of the property of any plaintiff without 
the plant, that is, \vithout the plant being located as it 
is; and 
(2) Value of the property with the plant located as 
it is. 
No consideration was given by any of the witnesses 
for the plaintiffs as to what the value of the plaintiffs' 
properties would be if there were some other industry 
located on the site of defendant's plant in place of the 
defendant's plant, such as the brick kilns that were 
formerly located there. The values testified to are the 
opinions of these witnesses based on the assumption that 
there is no industry whatsoever located on the site of 
defendant's plant. 
Let us consider the brick plant. Were we to proceed 
logically upon the theory of the plaintiffs, the brick plant 
itself would make the lands of the plaintiffs less desirable 
for residential purposes, because of the presence of this 
industry in close proximity thereto. Only a question of 
degree separates the brick yard on the one hand and the 
defendant's plant on the other, at best. It is this differ-
ence in degree alone that could be recovered in damages. 
This degree of difference, even on their own theory, the 
plaintiffs failed to prove. The Court's findings are for 
the full amount without subtracting therefrom the per-
centage or degree of depreciation caused or which 
would have been caused by the continued maintenance 
and operation of the brick yard as it was operated for 
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twenty years preceding defendant's operations on the 
same tract. Which one of these plaintiffs or their pre-
decessors in interest sold this property to the brick yard, 
to be used by the brick yard for industrial purposes~ 
Would he now be entitled to recover back damages after 
having received the full purchase price of the property 
sold for the purpose of being used for industrial pur-
poses~ The question answers itself. If the proper meas-
ure of damage had been applied, the plaintiffs would 
have been required to offer some evidence upon which 
to base an award of damage measured by the proper 
scale. The findings of the Court could then have been 
predicated upon evidence relating to the proper measure 
of damage rather than to the measure of damage adopted 
by the Court, and we might say in passing that it is im-
possible to determine from the findings what measure of 
damage the Court d1d adopt. The damage allowed does 
not conform in any case to any of the proof adduced 
either by the plaintiffs or the defendant, but "\vould seem 
on its face to represent some opinion of the Court not 
in any wise taken from the evidence. 
It is, of course, possible that if testimony had been 
taken upon the subject there would have been some ele-
ments in relation to the operation and maintenance of 
brick kilns and a brick yard on the premises occupied 
by the defendant, which would have reduced the market 
value of plaintiffs' premises as much as the presence of 
defendant's plant. This might readily be the case if the 
extent to which the premises were occupied as a brick 
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kiln "?ere sufficiently great in comparison to the small 
plant of the defendant as to 1nake the deteriorating effect 
of each industry equal, in "'"hich case even on plaintiffs' 
theory there could be no recovery of damage. 
The evidence of plain tiffs ' expert witnesses further 
revealed the fact that they did not depreciate the plain-
tiffs' property any because of its close proximity to the 
main lines of railroad running through the neighbor-
hood, nor did they depreciate the property any on ac-
count of the pea vinery, the sugar factory or any other 
industry. If all of these industries are to be overlooked 
in arriving at damage, then clearly it must be upon the 
theory, and the theory alone, that this is an industrial 
community, in which event the discomfort suffered by 
the plaintiffs on account of the odors emanating from 
defendant's plant is just a further inconvenience to be 
suffered because of the industrial nature of the vicinity. 
Whether considered as legal or equitable, there is 
no competent proof upon which a finding of damage can 
be predicated. The detracting influences, if such they 
may be called, have had their effect upon these properties 
of the plaintiffs for the last twenty years, and there is 
no proof from which it may be inferred or found that 
the coming of the defendant's plant affected or depreci-
ated the value of these properties here involved in any 
respect whatsoever. No expert witness of the plaintiffs 
has told us what would be the value of any one of the 
properties with the brick yard operating as it did for 
twenty years. No wi~ness has testified as to the differ-
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ence in value of any of the properties of the plaintiffs 
with the brick yards operating, in one instance, and the 
defendant's plant operating, in the other. Assume that 
all these conditions are thrown aside. It is submitted 
that the finding of the Court as to the damage is without 
foundation in the evidence and is excessive in fact. 
It is submitted that the weight of the testimony, in 
view of all that has been said and done in this case, 
compels a finding that no plaintiff has been in any respect 
damaged by having the value of his property in any wise 
depreciated by the presence of defendant's plant. 
Speculative Value of Lands too Remote to Be 
the Predicate of Damages 
It is common knowledge that what will make property 
more attractive to one person will in some cases make it 
less attractive to another. There is no dispute about the 
fact that a great many people consider that properties 
have been decreased in value when even churches are lo-
cated in close proximity thereto. Others will have the view-
point that properties are made less valuable by the coming 
into the community of certain individuals.· A bad neighbor 
can often make your home very undesirable. Trespassing 
children, especially when they belong to someone besides 
yourself, often have a tendency to decrease the joys of 
life. The presence of negroes is always regarded as 
detrimental by the whites. 
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But the law of the land cannot speculate and deal 
with all of these various peculiar tastes of men or future 
speculative values of land. The law itself recognizes 
that it has a very narrow zone within which it may 
properly function. l\Iatters of taste and the congeniality 
of neighbors or of neighborhoods, and their standing 
socially or in the business 'vorld, even their color or 
their integrity, must be disregarded by the law of the 
land; otherwise all society would be in a constant jangle 
and furore. 
Assume for the argument, and for that purpose only, 
that the value of the plaintiffs' homes has been materially 
decreased by the presence of the defendant's plant. The 
finding of the Court is that the real estate will grow just 
as good and just as much garden produce with the ren-
dering plant present as with it absent; that no one's 
health living in any of the plaintiffs' homes will 
be affected; then it seems that under those circumstances, 
logic and reason drive us back to the conclusion that this 
decrease in value, if any decrease exists, is because of 
personal taste or personal discomfort, and the rule of 
law seems to be very well established that individuals, 
as members of society, must tolerate a certain amount 
of personal discomfort. 
Before anyone can say that there have been substan-
tial damages to be recognized by law, he must make it 
manifest to any fairly instructed eye, and it must be such 
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as can be shown by a plain witness to a plain juryman. 
There is not a particle of doubt that the passing of a 
heavy engine at a high rate of speed through Benjamin, 
the blowing of whistles and the ringing of bells and the 
·vibrations that are incident to this event, all make life 
a little less desirable in any of the residences that are 
even within 2500 feet of the railroad; and there is not a 
particle of doubt that any one living in any of these 
houses in and about Benjamin must endure these noises 
and these vibrations. Whether he likes it or not the 
law affords him no ground of complaint. All the plain-
tiffs live as close, if not closer, to the railroad than to 
defendant's plant. 
This subdivision 5 (e) involves a specification of er-
ror in which is included the specific findings of the Court 
with reference to ownership, value and damage in the 
case of each of the ten plaintiffs. We have already 
pointed out the in1propriety of such findings with refer-
ence to the plaintiffs John Anderson, Edward Ludlow 
and Mrs. Hansen. Included within this specification of 
error is likewise the basic error to be found throughout 
the Court's findings, conclusions and decree in finding 
a nuisance value of the property and damage. 
The Court finds (Abs. 384) Finding No. 1 of its 
original findings, that the plaintiffs are the owners of 
the lands respectively referred to and described in the 
amended complaint, thus including in this finding the 
lands of John Anderson, which he testified he did not 
own, but that his wife owned; the lands described as 
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the lands of Margaret D. Hansen, a substantial portion 
of 'vhich belongs to the estate of her deceased husband; 
and the lands described as the lands of Edward Ludlow, 
the title to 'Yhich he testified 'vas Yested in his son. These 
are all the general basic grounds upon '""hich this speci-
fication of error rests. 
Specification of Error 5(f) 
In addition to those already pointed out, there are 
some detailed specific grounds covered by subdivision (f) 
applying to one plaintiff and not the other. Specifically 
these latter consist of the evidence which shows that much 
of the improvements placed upon the lands of John An-
derson, Rufus Anderson, Paul E. Swartz and John Angus 
were placed thereon after the beginning of the original op-
erations of defendant but before the rebuilding of the de-
fendant's plant. The Court has allowed in these specific 
findings full value and full damage for all such improve-
ments placed upon the lands of the various plaintiffs 
between the original date of commencement of defend-
ant's plant and the date of the fire. 
One of two situations must be ultimately determined 
by this Court on appeal, either that the damage was per-
manent, on the one hand, as found by the lower Court, 
in which event the cause of action became complete at 
the commencement of defendant's operations, and barred 
by the Statute of Limitations, or that the damages are 
temporary, intermittent and occasional, in which event 
the decision of the lower Court would have to be reversed 
as based and predicated upon a fundamentally wrong 
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basis or measure of damage. In either event, the decision 
of the lower Court must be reversed. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 6 
This specification of error is based upon the lower 
Court's conclusions of law. The principal arguments in 
this brief are made for the purpose of demonstrating that 
just the contrary should have been the Court's conclu-
sions, that is to say, that there was no nuisance, plaintiffs 
are not entitled to damage, and that the Court erred in 
not concluding that the defendant's plant as located was 
reasonable and lawful. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 7 
It would necessarily follow if any of the contentions 
of the appellant herein are correct the decree of the low-
er Court would of necessity have to be reversed either 
in whole or in part. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 8 
It is respectfully submitted that this defendant was 
entitled to have the lower Court find: 
(a) That the defendant's plant has actually ben-
efited the health and comfort of the community by the 
removal of carcasses and offal that were formerly left 
on the premises of the plaintiff to stink, decay and ul-
timately bleach. So far as the plaintiffs' testimony is 
concerned, it simply confirms in part, if not in its en-
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tirety, the contention of defendant's witnesses with ref-
erence to this in1portant n1atter. Sueh a finding would 
determine the propriety and the reasonableness of the 
location of defendant ·s plant. 
(b) That since the building of defendant's plant 
the plaintiffs Edwin Selene, John Anderson, Rufus An-
derson and Paul Swartz have all built improvements on 
their property. This was a fact defendant was entitled 
to have found, in order that the appropriate law could be 
applied thereto and any element of d~mage or deprecia-
tion to these improvements eliminated from the judgment 
of the Court. The lower Court appreciated the rule of 
law, but it is submitted applied it to the improper period, 
namely, since the rebuilding of the plant rather than from 
the beginning of operations. 
(c) That the plaintiffs had profited by the build-
ing and operation of defendant's plant, had patronized 
it, and had even acquiesced in its location and existence 
to the point of assisting in its operation and construction, 
and originally in the selection of the site by the defend-
ant for the purposes used. Such acquiescence in the be-
ginning does not and cannot support the present ob-
jections of the plaintiffs. The cases so holding are cited 
elsewhere in this brief. 
(d) As to the condition of the property upon which 
its plant is located, and particularly the sump, during the 
twenty-oda years the property was operated as a brick 
plant. 
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(e) That the defendant operated its plant in a 
sanitary manner. To this effect is all the competent evi-
dence in the case. 
Throughout this extensive record, there is no evi-
dence of the plant itself being operated improperly or 
in an unsanitary manner. There is some evidence that 
the manure pile maintained in connection with the ren-
dering plant is unsanitary, but the evidence even of the 
plaintiffs' witnesses is to the effect that it is no more 
unsanitary, if as much so, as the manure piles and the 
stock feeding yards of the plaintiffs, in which there is 
to be found manure up to the belly of the stock being fed. 
(f) That the action was dismissed as to Maylan 
Carter. This is the fact, as we have heretofore pointed 
out. 
(g) That the non-condensable gases produced by 
defendant's cooking operations were consumed in passing 
through the fire of the boiler, and that nothing but the 
smoke irom their consumption reaches the atmosphere. 
There is no evidence to the contrary. This fact is clearly 
shown by the evidence which we have herein pointed out. 
(h) The installation of screens over all openings 
since the original trial of the case. In page 8, Findings 
of Fact No. 8 of the Court's original findings, included in 
par. 1 of the Court's final findings by reference, the 
Court found: 
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"That the defendant's plant has been oper-
ated "~ithout screens and tends to attract flies and 
the particular specie8 of flies kno\Yn as blo'v flies.'' 
In Finding No. 4 (Abs. 395), the Court finds, upon 
the second trial of this case, that the defendant's plant 
at the time of re-opening of the case and the trial of is-
sues relating to damage, was being operated in a manner 
similar to that described in the Court's former memor-
andum, entirely ignoring, although it stands uncontra-
dicted, the evidence of the defendant (Abs. 370: Mr. 
Soble) that they have made some changes in the plant 
since the last hearing of the case; that they have entirely 
equipped the building with screens and made changes in 
the grease basin or septic tank so that there is no refuse 
that goes into the pond except clear water. 
In spite of the fact that the only allegation of injury 
either in the amended complaint or in the supplemental 
complaint is the odors produced by the defendant's plant, 
the Court permitted a very large amount of evidence to 
be received concerning flies and rats, and no doubt the 
Court took the finding above set forth in its original 
findings into consideration in arriving at the damage, but 
it is respectfully submitted that this element of damage 
is entirely beyond the scope of the complaint or any 
pleadings in the case. 
The Court's 9th Finding of Fact is interesting in 
this particular and would tend very definitely to establish 
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the conclusion that the defendant's plant was not a 
nuisance. Finding No. 9 reads: (Abs. 389) 
"That the operation of defendant's plant, if 
operated in a proper location and sanitary Inan-
ner is desirable and beneficial in the interest of 
public health and sanitation since it results in the 
gathering of carcasses of animals which "\Vould 
otherwise, in many cases, be left unburied or in-
sufficiently buried and be allowed to contan1inate 
the surrounding atmosphere with noxious odors 
as well as constitute a feeding and breeding place 
for flies and vermin." 
The Court makes no finding of fact that the location 
of defendant's plant is not a proper location, nor does 
it find that the plant is operated in an unsatisfactory 
manner. Without a finding to this effect it is to be 
assumed that the plant, from the findings as found by 
the Court, is a decided benefit to the specific locality in 
which it is located. If so, its location would almost 
necessarily be a proper location. 
(i) The defendant was entitled to a finding that 
plaintiffs' lands were not depreciated by the defendant's 
plant. This, together with sub-divisions (j), (k) and 
(I) are thoroughly discussed throughout this brief, and 
needs little further discussion at this point. 
There is no finding of fact by the Court as to the 
character of the community. In paragraphs 10 and 11 
of the lower Court's original memorandum decision, 
adopted by reference in the Court's Finding of Fact No. 
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1, we have the only finding the Court made as to the 
nature of the locality. In. paragraph 10 it is true the 
Court says (Abs. 390): 
''that the area occupied by defendant's plant can-
not be classed as an industrial area.'' 
This is a conclusion of law, pure and simple, and is not a 
finding of a fact or the statement of a fact. 
When the Court finds that there is a pea vinery, a sug-
ar factory, a railroad and formerly a brick yard it is find-
ing the facts. It should have also found two railroads, sev-
eral stock and feed yards, flour mill, and formerly an alfal-
fa mill, ·w·oolloading platforms, beet storage and loading 
station and cattle loading yards and chutes on the rail-
roads and the steel mills not far away. There is no con-
clusion of law that in view of these facts this area is a 
residential district; in fact, there is no finding of fact 
from which the conclusion that it is a residential district 
could be drawn, and certainly no evidence to sustain any 
such finding. The very beginning of paragraph 10 "that 
the defendant's plant is located in an area which is es-
sentially agricuRural'' is likewise a conclusion of law, but 
the decree is not based upon any such conclusion, because 
the Court does not include any such conclusion of law in 
its ''Conclusions of Law'' as filed. If we take paragraphs 
10 and 11 above referred to and consider the actual find-
ings, then only one conclusion can possibly be drawn 
therefrom, and that is that the defendant's plant IS 
properly located, so far as environment is concerned. 
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THIS IS A SUIT IN EQUITY 
This action is basically one for equitable relief, 
permanently enjoining, forbidding and restraining the 
defendant from further continuing to operate the ren-
dering plant at Benjamin. The sole ground for recovery 
pleaded is the odors produced by defendant's plant. 
The damages allowed by the Court were not confined 
to the pleadings (see par. 8 of the Court's findings, Abs. 
389). 
As has been suggested heretofore, this is an equity 
appeal, and appellant is entitled to a review by this 
Court of the facts, as well as the law. The degree of 
proof to substantiate an equitable cause of action prop-
erly pleaded exceeds that which is required to satisfy 
a law court, that is to say, something besides a mere 
preponderance of the evidence is necessary to properly 
invoke the extraordinary relief granted by a court of 
equity. There is neither evidence nor finding to satisfy 
such a requirement of proof. Unless this Court, sitting 
as a court of review, is satisfied far beyond a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, the granting of equitable 
relief could not be justified. In the recent case of Starley 
v. Deseret Foods Corporation, 93 Ut. 577, 74 Pac. (2d} 
1221 to 1225, this Court said, in speaking of equitable 
relief: 
''The evidence must be clear, convincing and 
~ :;:fy6~ II. :}~) 7 7 'ufa.Jv /31, 
$1-d.- jevv·14LJ~. 
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·~lo Right in Trial Court to Retain Jurisdiction for 
Pttrpose of .... -1ssess'ing Legal Damages. 
If the legal demand is incidental to equitable relief, 
and is averred and proved along with the equitable de-
utand, it n1ay be detern1ined in a court of equity, but 
unless there is some substantial ground of equitable 
jurisdiction~ both alleged and proved, then there is 
nothing to 'vhich the legal demand may attach itself, 
and consequently equity has no jurisdiction to retain. 
The real purpose of the action was not to regulate the 
operation of the plant, and no allegation was made that 
it was improperly or negligently operated, but it was 
to abate and prevent all operation. 
In Graeff v. Felix, 200 Pa. St. 37, 49 Atl. 758 (1901), 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said: 
"It is quite true, as held by the learned 
judge below, that equity, having acquired juris-
diction of a case, may decide all matters incident-
ally connected with it, so as to make a final deter-
mination of the whole subject; but this rule does 
not extend to a case where only some incidental 
matter is of equitable cognizance, and thereby 
enable the court to dra'v in a main subject of 
controversy which has a distinct and appropriate 
legal remedy of its own." 
And in Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. 951 (1898) it is 
said: 
"While a court of equity, having taken juris-
diction of a case for one purpose, will, in general, 
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retain it for all purposes, so as to do complete 
justice, still, where it has obtained jurisdiction 
only to pass upon the validity of a decree of fore-
closure, it cannot go further, and pass upon the 
validity of the mortgages themselves, and of the 
title sought to be conveyed thereby." 
These two cases are merely illustrative of the rule 
that incidental matters, even though of equitable cog-
nizance, cannot constitute a basis for the retention of 
jurisdiction to grant legal relief where all substantial 
grounds of equity jurisdiction have failed of proof. 
The substantial ground in this case was that the 
rendering plant in its location in Benjamin was a nui-
sance because Benjamin was a strictly residential com-
munity. It was not claimed by the plaintiffs that there 
had been any negligent operation of a rendering plant 
that was properly located, but it was claimed that be-
cause of the character of the community the plant could 
not be located in that community at all; that to locate it 
and operate there even with most extreme caution was 
unlawful. 
This basic claim of the plaintiffs failed of proof. 
This basic claim not only was asserted as a ground of 
recovery, but was a predicate upon which the right of 
the plaintiffs to join was sustained by the trial Court. 
The cause of action stated by the plaintiffs as joined 
was the alleged wrongful location of this rendering 
plant, and when the location was shown to be legal and 
not unlawful, then the right to join failed along with 
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the right to abate. The cause of action, if any, which 
each of the owners of the separate and distinct tracts 
of land had to recover damages for depreciation of the 
value of that land is not in any sense joint. There are 
eleven different tracts of land, and if causes of action 
exist at all for damages, consisting of a depreciation of 
the value of this land, they are eleven separate and 
distinct causes of action. 
The case as presented is son1ewhat similar to that of 
Benson v. Rozz·elle, 85 Ut. 582, 39 Pac. (2d) 1113, decided 
by this Court in 193-±. In that case the Trial Court found a 
partnership, ordered a dissolution and directed an ac-
counting. The case was brought to this court upon appeal 
and by means of a writ of review, and on inspection of 
the record it was found that there was no evidence 
whatever of a partnership. This court then held that 
there being no partnership, the Trial Court was without 
jurisdiction to order an accounting. The writ of review 
was sustained and the judgment of the Trial Court was 
reversed. 
Apply the reasoning of the Rozzelle case to the case 
at bar, and is not the conclusion compelled that when 
the Trial Court has denied the equitable relief of in-
junction and abatement, that court is then without juris-
diction to retain the case for the purpose of attempting 
to assess damages~ In this case the Trial Court has 
refused to enjoin, has declined to grant any equitable 
relief, has found against the plaintiffs below, in and so 
far as the matters of equitable cognizance are concerned, 
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and consequently the Trial Court has no jurisdiction 
to retain. 
It is submitted that under the case of Dahl v. Utah 
Oil Refining Co., 71 Ut. 1, there is and can be no right 
of recovery, either at law or in equity, by the plaintiffs 
below, and that the Trial Court was without jurisdiction 
to proceed to a determination of any issue of damages-
in fact, there is no cause of action existing in favor of 
any plaintiff. 
The Dahl case controls in fact, the case at bar. It con-
clusively appears that damages cannot be awarded either 
as a substitute for equitable relief or in addition to equit-
able relief, or even as the consequences of an action at law. 
We get right down to where this Court got in the Dahl 
case, except that that case did not involve a misjoinder of 
parties or of causes of action, which makes it all the more 
decisive as to the present case. The Dahl case further 
differs from the case at bar because in that case evidently 
the trial court found that the question was one for the 
jury. Though this Court on an appeal of a law question 
would and should hesitate to interfere with the judg-
ment of the trial court, who has seen the witnesses and 
noticed their demeanor on the stand, yet this Court in 
the Dahl case unanimously reversed the trial court be-
cause they were unable to say, as a matter of law, that 
a case of unreasonable use or actionable nuisance was 
made out. This Court emphatically said: 
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• • No precedent for sustaining liability under 
siinilar circwnstances has been cited and we have 
found none. H (71 Utah, 14) 
In the case at bar, on the contrary, this Court is 
charged w·ith the duty of reviewing the evidence, as 
well as the law··, 'vhich distinction between the two cases 
makes the ruling of this Court in the Dahl case more con-
clusively in favor of the appellant herein. This opinion 
was concurred in by the entire Court, including my 
worthy opponent on this appeal, Judge Elias Hansen. 
The only consequence that has resulted from the pres-
ence of the plant or is shown by the findings of the Court is 
that there has been some personal discomfort. That per-
sonal discomfort, if such there was, has undoubtedly been 
sustained by every person who lived in the vicinity of the 
plant or happened to be in that vicinity. Such personal 
discomfort is not and cannot be in any wise connected 
with the ownership of the realty. It does not form the 
proper basis for joinder of plaintiffs. It would make 
not a particle of difference as to the effect of that dis-
comfort whether a man owned ten acres, one acre or not 
even a foot of property in the vicinity of the plant. If he 
merely happened to be in the community he might en-
dure some slight personal discomfort that is occasion-
ally caused by the presence of any industry, either de-
fendant's plant or such a plant as the Columbia Steel 
plant a little farther up the tracks. If one could so tor-
ture the evidence as to make out a personal injury to 
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someone who might breathe in the odors, it would be a 
strictly personal action. A remedy for such an injury 
is wholly disassociated from the ownership or possession 
of real or personal property, or of the action here 
pleaded. Here again we call attention to the Wasatch 
case. In paragraph 15 of the syllabi (92 Ut. 50, 63 Pac. 
(2d) 1071): 
"'Vhere case is one in equity, rule that equity 
having once taken jurisdiction of cause will re-
tain it for purpose of administering full and com-
plete relief, does not apply when facts relied on to 
sustain equity jurisdiction entirely fail of estab-
lishment. ' ' 
The Court in this case dealt with the Kinsman case, 
Kinsman v. Utah Gas cf; Coke Co., 55 Ut. 10, 177 Pac. 
418. After reviewing the facts in that case the Court 
said: 
''The Kinsman case stands for this: That 
where the evidence shows actionable nuisance but 
there is an intervening fact such as delay on the 
part of plaintiff in bringing the suit so that the 
equity court will not enjoin the operation of the 
plant, damages will be assessed in lieu of equitable 
relief and that such damages will be fixed by the 
court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.'' 
If there is no actionable nuisance proven, the fact that 
the Court finds an intervening fact such as delay on the 
part of the plaintiff in bringing suit, as the lower Court 
did in this case, cannot justify the application of the rule 
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above announced, and thereby confer jurisdiction on the 
part of the equity court to assess damages. Its basic 
jurisdiction n1ust be predicated on a finding properly 
supported by the evidence that there is a nuisance such 
as to justif~- the intervention of equity. 
In the Kinsman case !fr. Justice Gideon said: 
"The cause is therefore remanded, with di-
rections to the district court to allow amendments 
to the pleadings if desired, and proceed to hear 
testimony and determine the past and future 
damages to each plaintiff by reason of the con-
tinued and perpetual operation of the company's 
plant at its present capacity, and to make sep-
arate findings upon such issue of fact, and enter 
judgment or judgments accordingly; or the court 
may call to its assistance a jury to determine the 
amount, if any, of such damages, as in other equit-
able proceedings.'' (Italics ours) 53 Utah, 24. 
~Ir. Justice Frick cited cases from the United States 
Supreme Court and from the State of New York. The 
Court then said : 
"In the foregoing cases it is held that where 
business enterprises constitute a continuing nui-
sance, like defendant's gas plant, and an injunc-
tion is refused as a matter of right, the damages 
may, nevertheless, be assessed in the equity ac-
tion; that is, the court may deny the injunction as 
a matter of right, but may assess the damages 
caused by the nuisance in that action." 
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It is plain from these quotations that this Court, in 
deciding the Kinsman case, treated and considered the 
damages which it ordered assessed as equitable and 
not legal in character. It may be that the Court erred 
in considering the delay of the plaintiffs in bringing their 
suit in the Kinsman case as an intervening fact, just as 
the lower Court in this case may have made the same 
error, but nevertheless the principle upon which the 
Kinsman case was decided was that the delay was an 
intervening fact and that such intervening fact prevented 
the granting of an injunction as a matter of right. The 
Court, however, granting damages in lieu of such injunc-
tion, never for one moment stepped out of equity and 
into the law. It is hardly to be presumed that this Court 
failed to appreciate the distinction which exists between 
an action where eleven plaintiffs join in a complaint 
seeking an injunction and abatement, and a case where 
eleven plain tiffs join seeking the remedy of damages, 
the damage of each plaintiff being different from the 
damage of each other plaintiff. 
In the case at bar, the lower Court undertook to 
find, if anything, legal damages, not equitable damages. 
The damages were for loss of market value of real estate, 
as found by the Court, whereas, as disclosed by the 
evidence, they were for personal discomfort. The Court 
exercising such equitable powers need not call in a jury, 
and, as in the case at bar, gave to the defendant no 
opportunity for a trial by jury. Whenever in such a 
case the basic ground of equitable jurisdiction has been 
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established by the evidence, which, of course the appel-
lant contends 'v-as not the case in the case at bar, then 
the case remains as it was in the beginning, equitable in 
character, and the relief granted, whether that relief 
consists of an injunction or a decree for specific perform-
ance or damages in lieu of such drastic remedies, is 
equitable and not legal. This is clearly the effect of the 
decision of this Court in the case of Wasatch Oil Refining 
Company v. Wade. 
The action which this Court atten1pted to try com-
mencing October 17, 1939 (Abs. 393) was not one action, 
but it was eleven actions at law to recover eleven dif-
ferent judgments. In any one of these eleven judg-
ments the owner of the property would have a separate 
and distinct ownership from that of all other plaintiffs. 
The cause of action, if cause of action there was, would 
be entirely different from that which might exist, if one 
could exist, with reference to each other piece of prop-
erty. In the instant case, one of these eleven causes of 
action was dismissed. 
We have heretofore in discussing these several cases 
definitely pointed out how separate and distinct they 
are, and how in the various causes of action we find dif-
ferent facts and circumstances, different defenses, and 
cases calling for different results, even upon the assump-
tion that there is a nuisance maintained by defendant. 
Personal discomfort, as has been pointed out, may be 
suffered by a man who owns no property. Even the chi}.. 
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dren of plaintiffs' families may have suffered personal 
discomfort. From that standpoint each such personal 
discomfort is actionable. Those children would have just 
as sound a cause of action as would any of the plain-
tiffs. It would be a suit in the nature of a personal in-
jury, certainly not a suit involving a nuisance, either 
as defined by the statutes herein quoted or by the common 
law. It would not be assignable. It would be similar to 
infecting a person with germs, or exposing him to the 
yellow fever. These actions would be actions at law, 
where the pain, suffering, loss of health or employment 
would all be elements to be considered in determining 
the amount of any verdict that might be rendered. No 
lawyer would contend that such an action to recover for 
such an injury would have the slightest equitable feature 
about it, or permit of numerous such suits to be joined 
in one action to collect damages. 
There Being no Basis for Equitable Relief, There Is a 
Misjoinder of Parties Plaintiff. 
Since the plaintiffs have no joint or common inter-
est in the damages sustained by each other, and the 
actions of the plaintiffs thus are misjoined, the suit 
must be dismissed. The lower Court erred in failing so 
to do. 
This contention is based upon the assumption, in-
dulged in for the purpose of argument only, that each of 
the owners of the eleven tracts of land is the owner and 
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has a cause of action, legal in character, to recover dam-
ages from the defendant because of the maintenance and 
operation of its plant. 
See the case of Reynolds v. liVarner, heretofore in 
this brief discussed in connection with Specification of 
Error N" o. 3 (page 87). 
It may be added that the statutory prohibition against 
misjoinder of parties plaintiff, and the improper union 
of cause8 of action, cannot be defeated by alleging an 
equitable cause of action which does not exist. 
It might be said that no demand was made for a 
jury in this case. The original trial of this case com-
menced the 3rd of April, 1939 and continued to April 
27th. The cause of action stated in the complaint then 
was strictly equitable in character. Of course no demand 
for a jury was made prior to the trial. It would be a 
ridiculous proposition to think that part of the case 
could be tried without a jury and then part of it tried 
with a jury. When the equitable features failed of estab-
lishment the defendant's plea of misjoinder commenced 
to operate. It did not operate merely to a partial extent. 
It operated to the extent of requiring a dismissal of the 
action. If a jury had then been called it would have acted 
only in an advisory capacity. On the theory upon which 
the Court resumed the trial on Oct. 17, 1939, that the 
action was still equitable, the demand for a jury would 
have availed nothing. The plea of misjoinder of parties 
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plaintiff stood out as a bar against a judgment in favor 
of any plaintiff in any amount whatsoever. At that point 
the Court should have permitted the separation of the 
causes of action. Its refusal to do so made a demand 
for a jury trial an impossibility. We have pointed out 
that no court, much less a jury, has the machinery for 
determining property elements of alleged damage in 
eleven distinct and different types of injury. The only 
reason that a joinder of the plaintiffs could be allowed 
was that the lower Court found an equitable cause of 
action stated in their complaint, in which they were all 
jointly interested. The point of common interest was 
the injunction, but the trial was had and this common 
point failed of establishment in the proof, as required 
by the ruling in the case of Wasatch Oil Refining Com-
pany v. Wade. Then the equitable feature was gone. 
We know that the existence of a nuisance is a mat-
ter of fact and law. Courts of equity should require a 
person claiming the existence of a nuisance to make out 
that existence in a court of law before he comes into 
equity. Norback v. Board of Directors, 84 Ut. 506. 
Personal discomfort, if it can be worked into a cause 
of action at all, must constitute a personal action. The 
idea of saying that a man has been legally wronged by 
some act of the defendant and that the injury is that of 
personal discomfort, and then undertaking to establish the 
damage that should be allowed by hearing proof which 
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tends to sho'v a depreciation of the value of unimproved 
real estate o'vned by the person who endured the personal 
discomfort, but upon 'vhich no one lives to be personally 
discomforted, is 'vholly unsound, because this would re-
sult in the principle that only those 'vho happen to own 
real estate could join or recover. Other men living in the 
same community and suffering the same amount of per-
sonal discomfort, or even a greater amount, could not 
recover at all, because they did not own real property 
at the time the alleged unlawful injury was inflicted upon 
then1. The extent of personal discomfort varies with the 
physical and mental constitution of the injured person. 
One would suffer more than another in the same com-
munity. The extent of such suffering does not depend 
upon the ownership of real estate. This makes it clear 
that the alleged causes of action are strictly personal 
in nature, that they are non-existent as a matter of law. 
The personal discomforts complained of are of the kind 
of annoyances and inconveniences that everyone in such 
a community is required by law to endure. There is no 
special damage to the plaintiffs other than that suffered 
by the public generally. 
It Is Contended by the Plaintiffs That They May 
Join Together in One Action. 
This contention is made in the face of the fact that 
there are at least eleven separate, individually-owned 
tracts of land described in the complaint. The proposi-
tion has often been laid down that several persons injured 
by a nuisance common to all may unite in seeking equit-
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able relief, although they own distinct property interests 
and the injury is not joint but merely common, and this 
statement, when properly understood, is true, but they 
cannot join when the object of the suit is to restrain 
that which is a distinct and special injury to each of their 
properties. 
In the case of Davidson v. Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. 186, 
the Court said : 
''Where several complainants unite in a bill 
of this kind, the injury or grievance complained of 
must be common to all. The several complain-
ants cannot unite their distinct and individual 
causes of complaint, and by their combination 
make a case of nuisance, which separately would 
not establish the complaint.'' 
The same equitable principle was applied to the 
Kinsman case, in which it was said: 
''In the very nature of things, any noxious or 
offensive odors given off by defendant's plant 
would gradually diminish as the distance in-
creases, and the relief to plaintiffs, whose hon1es 
are near the gas plant, might and should differ 
from the relief which should be granted to those 
whose residences are at greater distances from 
the defendant's plant." 
We are not dealing in this case as in the Kinsman 
case with rows of homes built close to each other on 
small city lots (all 59 homes were within a radius of 
132 to 800 feet from the plant) but rather with a few 
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ranch houses separated by tracts of land located in dif-
ferent directions from the plant and at distances vary-
ing from 650 ft. to three-quarters of a mile. 
It 'vould be rather fanciful to assume that the odor 
would be so substantial three-quarters of a mile away as 
to justify the granting of an injunction. Yet plaintiffs 
would undertake to make these complaints about odors 
near the plant which are distinct, individual causes of 
complaint, 'vork a nuisance in favor of the most remote 
plaintiff. This under the ]\T ew Jersey case cannot be 
done, and under the Kinsman case was not done because 
the Court, by authorizing the amendment on remand, 
treated the causes of action of the individual plaintiffs as 
separate and distinct, even suggesting separate appeals 
as to each plaintiff. 
The case of Fogg v. Nevada C. 0. R. Co., 20 Nev. 
429, 23 Pac. 840, was decided in 1890 by Chief Justice 
Hawley, one of the most learned judges who ever graced 
the bench. What did he say in the case cited~ Three 
plaintiffs, Fogg, Brookins and Peterson were the separ-
ate owners of three certain town lots in Reno, Nevada. 
Each of said plaintiffs had a dwelling house upon his 
lot in which he resided with his family, consisting, among 
others, of children of tender years. The said premises 
abutted and fronted on East street. The defendant rail-
road company had constructed a railroad track in the 
middle of the public street and raised it six or eight 
inches above the level of the street. It was claimed that 
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said tracks and railroads so constructed ''are an existing, 
continuing and constantly recurring nuisance and ob-
struction in said East Street." It was claimed that it 
made the street extremely dangerous, especially for 
children of tender years, and rendered destruction by 
fire of each of said plaintiffs' houses extremely probable; 
that it interfered with the approach of vehicles to each 
of the plaintiff's residences; that freight cars were left 
standing for hours at a time in front of these houses; 
that these annoyances and others of a kindred character, 
not necessary, to specify, were constantly recurring, and 
greatly decreased the value of the premises of the 
plaintiffs, all to their irreparable damage. The prayer 
was for an abatement and an injunction. No damages 
were asked. 
Now, it seems that we have a case directly in point 
with the complaint in the case at bar. It will not do to 
say that Judge Hawley did not understand the legal 
and equitable procedure. He said: 
''Did the court err in sustaining the demur-
rers to this complaint~ To enable the plaintiffs 
to maintain this action, it must he clearly shown 
that they have sustained or will sustain, a special 
and peculiar injury, irreparable in its nature, 
and different in kind from that sustained by the 
general public.'' 
He then quoted Section 3273 of the Nevada statutes, 
which is identical with Section 7240 of the Compiled Laws 
of Utah, 1917. In fact, a comparison reveals no dif. 
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ference, even in phraseology, between the two statutes, 
and he said: 
"This statute, instead of changing, simply 
affirn1s the rule above stated.'' (Citing author-
ities) ''It '""as copied from the statute of Califor-
nia, and, prior to its adoption by the l~gislature 
of this state, the supreme court of that state, in 
construing the statute, held in Blanc v. Klumpke, 
that if the nuisance con1plained of only affects 'the 
plaintiff in common with the public at large, al-
though in a greater degree, he cannot have his 
private action.' 29 Cal. 159'' 
He then points out that this same principle, under 
the same statute, was ultimately affirmed in other Cali-
fornia cases, citing them. 
What becomes of the argument to the effect that 
the injury to the plaintiffs in the case at bar was the 
same in kind but different in degree! 
rna: 
Hawley said, quoting the Supreme Court of Califor-
''If it only affects the plaintiff in common 
with the public at large, although in a greater 
degree, he cannot have his private action.'' 
After discussing the claims of the appellant, he said: 
''The averment relative to the branch track 
does not merit any consideration, as it is not 
specific enough to enable us to determine whether 
or not any special injury other than is alleged by 
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the construction of the main track, is occasioned 
thereby.'' 
Again he says : 
''Injunctions ought not to be granted in cases 
of this character, unless 'the threatened use of 
property or the act sought to be restrained is 
clearly shown to be such as leaves no doubt of 
its injurious results; such results as are recog-
nized to be substantial legal injuries. The bill must 
set forth such a state of facts as leaves no room 
for doubt upon the question of nuisance, for, if 
there is any doubt upon that point, the benefit 
will be given to the defendant. Mere allegations 
of conclusions or opinions as to the contemplated 
injuries are not sufficient, the precise manner in 
which he is to be injured must be stated.' Garnett 
v. Railroad Co., 20 Fla. 902. In Lewiston T. Co. 
v. Shasta & W. W. R. A. Co., the court said, citing 
from previous cases, 'that where the damages are 
special-that is, such as do not necessarily arise, 
or are not implied by law, from the act complained 
of-the facts out of which the damages arise must 
be averred in the complaint.'' 
And then he takes up the question of the sufficiency 
of the allegation of danger, and he quotes from Wood on 
Nuisance as follows: 
''The courts very wisely have unswervingly 
adhered to the rule that an individual, in order to 
be entitled to a recovery for injuries sustained 
from a public nuisance, must make out a clear case 
of special damages to himself, apart from the rest 
of the public, and of a different character, so that 
they cannot fairly be said to be a part of the com-
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mon injury resulting therefron1. It is not enough 
that he has sustained n1ore damage than another; 
it 1nust be of a different character, special and 
apart fron1 that \vhich the public in general sus-
tain, and not such as is common to every person 
\vho exercises the right that is injured.'' Wood 
on }luisance, 646. 
We are entitled to infer from the allegations of 
plaintiffs' complaint that the great damage is suffered 
by the entire con1munity, that is, the public at large. It 
is not alleged that the damages of the plaintiffs are dif-
ferent in character or special and apart from those which 
the public in general sustain. Later on in the opinion 
Justice Hawley says: 
''The mere fact that the alleged inconvenience 
and annoyance is greater in degree to the plain-
tiffs than it is to other citizens does not authorize 
a private action to be maintained. All the author-
ities agree that, to support the action, the damage 
must be different, not merely in degree but differ-
ent in kind, from that suffered in com1non; hence 
it has been well settled that, though the plaintiff 
may suffer more inconvenience than others from 
the obstruction by reason of his proximity to the 
highway, that will not entitle him to maintain an 
action.'' 
A long list of authorities is cited, and he then passes 
to the question of misjoinder. He says: 
''The bill is objectionable on the ground of a 
misjoinder of parties. The complainants are own-
ers of several and distinct lots, having no common 
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interest, but seeking to enforce several and dis-
tinct claims. They seek to enforce no common 
right, as in case of right of common, nor to obtain 
relief against a common wrong. * * * The bill 
seems to have been framed under the impression 
that the nuisance was a grievance common to all 
the land-owners, and therefore, that all might 
properly be joined. But each complainant seeks 
relief for special injury to his own property by 
the construction of the railroad. On this ground 
the bill is clearly demurrable.'' (Citing author-
ities) 
In Hudson v. Maddison, 12 Sim. 416, 35 Eng. Chane. 
362, 59 Reprint, 1192. 
''In the present case the bill is filed by five 
persons each having a separate tenement; and 
they represent that the erection of the steam 
engine and chimney will operate as a nuisance to 
all of them. They, therefore, have joined their 
cases together. It is obvious, however, that as 
each of them has a separate nuisance to coinplain 
of, that which is an answer to one may not be an 
answer to the other; and if, upon such a bill, a 
decree were to be pronounced, it must be a de-
cree which would provide for five different cases; 
and I do not think that such a decree could be 
made.'' 
In Burroughs v. City of Dallas, 276 Fed. 812, the 
plaintiff sought to restrain the operation of a scenic 
railway as a nuisance. This scenic railway was main-
tained on the exposition grounds of the City of Dallas 
and it was alleged that it disturbed the occupants of the 
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plainti:ff~s property, a boarding house, resulting in a 
substantial in1pairment of the value of that property, 
lessening the revenue and rendering it less beneficial. 
There was a conflict in the evidence and the lower Court 
denied the injunction. The Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the Fifth Circuit said: 
"It is familiar law that injunction will not 
issue to enforce a right that is doubtful, or to re-
strain an act the injurious consequences of which 
are merely trifling. If the evidence be conflicting 
and the injury doubtful, this extraordinary remedy 
properly may be withheld when it is applied for 
before the asserted right has been established at 
law. Consolidated Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 
177 U.S. 296, 20 Sup. Ct. 628, 44 L. Ed. 777; Park-
er v. Winnepiseogee Lake Cotton & Wollen Co., 
2 Black 545, 17 L. Ed. 333. '' 
City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260 
ill. 111, 102 N. E. 992. 
In this case a decree had been found for the com-
plainant and an appeal was taken from that decree. The 
facts were reviewed and the Court laid down this rule : 
''The existence of a nuisance not having been 
established by an action at law before bringing 
this suit in chancery, under all the authorities 
the facts must be clearly established, and the law 
be without question before an injunction \vill is-
sue. No such strong or exceptional case of such 
pressing necessity as would justify the interfer-
ence of a court of equity exists here.'' 
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See also Stoddard v. Snodgrass (Ore), 241 Pac. 73. 
''The law cannot take notice of things which 
are not offensive to normal persons. If it did there 
would be no limit to litigation." 
''Since the defendants have expended large 
sums of money in constructing the building and 
preparing the same for carrying on the business, 
should they be enjoined from conducting their 
business in said building it would result in great 
loss and hardship to them.'' 
The injunction was denied, although this undertaking 
establishment was in the vicinity of dwellings and had 
a depressing effect upon the occupants of the dwellings. 
See also Pearson v. Bonnie, 209 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 
375. The Kentucky court refused to enjoin the con-
ducting of an undertaking business in a residential por-
tion of the City of Louisville, Kentucky, because the 
injuries were not sufficiently substantial to justify an 
interference by equity with the harsh remedy of in-
junction. 
The business of the defendant in the case at bar is 
not a nuisance. The persons who have organized 
the defendant corporation have made a large investment. 
It is true it is not comparable in value with many of the 
greater plants that exist throughout the country, but the 
Court knows from the evidence that it is a substantial 
investment; that it means much to the stockholders in-
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terested in the defendant eorporation. Nothing appears 
in this co1nplaint to sho\Y that this location of the plant 
was made in bad faith or \Yith n1alicious intent to annoy 
the plaintiffs, and nothing is alleged to show that there 
was an objection by the plaintiffs to the location of this 
plant. 
The rase of Ki/nsnz.an v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 
Utah 10, 177 Pac. 418 (1918), is the case relied upon 
by the plaintiffs for a justification of their application 
for alternative relief. It seems that fifty-nine plaintiffs 
joined together in an action to enjoin the operations of the 
gas plant by the defendant. In the lower Court they 
obtained a decree. Each plaintiff had a separate and 
individual claim or right of action for damages growing 
out of the same trespass. (Quoting Judge Gideon's opin-
ion.) Both Judge Gideon and Chief Justice Frick ren-
dered opinions, whereby they suggested that even though 
equitable relief was denied, the plaintiffs might be al-
lowed to amend and the amount of each plaintiff's dam-
ages might be determined without requiring the plaintiffs 
to bring separate actions. 
Chief Justice Frick and Justice Gideon relied upon 
statements made by l\{r. Pomeroy in his work on Equity 
Jurisprudence, where he states the law to be as follows: 
"If a person appeals to a court of equity for 
an injunction to restrain the maintenance or to 
compel the removal of the structure, the court to 
which such appeal is made has the power to deter-
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mine the amount of unpaid damages, and to with-
hold an injunction, and to direct that the structure 
be permitted to remain and be operated, provided 
the assessed damages are paid.'' Pomeroy's 
Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 473. 
Justice Gideon makes the following quotation: 
'' The rule has already been stated, as one of 
the foundations of the concurrent jurisdiction, 
that where a court of equity has obtained juris-
diction over some portion or feature of a con-
troversy, it may, and will in general, proceed to 
decide the whole issues, and to award complete 
relief, although the rights of the parties are strict-
ly legal, and the final remedy granted is of the 
kind which might be conferred by a court of law.'' 
Porn. Eq. Jur. 3rd Ed. Sec. 231. 
But notice this portion of Justice Frick's opinion: 
''A majority of the court doubt both the 
propriety and the necessity of enforcing the al-
ternative relief suggested in the quotations from 
Pomeroy; therefore both Justice Gideon and my-
self defer to their judgment, and have yielded 
assent to the judgment as stated." 
From this quotation it appears that the majority 
of the Supreme Court, consisting of Justices McCarty, 
Corfman and Thurman, did not accept the suggestions 
made by Justices Frick and Gideon, but however that 
may be, it is submitted that on account of the peculiar 
facts as they are shown by this record, there cannot be 
any retention of jurisdiction in this case for the purpose 
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of adjudicating the alleged purely legal rights of the 
plaintiffs. 
Compare later case of Norback v. Board of Directors, 
84 Ut. 506. 
The following cases cited by Justice Gideon in his 
opinion in the K~insman case are decided by the Federal 
Courts and by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and by 
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. 
Take the case of Waite v. O'Neil, 72 Fed. 348, and 
76 Fed. 408. This is the same case as decided by the 
trial court and as decided by the appellate court. In the 
trial court Judge Hammond denied specific performance 
on the ground that the enforcement of the· covenant 
would be unconscionable, and yet held that there was 
such a show of equitable cognizance in the bill that the 
case would be retained for the purpose of affording such 
other relief, even purely legal in character, as the proofs 
might justify. He said that the unconscionable character 
of the covenants did not arise out of the covenants them-
selves but out of the construction that was thereafter 
put upon them. In other words, intervening facts had 
made the covenants unconscionable, and under those 
circumstances he retained the cause for the purpose of 
granting legal relief. 
When the case came to the Court of Appeals, Circuit 
Judge Lurton held that though specific performance was 
refused, there was such a showing of equitable cogni-
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zance that the cause should be retained for the purpose 
of affording other relief, even purely legal in character, 
and it is also shown in this case that there was a failure 
to make the objection that the bill was without equity 
at the earliest possible moment. 
These two cases can be laid aside as having no 
application to the case at bar. 
The case of Combs v. Scott, 76 Wis. 664, 45 N. W. 
532, is a case for specific performance, but it appeared 
that pending the suit the statute of limitations had run 
on the contract. Therefore, the plaintiff was deprived 
of his remedy at law. Under those circumstances, and 
because of this intervening fact, the Court retained the 
case for the purpose of granting purely legal relief. 
Goddard v. American Queen, 59 N. Y. S. 46, is also 
a case for specific performance, where to grant it would 
inflict an injury upon parties innocent of any wrong. 
Under those circumstances the case comes within the 
well known principle that damages may be allowed in 
lieu of specific performance. 
It would seem that according to the opinions of Jus-
tices Frick and Gideon the rules adopted in actions where 
specific performance is sought are applicable to suits for 
injunction. 
In 25 R. C. L., p. 345, Sec. 172, the subject of damages 
in lieu of specific performance is discussed. It is pointed 
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out that a bill for specific performance of a contract will 
not be retained for the assessment of damages where a 
case is not made out for specific performance and no 
other special equity is shown which will support the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
'' The rule has been laid down that a court 
of equity will not grant pecuniary compensation 
in lieu of specific performance unless the case pre-
sented is one for equitable interposition such as 
'vould entitle the plaintiff to performance but for 
intervening facts, such as the destruction of the 
property, the conveyance of the same to an inno-
cent third person, or the refusal of the vendor's 
'vife to join in a conveyance. '' 
Bradley 1:. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504; 100 Am. Dec. 528. 
This case was decided in 1869, after the adoption of 
the Code of Civil Procedure in New York. It applies with 
peculiar force to the case at bar, because it appeared 
that damages were not alleged in the complaint nor 
claimed upon the trial. The Court said : 
"It does not appear that the plaintiff at any 
time treated the action as brought to recover dam-
ages. No such idea could be suggested by the 
complaint; no such claim appears to have been 
made at the trial. ' ' 
Under such circumstances the Court of Appeals of 
New York held that the plaintiff, not being entitled to 
equitable relief, could not in that action recover damages. 
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Dobler v. Smith, 294 Pac. 1089, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma in 1930, states: 
"We are cognizant of the fact that in certain 
cases a court of equity, when unable to grant 
specific performance of a contract, will not dis-
miss the petition, but will retain jurisdiction and 
a'vard darnages in place of such performance. 
Cornell v. Rodabaugh, 117 Iowa 287, 90 N. W. 599, 
94 Am. St. Rep. 298 ; Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. 
Martin, 227 Ill. 260, 81 N. E. 417, 10 Ann. Cas. 
227. But the rule in this regard is that a court 
of equity will not grant relief unless the parties 
asking the relief bring themselves clearly within 
the rule entitling them to specific performance, 
and that specific performance cannot be awarded 
for the reason that the corpus or the thing in ac-
tion has been disposed of, or for so1ne reason 
that a decree for specific performance would not 
give the complaining party an adequate remedy. 
Marks v. Gates (C.C.A.), 154 F. 481, 14 L. R. A. 
(N.S.) 317, 12 Ann. Cas. 120; 25 R. C. L. 346. In 
cases of that nature, that is, cases falling under 
the special circumstances indica ted, no special 
pleading in regard to damages is required.'' 
In Bourget v. Monroe, 58 Mich. 563, 25 N. W. 514 
(1885), Justice Campbell says: 
''It is claimed, however, that, if specific per-
formance cannot be granted, complainant can have 
a decree for damages. But there is no authority 
for holding that equity can grant damages unless 
there is some case of equitable relief made out 
also, to which the damages would be applicable or 
subsidiary.'' 
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See also Schook v. Zimmerman, 188 Mich. 617, 155 N. W. 
526 ( 1915). The Supreme Court of Michigan said in this 
ease: 
'' ''Thile equity will retain jurisdiction to set-
tle controversies for 'Yhich courts of law afford 
adequate relief 'vhen they are involved with and 
grow out of an equitable cause which gives the 
chancery court jurisdiction, the bare pleading in 
connection therewith of equitable rights not prov-
en, does not confer jurisdiction to try con tro-
versies, 'vhich otherwise are of exclusive law 
jurisdiction, and legal remedies administered in 
equity must be connected 'vith and grow out of 
an equitable right, both alleged and proven.'' 
See also Toledo R. R. v. St. Louis R. R., 208 Ill. 623, 70 
N. E. 715 (1904). 
As was said by Vice Chancellor Reed in the case 
of Stout v. Phoenix .Assurance Co., 65. N. J. Eq. 573, 56 
Atl. 691: 
''A court of equity in this state. can deal 
with legal questions only so far as their decision 
is incidental or essential to the determination of 
such equitable question. Merely because a court 
of equity has acquired jurisdiction for one pur-
pose, it is not empowered to retain the case for 
complete relief.'' 
Chief Justice Beasley said in Loder v. McGovern, 
48 N. J. Eq. 279, 22 Atl. 200: 
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"It is not true, by any means, that when a 
court of conscience has acquired cognizance for 
one purpose, it thereby acquires cognizance over 
the entire controversy for all purposes.'' 
But it may be said that these are cases from New 
~T ersey, where equity and law are still separate and 
distinct. Let us pass to West Virginia: 
In Wyoming Sales Co. v. Smith-Pocahontas Coal Co., 
105 W.Va. 610, 144 S. E. 410, 62 A. L. R. 740, it is said: 
"The rule that equity will retain jurisdiction 
once assumed, and dispose of all rna tters in litiga-
tion, is limited to cases where that jurisdiction has 
been rightfully invoked. An equitable right must 
be both averred and proved before a purely legal 
right will be adjudicated by a court of chancery." 
And quoting from the opinion : 
''The rule is that where a cause of action cog-
nizable at law is entertained in equity on the 
ground of some equitable relief sought by the bill, 
which it turns out cannot, for defect of proof or 
other reason, be granted, the court is without jur-
isdiction to proceed further, and should dismiss 
the bill without prejudice.'' 
10 R. C. L., Sec. 120, p. 370. 
This section states the general doctrine, which is to 
the effect that a court of equity once having assumed jur-
isdiction of a cause on any equitable ground will reach 
and draw into its consideration and determination the 
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entire subject matter, and will dispose of all matters in-
volved in the controversy, even though it is required to 
pass on strictly legal questions or grant legal remedies. 
That is the general rule, but in Section 121, on page 372, 
the rule is laid down as follows : 
""Thile it is true that a court of equity, hav-
ing once obtained jurisdiction of a cause, will re-
tain it for all purposes and administer complete 
relief, it is generally conceded, despite the exist-
ence of a few opposing decisions, which 1nay be 
characterized merely as variants from the general 
rule, that in order to authorize relief which can 
be obtained in a suit at law there must be some 
substantial ground of equitable jurisdiction, and 
if there is no equitable ground of jurisdiction and 
the remedy sought can be as well obtained in an 
action at law, a court of equity cannot retain 
jurisdiction and grant a purely legal remedy. 
Mere statements in a bill on which the chancery 
jurisdiction might be 1naintained, but which are 
not pro~red, will not suffice to authorize a decree 
on such parts of the bill as, if standing alone, 
would not give the court jurisdiction, but to justi-
fy the retention of a cause not only must some 
special and substantial ground of equitable juris-
diction be alleged, but it must also be proved on 
the hearing. For instance, a bill for specific per-
formance of a contract will not be retained for the 
assessment of damages where a case is not made 
for specific performance, and no other special 
equity is shown which will support jurisdiction 
of the court. So in general when the jurisdiction 
fails, all the power of the court also fails, except 
to ~ive judgment for costs. Otherwise, as the 
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courts have frequently pointed out, a litigant, by 
a pretended claim for equitable relief, might de-
prive his opponent of advantages incident to an 
action at law, as for instance, his constitutional 
right of trial by jury." 
1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurispr-udence, Sec. 237, p. 341. 
''The award of mere co1npensatory damages, 
which are almost al,vays unliquidated, is a remedy 
peculiarly belonging to the province of the law 
courts, requiring the aid of a jury in their assess-
ment, and inappropriate to the judicial position 
and functions of a chancellor. It may be stated, 
therefore, as a general proposition, that a court 
of equity declines the jurisdiction to grant mere 
co1npensatory damages, when they are not given 
in addition to or as an incident of some other spe-
cial equitable relief, unless under special circum-
stances the exercise of such jurisdiction may be 
requisite to promote the ends of justice.'' 
Wimer v. Wagner, 323 Mo. 1156, 20 S. W. (2d) 650, 
79 A. L. R. 1231, was a suit for specific performance, de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1929. It 
holds: 
''The rule that equity, having once become 
possessed of a cause, will retain it for the purpose 
of administering full and complete relief, does 
not apply when the facts relied on to sustain the 
equity jurisdiction fail of establishment.'' 
And in Marks v. Gates, 154 Fed. 481, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals said: 
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'• The facts presented in the complaint are 
not such as to entitle the court to retain the case 
for the assess1nent of such damages as the ap-
pellant Inay haYe sustained for breach of the 
contract. .. .\._ court of equity will not grant pecun-
iary con1pensation in lieu of specific perfor1nance 
unless the case presented is one for equitable in-
terposition such as "rould entitle the plaintiff to 
performance but for intervening facts, such as 
the destruction of the property, the conveyance 
of the san1e to an innocent third person, or the 
refusal of the Yendor 's wife to join in a convey-
ance.'' (Citing authorities.) 
There are, in fact, no intervening facts in the case 
at bar. It must be assumed that all of the plaintiffs knew 
the character of the community in which they lived. They 
may have chosen to call it a residential community, but 
you cannot change the character of a community by 
calling it one thing or the other. There was no ground 
here for equitable cognizance, and it is submitted there 
is no ground for legal cognizance. In practically all of 
the cases above discussed taken from the opinion of the 
Court in the Kins1nan case, there was no issue raised as 
to a misjoinder of parties or causes of action, as there 
is in the case at bar. All of the facts which have been 
developed by the evidence, both before the filing of the 
supplemental complaint and after, should come before a 
jury if the matter is to be tried as an action at law. 
Each plaintiff should be required to bring his own action, 
and stand upon his own feet. The idea of trying an 
action as if it were strictly equitable in its nature, and 
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then, after the completion of the trial, transforming it 
into a law action, certainly cannot be commended. 
All of the evidence admitted by the Court prior to 
the filing of the supplemental complaint in the equity pro-
ceedings was considered by the Court in determining the 
issues raised by the supplemental complaint. The Kins-
man case, when read and thoroughly considered, is not 
an authority for the contention made by the plaintiffs 
that they may try their case as they have tried it, con-
tending at every point that it was a suit in equity and 
not one for damages; that they might proceed up to the 
point where the Court was ready to sign findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree and then, upon motion, 
have the Court re-open the cause, amend the complaint 
and transform it into a suit for damages. Such a con-
sideration of the Kinsman case makes inevitable the fol-
lowing conclusions : 
1. That portion of the op1n1on of Chief Justice 
Frick which reads: 
''A majority of the court doubt both the 
propriety and the necessity of enforcing the al-
ternative relief suggested in the quotations fron1 
Pomeroy. Therefore, both Justice Gideon and 
myself defer to their judgment and have yielded 
assent to the statement as stated" 
makes it extremely doubtful in the mind of the writer 
whether the opinion can be considered as an authority 
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for the proposition that 'vhere an injunction is denied 
as a matter of right, a Court of equity may still retain 
the case and assess damages caused by the alleged nui-· 
sance. 
2. Does not the Kins,rnan case, if accepted as author-
ity for the proposition that a court of equity may retain 
a cause, 'vhere an injunction is denied as a matter of 
right, and assess the damages as a matter of law, con-
stitute a severance of each plaintiff from every other 
plaintiff, and thereby transform one action into fifty-nine 
separate actions~ (There were fifty-nine plaintiffs in the 
Kinsman case.) 
It will be noticed in the opinion of Justice Frick that 
he says: 
''Nor does such procedure affect the right of 
appeal of any one or all of the parties to the 
action. In actions where the rights of the parties 
are separate, but where they join in one action, 
to avoid a multiplicity of suits or for some other 
good reason, each one may prosecute an appeal 
independently.'' 
(He also discussed the right of the defendant to appeal as 
to any one or more or all of the plaintiffs.) 
3. Has it ever been supposed that merely because 
many persons have been separately injured in one acci-
dent, or by reason of one wrong, in order to avoid a 
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multiplicity of actions all the persons thus injured could 
join~ Is such a test an accurate one by which to deter-
mine the right of plaintiffs to join in one suit~ 
The cases cited and relied upon by Justice Gideon, 
to-wit: Robinson vs . .Appleton, 124 Ill. 238, 15 N. E. 761; 
Browder vs. Phinney, 30 Wash. 74, 70 Pac. 264; Waite v. 
O'l~leil, 72 Fed. 348; Waite v. O'Neil, 76 Fed. 408; Combs 
v. Scott, 76 Wis. 664, 45 N. W. 532; Goddard v. American 
Queen, 59 N. Y. S. 46, are each and all, with only one 
possible exception, predicated upon the doctrine that 
equity would have granted relief except for an interven-
ing right, and did not involve multiplicity of parties 
plaintiff or misjoinder of causes of action. Furthermore, 
in the Kinsman case the finding of a nuisance by the 
Court was sustained by the evidence. In the case at bar 
it is not. 
In Browder v. Phinney, supra, the action was one for 
damages based upon the ground that the defendant had 
wrongfully evicted the plain tiffs from certain leased 
premises. It appeared that the plaintiffs were put in 
possession in October, 1899 ; that they paid rent for the 
months of October and November, and said rent was 
accepted by said defendant; that on the 12th day of 
January, 1900, they were evicted from the premises. The 
contract or lease upon which they relied was claimed to 
be invalid in law, because it was not acknowledged, and 
it was claimed that the facts showing part performance 
of the contract could be enforced in equity but could not 
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be sho'"~ in an action at la\v. For this reason upon mo-
tion of the defendant, the action was dismissed. The Su-
prenle Court of ''T ashington held that the Court was 
empo,vered to try all of the features of the action and 
that it \vas a question for the jury whether there was 
sufficient testimony to establish part performance. 
If the case at bar were a case by a single plaintiff, 
then the ele1nent of misjoinder would be eliminated, 
but the question of a right to a jury trial would still be 
present. In the 'Vashington case there was no question 
of misjoinder. The action was one at law and was being 
tried before a jury. In the case at bar all the evidence 
has been taken before the Court without a jury. 
4. Under the Dahl case, the plaintiffs have no right 
to recover in an action at law, and it is well settled that 
the equitable principle of retaining jurisdiction has no 
application to a case where there is no right to recover 
either at law or in equity. Hennessy v. City of Boston 
(Mass.), 164 N. E. 470, 62 A. L. R. 780. 
To summarize the foregoing contentions, defendant 
claims: 
1. Plaintiffs had no right to re-open their case, and 
an order allowing them to re-open it is an abuse of 
discretion and constitutes reversible error. 
2. The suit as originally commenced and tried was 
one in equity. The right to join could exist only in equity. 
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Equity jurisdiction has failed. To transform the action 
now into one at law is not supported by any legal or 
equitable rule of procedure. 
3. To permit the case to be reopened and the action 
to be determined as one at law for damages denies the 
defendant's right to insist upon a misjoinder of parties 
plaintiff, a misjoinder of causes of action, and denies 
defendant's right to a jury trial. 
To sustain the decree in this case would not only 
permit every nuisance suit instituted to follow the same 
procedure, but would invite this practice. Such a prac-
tice would forever defeat every future defendant's right 
to a trial by jury in a nuisance action. There is hardly a 
nuisance conceivable affecting more than one person which 
would not lend itself to such treatment. Such a practice, 
once established, would be a departure from due process 
of law, and violative of the basic and constitutional rights 
of litigants. 
Multiplicity of Suits Alone Does Not Justify 
Equitable Interference 
The mere fact that eleven plaintiffs have a commun-
ity of interest in the questions of law and fact presented 
by this controversy will not warrant the interposition of 
equity. 
The case of Tribette v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 70 
Miss. 182; 35 Am. St. 642, 12 So. 32, 19 L. R. A. 660, 
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is one of the leading authorities of the country. If it is 
the position of the plaintiffs that mere multiplicity of 
suits can justify the Court in retaining jurisdiction of 
this case, and determining the right of each individual 
plaintiff to recover damages as against the defendant, 
then the Tribette case is a complete answer to that posi-
tion. 
Cunzberland v. Willianzson, 57 So. 559, was decided 
in 1912. The Supreme Court of Mississippi again re-
viewed the contention to be found in so1ne of the editions 
of Mr. Pomeroy's work on Equity Jurisprudence, and 
refused to accept that doctrine. 
See also Turner v. City of Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 So. 
132. In this case the Supreme Court of Alabama, speak-
ing through Chief Justice McClellan, reviews what is 
known as the doctrine of multiplicity of suits and holds: 
''Where several persons hold tracts of land 
under different titles, and there is no privity be-
tween them, but a person brings an ejectment suit 
against each of them, plaintiff's cause of action 
in each depending on the same state of facts and 
principles of law, there is no ground for equity 
jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits.'' 
In the course of the opinion Chief Justice McClellan 
says: 
"We have considered the position of Mr. 
Pomeroy on this question thus at length because 
the views of no text-writer of the law are entitled 
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to more consideration than his, because his work 
is the authority mainly relied upon by the appel-
lants in this connection, and because we are dis-
inclined to repudiate any proposition advanced 
by him without a thorough examination of it." 
When it is remembered that Chief Justice McClel-
lan at one time said in substance that the only place 
he had disagreed with Pomeroy was upon this question, 
then the force of the Alabama opinion is made manifest. 
He quotes Judge Cooley very extensively, but 
Cooley's quotation may be summed up in one pointed 
sentence: ''Suits do not become of equitable cognizance 
because of their number merely.'' 
The Alabama Court also quotes Judge Nelson of the 
Federal bench in part as follows: 
''There is scarcely a suit at law or in equity 
which settles a principle, or applies a principle 
to a given state of facts, or in which a general 
statute in interpreted, that does not involve a 
question in which other parties are interested, as, 
for instance, the doctrine of trusts, and the stat-
utes of descents, of frauds, of wills, and the like; 
yet no lawyer would contend that such an interest 
would justify the joinder of parties as plaintiffs, 
in cases arising under the law of trusts, or under 
any of the statutes mentioned. The same may be 
said of questions arising under the revenue laws, 
such as the tariff and the excise laws, which are 
the subject of litigation in the courts almost daily. 
Large classes of persons other than the parties to 
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the suit are interested in the questions involved 
and deter1nined. To allow them to be 1nade parties 
to the suit 'Yould confound the established order 
of judicial proceedings, and lead to endless per-
plexity and confusion. ' ' 
Justice ~IcClellan hin1self says: 
''It is a palpable non sequitur to say that 
when numerous persons have like, but independ-
ent, legal estates or legal rights in respect of 
which severally they have no right to invoke the 
jurisdiction of chancery, yet because they are 
numerous, the separate legal right of each is 
metamorphosed into an equity right in all, or in 
one for all.'' 
He points out that when each plaintiff has a right 
to come into equity on some identical ground, then 
several plaintiffs having this common right would be 
allowed to come in together, on the theory of multiplicity 
of suits, but it does not follow that merely because plain-
tiffs are numerous, or the suits are many, because 
of the multiplicity, equity jurisdiction has been created. 
It is submitted that to try the issue between the 
defendant and the individual owners of the eleven dif-
ferent tracts of land in one action cannot result otherwise 
than in confusion and injustice. This could not be dem-
onstrated more clearly than by the results reached in 
this case. 
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Neither Plaintiffs' Rights nor lnju·ries Are Common 
These properties are in some instances located on 
the east, in some on tlie west, in some on the north and 
in some on the south of the defendant's plant. Some of 
the properties constitute tracts of considerable size and 
others are small. Some of these tracts are improved; 
others are not improved; some are in close proximity to 
the plant, others more than three-quarters of a mile 
distant. One of the properties may be subjected to some 
odor when the wind is blowing from the plant and toward 
that property, whereas the other properties at that time 
may not get any odor at all. Some of the properties may 
have a large amount of fertilizer upon the properties, 
creating an odor as bad as any that could be produced 
by the rendering plant. The odors at the worst are 
intermittent and cannot affect all of these tracts at one 
and the same time. 
Going to the owners, some of the owners have had 
a pecuniary interest in industrializing the particular tract 
whereon the plant is located. Others participated in its 
operation and construction. The defenses as to one party 
may be no damage at all, whereas, the strongest defense 
against some might be in the nature of estoppel. There 
is, however, one defense common to all, and that is the 
case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Company, supra. Under 
that decision there could be no recovery at law; certainly 
none in equity. 
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It 'vould be strange doctrine to believe that the plain-
tiffs could join together and make an untruthful allega-
tion to the effect that the community was strictly resi-
dential and have the evidence show that this allegation 
\vas not sustained by the proof, and then have that un-
supported allegation continue in its use and only by 
the Court's contrary finding serve as a basis for giving 
legal relief. This would be one of the most anomalous 
positions that was ever insisted upon in a court. Its 
novelty, however, is exceeded by its want of merit. 
With such several rights and injuries and defenses 
there can be no joinder either in equity or at law. 
Persons Owning Distinct Property Interests in Severalty 
Cannot Bring a Joint Action to Recover Damages 
for a Nuisance. 
The reason for this rule is that they have no common 
interest either in the object of the suit or in the amount 
to be recovered. Some of the cases already cited support 
our contention. Merely because there are numerous 
plaintiffs, or there may be a multiplicity of suits, or, as 
one judge put it, a "bundle of separate suits", is no 
sufficient reason for permitting a joinder, either at law 
or in equity. 
As Mr. Justice Peckham said, speaking for the 
United States Supreme Court in Hale v. Allinson, 188 
U. S. 56, 47 L. Ed. 380: 
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"It might be that the exercise of equitable 
jurisdiction on this ground'' (referring to multi-
plicity of suits), "while preventing a formal mul-
tiplicity of suits, would nevertheless be attended 
with more and deeper inconvenience to the de-
fendants than would be compensated for by the 
convenience of a single plaintiff.'' 
One learned author has referred to bills of complaint 
of this character as '' spurious bills of peace.'' We know 
that each plaintiff must make his own case upon the 
facts. One might succeed and another fail, and to perrnit 
persons so severally interested to join in either a legal or 
equitable suit would confound the established order of 
judicial proceedings and lead to interminable confusion 
and embarrassment. 
In Bliss on Code Pleading, Third Edition, Sec. 76, 
the following is found: 
''This permissive union of parties is limited 
by the terms of the rule. All who would unite 
must be interested in the subject of the action and 
in the relief. It may not be possible to define with 
absolute precision the phrase ''subject of the ac-
tion', which is used in different parts of the Code, 
but we may say, in general, that it is the matter 
or thing concerning which the action is brought, 
and though one may be interested in that matter, 
unless he is also interested in the relief which is 
sought by another, he is not permitted to unite 
with him. 
''Thus, to take the cases which have been 
cited, two or more owners of mills propelled by 
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water are interested in preventing an obstruction 
above that shall interfere with the downflow of 
the "Tater, and 1nay unite to restrain or abate it 
as a nuisance; but they cannot hence unite in an 
action for dan1ages, for, as to the injury suffered, 
there is no con1munity of interest. There is no 
more a co1nmon interest than though a carrier 
had, at one time, carelessly destroyed property 
belonging to different persons, or the lives of 
different passengers. The abatement or preven-
tion of the nuisance involves but a single judg-
ment, in obtaining which all the mill-owners are 
interested, and by 'vhich they are all benefited; 
but to enable them to unite in an action for their 
several damages, there must be some connection-
something in which they have a common interest.'' 
Nahate v. Hanson, 106 ~finn. 365, 119 N. W. 55 
(1908) : 
''All persons whose property is affected by 
a nuisance, though they own the property in 
severalty, may unite in an action to abate the 
nuisance; but they cannot join with a cause of 
action for that relief their several claims for 
damages, in which there is no joint or common 
interest.'' 
The Court in its opinion said: 
"But plaintiffs have no joint or common in-
terests in the damages sustained, and it is clear 
that their separate claims in that respect cannot 
be joined with the cause of action for the equit-
able relief, in which they do have a joint and com-
mon interest.'' 
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In Foreman v. Boyle, 88 Cal. 290, 26 Pac. 94 (1891) 
under a code identical with that of Utah, the plaintiff 
Foreman, owning a tract of land in which his co-plaintiff 
had no interest, joined with another plaintiff Rogers 
and brought suit against the defendants because the 
defendants had diverted the waters being used by both 
of the plaintiffs. Foreman owned water and land and 
Rogers owned water and land, but neither plaintiff had 
any interest in the water or land or ditch of the other. 
The Supreme Court of California laid down the rule 
that the plaintiffs had no common interest in the dam-
ages, and that they could not unite in an action for 
damages, saying: 
''Two or more owners of mills propelled by 
water are interested in preventing an obstruction 
above that shall interfere with the down flow of 
water, and may unite in its restraint or abate it 
as a nuisance, but they cannot hence unite in an 
action for damages, for as to the injury suffered 
there is no community of interest.'' 
This is a quotation from Bliss on Code Pleading, Sec. 76. 
Barham v. Hostetter, 67 Cal. 274, 7 Pac. 689 (1885) 
was an action brought by eleven plaintiffs to restrain 
the alleged diversion of the waters of a certain creek by 
the defendant and for damages for such alleged diver-
sion. One plaintiff was alleged to be the sole owner of 
60 acres of land affected by the d-eprivation of the water 
caused by the defendant; two plaintiffs were alleged to be 
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joint owners of 40 acres; another plaintiff of 100 acres ; 
another plaintiff of 60 acres ; another plaintiff of 20 
acres, and so on until it '\vas shown by the complaint that 
each of the plaintiffs owned some particular tract of 
land. The Supreme Court of California said: 
''The cause of action for dan1ages is not joint 
as to all the plaintiffs, but undoubtedly several; 
it is joined with a cause of action for an injunc .. 
tion which is common to all the plaintiffs.'' 
The Court then quoted the section above cited from 
Bliss. This case is authority for the proposition that a 
cause of action for injunction which is common to all 
the plaintiffs cannot be joined with a cause of action 
for damages which is not joint as to all the plaintiffs but 
is undoubtedly several. 
It may be helpful to consider the nature of the two 
theories upon which the suit in equity for abatement 
rests on the one hand and the action for damages rests, 
upon the other hand. Evidently the plaintiffs claimed 
that the defendant was guilty of maintaining a nuisance 
which could be abated or suppressed by a court of equity. 
It was claimed by the plaintiffs that the operation of this 
rendering plant polluted the air with offensive odors 
injurious to health. The Court's findings disclose no 
irreparable injury to any plaintiff. The Court does find 
common law damages to the lands of plaintiff but no 
justification for the joinder. 
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Forms of Action Not Abolished by Code 
Section 104-7-3, Utah Statutes 1933, in part provides: 
''Plaintiffs may unite in the same complaint 
several causes of action, legal or equitable or 
both," etc. 
Section 104-9-5 provides in part: 
''A defendant 1nay set forth by answer as 
many defenses or counterclaims, legal or equit-
able or both, as he may have'', etc. 
All through the code of Utah and all through the 
decisions that have been rendered in construing and 
applying that code this Court has recognized what was 
known as a suit in equity, and made marked distinctions 
between such suits and actions at law, generally holding 
that the equitable issues shall be determined before en-
tering upon a trial of the legal issues. 
In 1878 Philemon Bliss gave to the bench and the 
bar his work upon Code Pleading, and in 1887 he pub-
lished a second edition. In 1894 a third edition was 
published by Elias F. Johnson. In Section 10 he says: 
"We have seen that in the States adopting 
the New York system, except Kentucky, Arkan-
sas, Iowa and Oregon, the distinctions between ac-
tions at law and suits in equity are abolished, 
either directly or by providing that there shall be 
but one form of action. Is the distinction, in 
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fact, abolished, and \Yas it necessary to expressly 
retain equity jurisdiction in the States named~ 
''The expression i8 not a happy one, for it 
is not easy to see hovv it is possible to abolish 
the distinction bet,Yeen these two classes of ac-
tions. One or the other may be abolished. The 
la\Y-mahing power may say that suitors shall no 
longer be entitled to equitable relief-that is, that 
hereafter they shall be allowed to sue only for 
money or for specific property; or, on the other 
hand, that they shall be entitled to equitable re-
lief only-that is, that they may sue for the spe-
cific performance of a contract, but not to recover 
damages for its breach. But it cannot abolish 
the distinction between the two actions; and if 
both these remedies continue to be allowed, the 
distinction remains. That it does remain is clear. 
The codes provide for trial by jury of substan-
tially the same issues as were so triable before 
their adoption-that is, issues of fact in actions 
for the recovery of money or of specific real 
or personal property. This provision covers all 
the issues of fact in common-law actions, and 
probably a few others; as, where it formerly be-
came necessary to resort to equity to recover a 
money debt. They also provide that every other 
issue-that is, in addition to issues at lavv, those 
which formerly were tried by the chancellor-shall 
be tried by the court. Thus the chief distinc-
tion between actions at law and suits in equity 
is preserved. The distinctions abolished are 
simply those which formerly existed between the 
two classes of actions in the manner of stating 
the facts, in the style of the writ, and the mode 
of submitting evidence; those which arise from 
the mode of trial and from the nature of the re-
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lief are as marked as before. * * * Legislation may 
affect modes of procedure; it will be found more 
difficult to reform a language.'' 
In Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Ut. 279, 60 Pac. 945 (1900) 
the Court said : 
"The equitable issues should be first passed 
upon by the court, for upon such determination 
as to the relief claimed by a defendant will the 
necessity of proceeding with the action at law 
depend.'' 
No one can successfully contradict the proposition 
that the Code of Civil Procedure, especially in Utah and 
in California, abolished forms but retained substance, 
and the distinction between law and equity is one of 
substance rather than form .. Some court (in Utah the 
District Court) has the general jurisdiction to grant or 
award either legal or equitable relief. Litigants seeking 
such relief all enter the court by the same door. Any 
litigant may invoke such court's general power to grant 
either or both kinds of relief, but legal relief has not 
been made synonymous with equitable relief, and, as 
Judge Bliss well said in the section above quoted: ''If 
both of these remedies continue to be allowed, the dis-
tinction remains. '' 
In the note 19 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1075, there is con-
tained a discussion of the effect of code provisions. That 
note reads: 
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'"The effert of statutory changes providing 
for the granting of judgments at lR\V and equitable 
relief by the same tribunal, and abolishing dis-
tinctions in the for1n of pleadings, 1nay be best 
traced in detail in the decisions hereinafter set 
forth. It 1nay here be stated, however, that the 
inherent distinctions between actions at la'v and 
suits in equity are still recognized; and the effect, 
broadly stated, of such statutory changes, is to 
permit the retention of a case in which the allega-
tions of the co1nplaint to which an answer has 
been filed disclose, in addition to a claim for 
equitable relief, the existence of a cause of action 
at law. 
''But "'here the complaint, as framed, dis-
closes onl!~ a cause of action in equity, the court 
cannot, upon denying equitable relief, enforce 
a legal right disclosed by the proof.'' 
On Page 1077 the same author says: 
"But an allegation of grounds in plaintiff's 
complaint for equitable relief and nothing else, 
where proof of such grounds fails, does not permit 
the court to try without a jury a cause of action at 
law appearing to arise out of the transaction.'' 
Park v. Minneapolis Ry. Co., 114 Wis. 347, 89 N. W. 
532: 
"It must not be overlooked, that, as a gen--
eral rule, legal rights should be enforced in a court 
of law, where the constitutional right to trial by 
jury is preserved. Only in exceptional cases, 
where unnecessary hardship clearly demands, 
should courts of equity assume that province.'' 
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In Schroeder v. Ennis, 5 N. & S. R. 881, it was said: 
"It was argued that the court, having once 
obtained equitable jurisdiction of the case, should 
retain it for the purpose of deciding all the ques-
tions and doing justice between the parties. If 
this be so, all that a party need do, to transfer 
his litigation to a court of equity, is to allege 
grounds of equitable jurisdiction, and, upon the 
trial, come in with a purely legal cause of action 
or defense. It must be the facts, and not the 
allegations, which call upon the court to exercise 
its equity jurisdiction." 
Gentry v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473, on p. 
477 the Court says: 
''All grounds of equitable jurisdiction having 
been properly denied and eliminated, the court 
was not justified in decreeing that the appellee 
be restored to the offices of president and director, 
nor in adjudicating his right to recover the full 
amount of his salary from October 1, 1922, to the 
date of the decree. This was not germane, nor 
incidental to any ground of equitable jurisdiction 
existing in the case; all such having been extin-
guished. * * * The appellee should have been rel-
egated to his legal remedies as to recovery of sal-
ary and as to restoration to office." 
It is not believed it is logical for anyone to say 
that the question being discussed is substantially affected 
by the Code of Procedure. That Code, of course, has 
never been applicable to federal courts, and yet federal 
courts have gone quite as far in administering what is 
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known as ''alternative legal relief'' as have any of the 
state courts. 
Where equitable and legal remedies are granted by 
the same court, then as between a single plaintiff and a 
single defendant, if, after failure to prove the allega-
tions of a complaint 'vhich would give equity jurisdiction, 
enough still remains in that complaint to make out a 
cause of action at law, and there is sufficient evidence 
to sustain it, the Court should not dismiss the action. It 
should give either party an opportunity to demand a 
jury trial, and if such jury is demanded it should retain 
the case and try it before a jury. If a jury trial is 
waived by both parties, then under such circumstances 
the Court would have both a power and a duty to render 
judgment for such an amount as was established by the 
evidence. This is giving full effect to both the letter 
and spirit of the Code of Procedure. 
But where there are numerous plaintiffs, each own-
ing separate and distinct properties and having no com-
munity of interest, except that they are all complaining 
of the same alleged nuisance, and are all permitted to 
join together, seeking equitable relief in the form of an 
injunction, then a failure on their part to prove the 
averments of their complaint that would give equity 
jurisdiction is fatal to all the jurisdiction that the plain-
tiffs thus joined had the power to invoke, and the action 
must be dismissed either by the plaintiffs themselves, 
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without prejudice, or by the court with leave granted to 
each plaintiff to sue at law. 
If this is not true, then numerous plaintiffs may join 
together eleven actions at law, and, as one judge has 
said, give eleven cases one complaint and one number in 
the clerk's office, and thereby deprive the defendant of 
the advantages of separate trials, of all benefit of the 
distinctions which exist between legal and equitable 
remedies in the trial court, and then in this court ma-
terially alter the scope of its power of review. No code 
has ever yet destroyed the distinctions referred to, nor 
can it so long as we have legal and equitable remedies 
for accomplishing the results just delineated. 
Considering the rights of the plaintiffs to damages 
in actions at law, or, for that matter, in any action, the 
object of such matters stands out in direct contrast to 
that of the object to be attained by the suit in equity for 
injunction. Actions at law have for their purpose that of 
compensation for injuries wrongfully inflicted. The com-
pensatory damages, if any are found and allowed, are 
not a substitute for or an incident to equitable relief, 
but the defendant held liable to pay such damages is 
compensating each plaintiff for the injury that the main-
tenance of the wrongful structure has done. 
Nuisance at Law Must First Be Established 
Injunctive relief should not be given, except under 
exceptional circumstances and with clear and convincing 
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proof of the necessity therefor, 'vithout first having the 
nuisance established at law. This principle is clearly 
recognized by this Court in the recent case of Norback v. 
Board of Directors, supra. The Court held: 
"The primary purpose of the instant case 
is the establishment of an easement based upon an 
alleged prescriptiYe user. If plaintiff fails in this 
his cause of action fails. The right of injunctive 
relief cannot come into existence until the ease-
ment has been established. This issue the plain-
tiff was entitled to have tried to a jury." 
The Kinsman case is not cited in the majority opinion 
of Justice Moffat, but is cited in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Straup and was, therefore, not overlooked by 
the Court. 
In the Norback case Mr. Justice Moffat, speaking 
for the Court, cites with approval the case of Rhea v. 
Forsyth, 37 Pa. 503, 78 Am. Dec. 441, which was an action 
for injunctive relief in a court of equity, and quotes 
therefrom as follows : 
'' 'The American cases are very numerous to 
the effect that the right of the complainant ought 
to be admitted or established at law before grant-
ing an injunction. (Cases cited.) * * * Neither the 
equitable jurisdiction of the court below, nor our 
jurisdiction, can properly attach until the plain-
tiff has established his right at law. Has the alley 
been in common use so long that the successors 
in the title may set up the presumption of a grant 1 
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If not, did the defendant dedicate it to the use of 
the plaintiff's lot~ These are questions for a court 
and jury to decide in an action at law.' 
and continues: 
"In Taylor v. Wright, 76 N. J. Eq. 121, 125, 
79 A. 433, 435, we find : 
'' 'If the easement here asserted by complain-
ant exists, it arises from well-defined rules of law 
and is a legal as distinguished from an equitable 
estate or interest. * * * That tribunal is the proper 
tribunal to determine the existence or non-exist-
ence of an easement or other legal estate in lands, 
and this court cannot properly determine an issue 
of that nature except to such extent as may be 
necessary to prevent irreparable injury.' (Cases 
cited.) 
"Whether or not the law courts and the 
equity courts were separate courts, the analogy 
of the situation is pertinent to the issues in the 
instant case. The necessity of establishing the 
easement at law before equity principles or 
'Equity Juris prudence,' as distinguished by Pon1-
eroy, may be applied to injunctive relief, is appar-
ent, although under our procedure both may be 
accomplished in the same action.'' 
It is submitted that such contentions as are made 
in the dissenting opinion in the N orback case, and as 
are made by the plaintiffs in the instant case, are based 
upon an erroneous conception of the effect of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. That Code was not intended to 
destroy the right of trial by jury. As was said in the 
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opwon in the Norback case, ''That either party to 
an action at la'v has the right to trial by jury when 
timely and properly demanded, is supported by the 
law and the decided cases.'' ( 8-! Utah, 514.) 
On the same page this Court quotes with approval 
from Hansen r. Hart, 26 Ut. 229, as follows: 
''It has long since been held that under our 
systen1 a legal and equitable remedy may be 
sought in the san1e action; but each remedy must 
be governed by the same law that would apply to 
it if the other remedy had not also been asked 
for." 
It would,be strange indeed if any Court should hold 
that the Code of Civil Procedure providing ''that there 
shall be but one form of civil action, and law and 
equity may be administered in the same action'' (Article 
VIII, Sec. 19, Utah Constitution), had the effect of 
making actions equitable which had theretofore been 
legal in character. It is the substance and not the form 
of things that controls. It would be even stranger to 
find that equity could be given jurisdiction by means of 
false allegations in the pleadings, and then, having ac-
quired jurisdiction by such means, it could determine 
the strictly legal rights of the parties without regard 
to their right to a trial by jury, and even in disregard of 
the misjoinder of parties plaintiff. 
What is said with reference to an easement in the 
case quoted should be equally applicable to the case of a 
nuisance such as we have in the case at bar. 
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WHAT IS A NUISANCE 
The Utah statute, Section 104-56-1, reads as follows: 
''Anything which is injurious to health, or 
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an o bstruc-
tion to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or prop-
erty, is a nuisance and the subject of an action. 
Such action may be brought by any person whose 
property is injuriously affected, or whose per-
sonal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance; and 
by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or 
abated, and damages may also be recovered." 
Section 103-41-1 reads as follows: 
"Whatever is dangerous to human life or 
health, and whatever renders soil, air, water or 
food impure or unwholesome, are declared to be 
nuisances and to be illegal, and every person, 
either owner, agent or occupant, having aided in 
creating or contributing to the same, or who may 
support, continue or retain any of them, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor.'' 
Section 103-41-3 reads as follows : 
''A public nuisance is a crime against the or-
der and economy of the state, and consists in un-
lawfully doing any act, or omitting to perform any 
duty, which act or omission either: 
(1) Annoys, injures or endangers the com-
fort, repose, health or safety of three or more 
persons; or, 
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(Applied: Dahl v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 262 P. 269, 71 U. 1) 
( 2) Offends public decency; or 
(3) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or 
tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous for pas-
sage, any lake, stream, canal or basin, or any 
public park, square, street, or highway; or, 
( 4) In any way renders three or more per-
sons insecure in life or the use of property.'' 
These various sections codify and attempt to define 
what constitutes a nuisance. It is significant that in none 
of these statutes does it define a nuisance as that which 
depreciates the market value of lands as home sites. In 
this connection it is respectfully submitted that there is 
but one basis upon which the Court finds the plaintiffs 
entitled to damage. In its Finding No. 4 (Abs. 395) the 
Court finds : 
''That by reason of such discharge of noxious 
and disagreeable odors by the defendant's plant 
and the carrying of such odors by movement of 
the atmosphere to the lands of the plaintiffs the 
market value of such lands has been depreciated 
as hereinafter set out, and the said lands have 
been made, and by the continued operation of de-
fendant's plant will be made, substantially less 
desirable as home sites.'' 
and in Finding No. 5 the court finds that these odor~ 
''are sufficiently intense and obnoxious to injure 
each of the plaintiffs by making their lands sub-
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stantially less desirable as dwelling places and 
substantially less attractive to tenants and pros-
pective purchasers of farms or home sites.'' 
and in Finding No. 6 : 
''That purchasers of farm lands, such as the 
lands described in plaintiffs' supplemental com-
plaint, are usually desirous of acquiring lands 
upon which homes can be maintained and the 
frequently recurring presence of obnoxious odors 
such as are discharged from defendant's plant 
depreciates the market value of farm lands adja-
cent to such plant.'' 
This Finding No. 6 is purely gratuitous on the part 
of the lower Court. No pleadings are to be found in the 
case raising any such issue, and no evidence is adduced 
from which the Court could properly find that purchasers 
of farm lands are usually desirous of acquiring lands 
upon which homes can be maintained. This, it is sub-
mitted, is not a finding of fact but a conclusion on the 
part of the Court, a conclusion in effect that people 
generally would seek out property of this nature contig-
uous to railroad rights of way for the building of homes. 
This Court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that 
there are many farm lands so located that the owners or 
tenants prefer to live in the town and go and come from 
the farm as the industry of the farm requires, rather 
than to make the farm their home. 
These findings clearly indicate that the Court found 
nothing more in this action upon which to predicate dan1-
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ages than a depreciation in the market value. In light 
of the foregoing statutes of this State, it is submitted 
this does not in and of itself constitute a nuisance. It 
is no n1ore possible to recover from a neighbor on the 
ground that 'Yhat the neighbor la,yfully does upon his 
land depreciates the market value of the land in the 
vicinity than it is possible for the person who so uses 
his land to increase the market value of the community 
can recover from those benefited an amount equal to the 
increase in the market value of their lands. Land owners 
n1ust in the very nature of things accept the unearned 
depreciation in lands as well as the unearned increment. 
The lower Court has wholly ignored the fact that 
with the coming of industry into a community such as the 
one in question, the plaintiffs have actually been ben-
efited by this new industry, not only so far as the health 
and sanitation of the community are concerned, but like-
wise from the standpoint of employment and from the 
standpoint of the use and occupancy of such homes as 
are built in the vicinity of industry by the industrial 
workers. The Court does not find damages in this case 
because of injury to health, quoting the words of the 
statute, or because of anything that is indecent or of-
fensive to the senses or because of an obstruction to 
the free use of property, or because of an interference 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, and 
those are the only elements for which the first statute 
provides; nor does the Court predicate damages upon 
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anything which is dangerous to human life or health or 
renders the soil or the air or the water or food impure 
or unwholesome, as provided in the second section of the 
statute above quoted; nor have damages been awarded 
because of any public offense peculiarly injuring these 
plaintiffs. Throughout these statutes, the term ''use of 
property" is used, but nowhere "sale of property", so 
that the lower Court has gone entirely beyond the terms 
and scope of these statutes to find its basis of damage. 
Society could not exist if the peculiar tastes and dis-
positions of individuals were taken into consideration 
and given recognition by the law. There is scarcely a 
human activity that does not in one sense annoy some 
individual who comes in contact with that activity. There 
are many noises and odors that are unpleasant to every-
one, and yet life cannot exist without human beings com-
ing into the presence of such odors. It all depends upon 
the places and circumstances under which they are en-
countered as to whether it is reasonable to endure them 
or not. When one goes into ·a slaughter house he does 
not expect to go into the same atmosphere that he would 
expect to find in the quiet of a refined library. Defend-
ant's plant, it is respectfully submitted, is entirely proper 
and in place in the midst of stock feeding corrals and is 
necessarily incident to the business of stock raising and 
feeding. 
The law of nuisance proceeds on the theory that one 
man must so use his property as not to inflict injury upon 
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owners 1n their use of other property. If industrial 
workers, by making their homes near industry, could 
transform the con1munity from industrial to residential 
by virtue of their so establishing their homes, as John 
Anderson undertakes to do in this action, industry could 
be con1pletely destroyed by these same workers having 
the industry declared a nuisance because of their homes 
which they built with their wages earned in the industry. 
Compare the situation presented in the Dahl case by 
the Utah Oil Refining Company plant, within the city 
limits of Salt Lake City, within a thousand feet of the 
St. Marks Hospital, an institution to promote and restore 
the health of those who are suffering physically. Can any 
reason be found why the law of this State, as declared 
in the Dahl case, should not likewise protect this defend-
ant. Judge Cherry, in his opinion, says : 
''There is no claim that the defendant, by any 
careless or extraordinary or unnecessary use of 
its property, produces the injury complained of. 
The sole ground of complaint is that offensive 
and disagreeable fumes or odors emanate from 
the refinery and are carried through the air to the 
plaintiff's house. It is admitted that the odors are 
not constant and are not injurious to life or 
health, and it is obvious that they cause no direct 
or physical injury to property. The extent of the 
offense claimed is that the odors are disagreeable 
and unpleasant and have at times wakened per-
sons sleeping in plaintiff's house and required 
them to shut doors and windows. In these cir-
cumstances we are unable to say as a matter of 
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law that a case of unreasonable use or action-
able nuisance was made out.'' (Citing authorities) 
''No precedent for sustaining liability under sim-
ilar circurnstances has been cited, and we have 
found none. The essential facts ·with respect to 
the nature, locality, and manner of use of defend-
ant's plant, and the situation with reference there-
to of the plaintiff's house, and the degree and 
extent of the plaintiff's annoyance and discomfort, 
are so clear that the question presented is one 
of law. We therefore conclude that the trial 
court erred in not directing a verdict for defend-
ant and in denying defendant's motion for a ne'v 
trial.'' 
It is well to remember that this Dahl case was a law 
case tried before a jury, and was predicated upon the 
depreciation of the value of plaintiff's property as a 
place to live. The plaintiff in that action had not engaged 
in any industry, as have the plaintiffs in the suit at 
bar. The property of the plaintiff was a city home, 
located on a city lot. This Court had no discretion, but 
was bound strictly by the rules of law that required the 
evidence to be in such a condition as. to permit of but 
one conclusion in the minds of reasonable men, and yet 
this Court, having that rule of law in mind, was compelled 
to reverse the trial Court for not directing a verdict in 
favor of the defendant. When this is fully appreciated, 
then the power. of the Dahl case is manifest. Surely it 
will not be contended that it takes less evidence to estab-
lish a nuisance in equity than it does at law. The rule 
is clearly settled to the contrary. One must prove the 
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existence of a nuisance, and he n1ust prove every element 
that is required for recovery on the law side of the 
court, and then only is he entitled to proceed with the 
necessary additional proof to recover in any wise in 
equity. 
First Establish Nui.sance at Law Before 
Seek,ing Equitable Relief 
The rule that a litigant must first establish his claim 
to damages at la\Y before seeking equitable relief is still 
as salutary a rule as it ever was, regardless of the fact 
that some courts have not adhered strictly to this rule. 
See case of Norback v. Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506. 
In the Dahl case Mr. Justice Cherry cited with ap-
proval Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 
N. E. 787 (1925). 190 plaintiffs alleged that the defendant 
maintained in the City of Everett a nuisance by reason 
of causing the emission of noisome and offensive gases 
and odors and by reason of the occurrence of loud and 
violent explosions and frequent and dangerous fires, all 
of which acts and conditions were alleged to have been 
done in the conduct of its business. Those plaintiffs 
sought an injunction and an assessment of damages as 
a result of the alleged nuisance. Testimony was taken 
before a master and it was finally reviewed by the Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts. 
It is submitted that one cannot read this case with-
out coming to the conclusion that the finding in the case 
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at bar must be for the defendant. When one compares it 
with the Dahl case he will be forced to the conclusion, 
however, that the Dahl case is a stronger authority than 
is the Strachan case, for the reason that in the Dahl case 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the 
verdict of a jury, whereas in the Strachan case the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts merely affirmed 
the findings of the lower court. 
If the coming of the railroad, the brick yards, the 
pea vinery, the sugar factory, the flour and alfalfa mills, 
the beet dump and the loading racks, the stock feeding 
yards and the other industrial activity testified to does 
not to some extent alter the character of a community or 
determine its character as industrial rather than resi-
dential, then it is difficult to see ·how this small render-
ing plant of the defendant could change the character 
of the community in the slightest respect, or disturb the 
residential character of the same. Compare the slight 
effect this little plant has upon the community as com-
,, 
pared to the steel plant at Springville or the industries 
that have grown up incident thereto in a community 
which a few years ago was given over to farms and 
small industries such as now exist in the vicinity of de .. 
fendant's plant. 
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Mere Diminut,ion in the r·ahte of Property, Without 
Irreparable Mischief, Will Not Furnish Any 
Foundation for Equitable Relief . 
.... ~re we not to be bound by an authority so well 
established as Story ·s Equity Jurisprudence, when he 
declares the law to be 
~'So a mere diminution of the value of 
property by the nuisance without irreparable mis-
chief will not furnish any foundation for equitable 
relief.'' 
(2 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1253, 13th Ed.): 
To apply this rule to the case at bar entirely defeats the 
Court's finding of nuisance. If no nuisance exists there 
is no equitable jurisdiction, and no jurisdiction to retain 
the case for the purpose of awarding damages, a subject 
upon which appellant elsewhere herein addresses itself. 
The case of Biber v. O'Brien, 32 Pac. (2d) 425, Dist. 
Ct. of Appeal, Cal., 1934, is cited because it is a rather 
thorough discussion of that phase of the law which re-
lates to apartment houses and hotels in cities and as they 
affect residential property. It was presented to the 
Court by some of the ablest members of the California 
bar. One portion of the opinion is applicable to one 
viewpoint that may be taken of the case at bar. The 
Court said: 
''As hereinbefore stated, an individual com-
plaining of an unlawful structure must show that 
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he has suffered some exceptional damage other 
than that suffered by the public generally. An 
increase in fire hazard or in insurance rates has 
been generally held not to constitute such dam-
age." (Citing authorities) "Nor will the fact 
alone that property will be depreciated in value by 
the mere proximity of an unlawful structure have 
that effect." 
It should be remembered that there is not a particle 
of evidence from which it might be inferred or found 
that any of the plaintiffs' property has been damaged 
in any respect by odors or fumes. None of the plant or 
animal life that exists on any of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty has been affected in any way. 
As appellant reads the Dahl case, its effect is not 
confined alone to an industrial section, but rather lays 
down the rule as applicable in any situation where the 
activities of the defendant complained of are a reason-
able use, in view of the nature of the locality. There 
is no evidence to show the unreasonableness of maintain-
ing a rendering plant in a stock feeding area. Whether 
we classify stock feeding as agricultural or industrial, 
we can with the same propriety designate defendant's 
activity by the same name. Its business is an incident 
to the raising and particularly the feeding and fattening 
of livestock. To talk about maintaining residences up 
and down the stock-feeding area of Utah County con-
tiguous to the main lines of the Oregon Short Line Rail-
road and the Rio Grande Railroad is to talk about tem-
porary maintenance. These lands and these homes are 
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awaiting the coming of the industry which their owners, 
as well as everybody else, hope to see come. The o'\vners, of 
course, desire to get something in the way of income to 
pay taxes and make "ThateYer use they can of these proper-
ties until the time arrives when the properties may be ap-
plied to an appropriate and beneficial use that will yield 
returns justifying the amount of money invested in such 
properties. If it were not for the future hopes of indus-
try in this locality, the identical lands of the plaintiffs 
would not have the value which is now claimed for them. 
It is said that one must so use his own property as 
not to injure another, but the law applies this maxim 
with an eye to practical justice, in order to preserve order 
and maintain a just equilibrium between the rights of 
man and man. As one author has said: 
''The problem is to discover the exact point 
where such equilibrium can be maintained. This 
must always be done on the particular facts of 
each case since, generally speaking, there is no 
inflexible criterion for determining just when an 
act constitutes a nuisance.'' 
Chief Baron Pollock at one time said: 
"I do not think that the nuisance for which 
an action will lie is capable of any legal definition 
which will be applicable to all cases and useful 
in deciding them. The question so entirely depends 
on the surrounding circumstances, the place 
where; the time when; the alleged nuisance, what; 
the mode of committing it, how; and the duration 
of it, whether temporary or permanent.'' 
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Everyone knows that the taking up of a residence in 
any community naturally entails some inconvenience, 
and a man is not allowed to complain of little annoy-
ances which are inseparable from the turmoil of towns 
and the business which is normally pursued in their dif-
ferent sections. 
Anyone is required to accept the consequences of 
his environment, and he is also compelled to endure the 
annoyances which are inseparable from the turmoil of 
the locality in which he lives. This is especially true when 
he helps to create the turmoil (odors), as have the plain-
tiffs in the community in which they live. Parties are not 
allowed to stand upon extreme rights and maintain ac-
tions merely because of their peculiar tastes and sensi-
bilities. Diminution of the value of property, even when 
it is direct and substantial, and even when it is such 
as can be shown by a plain witness to a plain juryman, 
may be adequately redressed in an action for damages, 
but does not give rise to any equitable action or any 
equitable jurisdiction. In the case at bar there is no 
direct injury to the property whatsoever. As was said 
by Mr. Justice Cherry in the Dahl case, referring to 
the odors: 
"It is obvious that they cause no direct or 
physical injury to property." 71 Ut. 14. 
If a man lives upon land that is decidedly appropriate 
for industrial and manufacturing purposes, and it is a 
fact that his residence upon that land is maintained in 
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anticipation of the property in the vicinity of the land 
being ultimately applied and put to that use for which 
it is most appropriate, then the coming of the anticipated 
industries and their location cannot be complained of as 
a nuisance, and it is necessary that he should suffer the 
consequences of the operation of those industries which 
may be carried· on in his in1mediate locality. Those in-
dustries are actually necessary for trade and commerce 
and for the enjoyment of the very property upon which 
he lives, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the 
community in which he lives and the public at large. He 
has no ground of complaint because he cannot have the 
quiet of a hermitage. 
In fact, the value of property depends upon the use 
to whlch it may be put. It is only as communities are 
settled and become intensely populous that the value of 
property may be said to increase. Property peculiarly 
appropriate for industrial and manufacturing purposes, 
even though used for residential purposes, cannot be 
irrevocably and irretrievably held for such residential 
purposes. There is a place for residences and there is 
a place for industrial concerns, as well as stock yards, 
stock feeding and fattening, and stock raising. 
Actionable Nuisance 
There is not and has not been any actionable nuis-
ance established by the evidence for which equitable re-
lief in the way of an injunction or legal relief in the 
way of damages may be awarded. The lower Court can-
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not confer upon itself equitable jurisdiction by a finding 
of nuisance and then avoid the necessity of recogniz-
ing it on the ground of laches, when in fact the evidence 
discloses no actionable nuisance at all. In making this 
contention the appellant desires to establish the fact 
that the lower Court should have permitted the cases of 
Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 Ut. 1, and Norback v. 
Board of Directors, 84· Ut. 506, and Wasatch Oil Refining 
Co. v. Wade, 63 Pac. (2d) 1079, to control rather than 
the case of Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Ut. 10, 
177 Pac. 418. If there is any conflict in these cases, the 
three cases first mentioned are the latest declarations of 
this Court, and would take precedence over any earlier 
decision, so far as it is related to the facts of this case. 
The question of the kind of neighborhood was not dis-
cussed in the Kinsman case. 
NATURE OF COMMUNITY 
Industries such as defendant must be located where 
they benefit a locality, rather than where there is no 
need for the industry. They are entirely dependent on 
the community for their raw materials. Defendant's 
plant does not constitute a nuisance, because it is located 
in a proper location. 
So far as the odors are concerned, the allegations of 
the amended complaint are denied, and the history of 
the community, and particularly that portion of it where 
the rendering plant is located, is shown. This identical 
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site upon 'vhich defendant's rendering plant is located 
was industrialized at least twenty years before the coming 
of the defendant, and used for twenty years as the brick 
yard for the to,vns and comn1unities near by. This par-
ticular place is on the outskirts, the very fringe of Ben-
jamin, and likewise on the fringe, and a little farther 
removed, from the town of Spanish Forie Most, if not 
all, of these plaintiffs, and their fathers before them, 
assisted in the development of this particular location as 
the center of such industrial activity as 'vas to be found 
in that community. The history of this community is the 
same as the history of all communities up and down the 
valleys of this State traversed by railroads. That land 
lying in close proximity to the railroads and on the 
outskirts of our towns and cities has become the indus-
trial property. Transportation is the most vital element 
with which industry is concerned. The result has been 
that industry follo,vs the railroad track into the towns. 
The exact number of miles from the Benjamin railroad 
station to the land of the plaintiffs is not shown by the 
evidence. The sugar factory is two miles closer to the 
town on the railroad right of way than defendant's plant. 
The pea vinery is three-quarters of a mile closer to the 
town. The evidence shows that this plant of the defen-
dant is the farthest removed of any plant of any industry 
in the community. Near the railroads and in this same 
vicinity there is or has been a flour mill, alfalfa mill, 
railroad stock loading yards and chutes, beet loading 
yards, wool loading yards and cattle feed yards. 
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The plaintiffs may say that they had nothing to do 
with the building of the sugar factory, although they 
grow sugar beets on their lands. They may say that they 
had nothing to do with the building of the pea vinery, 
although they grow peas on their properties and their 
cattle consume the by-products. But more than all of this, 
they and their fathers before them have been making a 
living off this land, feeding the crops grown and har-
vested off these lands and the products of the sugar 
factory, pea vinery, flour and alfalfa mills to live stock 
which they brought upon these lands for winter feeding. 
Are we going to say, as the lower Court in effect has 
said in awarding damages to these plaintiffs, that it is 
an industry to operate a rendering plant in which the 
losses occasioned in the stock feeding business are profit-
ably disposed of, but it is not an industry which pro-
duces these very losses~ On the other hand, it is defend-
ant's contention that the feeding of live stock in feed 
yards in close proximity to the railroad over which the 
stock can be shipped in and out, is as much an industry 
as the rendering plant operated by this defendant, and 
the operation of which in this same community is con-
demned by the lower Court. 
Let us look for a moment beyond the limits of this 
small community with its relatively small industries, to 
a metropolitan city like Chicago. The feed yards main-
tained in connection with the Union Stock Yards Com-
pany of Chicago represent a tremendous industry, and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
211 
in the heart of this industry are to be found the largest 
rendering plants in the world, known the world around, 
such as Armour, S'vift, l\1orris, and others. A skyscraper 
has been built in the n1iddle of these feed yards to house 
the army of employees required to operate this industry 
in all of its ran1ifications. Appellant ventures to say 
that even the respondents will not contend that stock 
feeding carried on on as a large a scale as it is in Chicago 
is not an industry. If this be the fact, where are we 
going to draw the line~ Are we going to say that it is 
not as appropriate for this defendant to have a $30,000 
rendering plant in the heart of the stock feeding district 
in the south end of Utah County, in a community in 
which one plaintiff alone feeds more than 2,000 head of 
livestock, as it is to have rendering plants worth $30,000,-
000 or more in a similar district in Chicago~ It is de-
fendant's most serious representation that its rendering 
plant, located where it is, is the farthest removed of any 
industries from the town of Benjamin, and is an industry 
naturally developed on account of the industrial activities 
of these feeders of cattle, making out of their yards 
and their gardens stock feeding centers, and thereby 
maintaining on their own premises an industry which 
would be most offensive in and of itself in any residential 
section. Thus the defendant brings itself strictly within 
the rule announced by this Court in the case of Dahl v. 
Utah Oil Refining Company, supra. This case is purely 
and simply a case of the owners and operators of one in-
dustry complaining of the operators of another, when 
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the odors produced by each emanate basically from the 
same source, and are equally objectionable to those who 
do not appreciate the smell of livestock and its necessary 
incidents. 
Of the four homes that are in close proximity to the 
plant, that is to say, less than seven or eight hundred 
feet away from it, one home is owned by the defendant, 
and two homes were built there in the days of the brick 
kilns, and the natural inference is that they were built 
so close thereto to accomn1oda te the employees thereof. 
They have since been used to house the employees of this 
defendant's plant. The fourth home has been built since 
the plant was built, and to the owner and occupant of 
this home the defendant has furnished employment from 
time to time. The occupant of this latter home, John 
Anderson, admits in his testimony that he assisted the 
defendant in rebuilding its rendering plant after the 
fire in 1937, and was employed in both the old and new 
plants. 
So far as the rest of the plaintiffs are concerned, 
they are so far removed from the plant that a mere in-
spection of their premises alone would show that any 
odors permeating their homes come from their own back 
door yards, rather than from a small plant a half mile 
or more away. 
This community is naturally adapted to industrial 
pursuits, being more sparsely settled than any vicinity 
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in Utah County adjacent to the railroad. This is dem-
onstrated in the panoramic view of the surrounding 
territory taken from the roof of defendant's building 
and shown in Exhibits 21 to 21-G, inclusive. Much of 
this land around the plant is farm land 'vithout im-
provements upon it, the owners living in town and 
farn1ing this ground either individually or through ten-
ants. ~Iuch of the land, as 'vill be seen from Exhibit 16, 
is in the possession of others than the plaintiffs. 
The defendant has constantly improved the opera-
tion of its plant. Only shortly before the trial of the 
case, expert combustion engineers changed the opera-
tion of the plant so that all gases emanating from the 
cooking operation, which seemed to be the main source 
of the odors complained of by the plaintiffs, were either 
condensed and carried off with the 'vater, or passed 
through a temperature in excess of 1300 degrees and 
were entirely consumed before passing into the atmo-
sphere through the smoke stack from defendant's boilers. 
The contention of the plaintiffs is that the location 
of their lands is a residential district, and the contention 
of appellant is that the district in which they live is in-
dustrial, including the agricultural industrial pursuits of 
the plaintiffs themselves. The evidence does not disclose 
the kind of a community alleged to exist in the complaint 
or found by the lower Court to exist in its findings. 
Not a single word of evidence was offered by any-
one for the purpose of showing this community to be a 
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residential community. Plaintiffs' first and really prin-
cipal witness, Mr. Greer, testified that he selected the 
site of defendant's plant and purchased the property 
for the defendant and helped build the plant (Abs. 49, 
50); that he had worked six or seven years in a rendering 
plant for this defendant before he came to Spanish Fork; 
that he selected this old brick yard as a suitable site 
for the defendant to begin doing business; that his ein-
ployment continued until after the defendant began ren-
dering carcasses in its plant in question ( Abs. 54). 
Some of the plaintiffs themselves, particularly E. 
B. Selene, an employee of l\1r. Greer now engaged in a 
competitive business, and John Anderson, testified that 
they had been employees of the defendant previously, 
and had worked in this plant, and John Anderson testified 
that he had helped to construct the new plant after the 
fire. It would be idle to contend that Mr. Anderson and 
~Ir. Selene did not know the purpose fQr which the new 
plant was being built, and it should be equally idle for 
them to contend that they did not acquiesce in the use 
of defendant's premises by defendant for the purposes 
which they testified have now become offensive to them. 
For these services Selene and Anderson received valu-
able consideration. They were willing to recognize the 
lawfulness of this industry and were satisfied to have 
their homes near by so long as they were employees. 
This all tends to establish this locality as a proper one 
for defendant's plant. 
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana has decided a very 
important case, Meyer v. Kemper Ice Co., 158 So. 378 
(1935). 
Passing oYer a portion of the opinion, we come to 
subdivision n1arked '' 3'' of the opinion, reading as fol-
lo'\Ts: 
''Plaintiff alleged in her petition, and the 
judge of the lower court said in his written opin-
ion, thafthis ice plant was located in an exclusive-
ly residential section of the city." 
(This portion of the opinion is highly important if 
one is considering the contention of the plaintiffs in the 
case at bar 'Yith reference to the locality in which their 
ho1nes are located being a residential community, plain-
tiffs appearing to have the idea that the presence of two 
railroads or a pea vinery or a sugar factory or a beet 
loading rack has nothing to do with determining whether 
a given corrununity is residential or of some other char-
acter. Let us see what the Louisiana court has to say 
on that subject. After using the language above quoted, 
the opinion continues :) 
''Some of the witnesses called by plaintiff said 
that, but we do not find it so. The undisputed facts 
are that there are some seven or eight business 
houses located along Railroad A venue, which 
forms the western boundary of the block in which 
plaintiff's residence and the ice plant are located. 
A railroad runs within 100 feet of the ice plant, 
and just across the railroad within a short dis-
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tance of plaintiff's residence there is a cotton 
gin and a rice mill, a sash and door factory, and 
other industries. The mayor testified that Rail-
road Avenue is given over principally to commer-
cial enterprises. He further testified that he con-
sidered the site selected by defendant a proper 
location for an ice plant. Several witnesses tes-
tified that, while there were no business houses 
located in that block on Vine or Liberty streets, 
yet there are in the block more business houses 
than residences.'' 
From an examination of this evidence the Court held 
that the allegation that the plant was located in an exclu-
sively residential section of the city was not supported 
by the evidence. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana expressed the same 
idea that is to be found in the opinion of Justice Cherry 
in the Dahl case. 
The Meyer case is direct authority, of a persuasive 
character, in support of the appellant's contention that 
the refining plant is not located in a community resi-
dential in character. 
What Is Industrial Property as Contradistinguished 
from Residential Property? 
A thing either personal or real that has no value for 
any purpose cannot be said to be property, and in the 
language of Chief Justice Bleckley in the case of Wells 
v. City of Savannah, 87 Ga. 398, 13 S. E. 442: 
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''The value of property consists in its use, 
and he who owns the use forever, though it be on 
condition subsequent, is the true owner of the 
property for the time being. This holds equally 
of a city lot or of all the land in the world.'' 
The use to 'vhich property may be put is what gives 
it a value, and in the case of real property, perhaps this 
rule operates "ith greater force than in the case of per-
sonal property. The appropriate uses are often numer-
ous and are indeed variable with the march of time, the 
increase or decrease of population and the exigencies of 
life. 
Some horses are built for speed; others for draft 
purposes. In one age the horse was ahnost a necessity. 
Since the coming of the· railroad train, the automobile 
and the aeroplane, he is almost a luxury. 
Some land is agricultural in character, whereas other 
land is mineral in character. Some streets in towns and 
cities are strictly residential; others are given up to 
mercantile purposes, and even these mercantile purposes 
are further classified. In one part of the mercantile dis-
trict you will find the wholesale houses and in another 
part the retail concerns. 
In some instances the character of land is to be deter-
mined by comparing its value for one purpose with its 
value for another purpose. In looking over this territory 
one can see that generally speaking the railroads have 
run parallel to each other and in close proximity to one 
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another. This was done because there was really no 
other place to put them. There was Utah' Lake on the 
west and the mountains on the east. In a sense, their 
location was surveyed for them by nature's obstacles. We 
find both of the railroads, Denver and Rio Grande R. R. 
and tJ nion Pacific R. R. paralleling each other in this 
locality. 
It was all right to pern1it dead animals to decay and 
dry up \vhere they fell in the early days of the pioneers, 
when farn1s were large and distances between ranches 
great, but as communities grew in number and farms 
and ranches diminished in size, it became just as neces-
sary for the establishment of plants such as defendant's 
plant to take care of the dead animals as for the 
growth of any other industry. To this extent defend-
ant's industry has not only been necessary for the further 
growth of the community, but extremely beneficial to the 
comn1unity since its initiation. This makes the location 
of defendant's plant not only appropriate but legal, that 
is to say, invulnerable in every respect as against the 
attack made upon it on the ground that it is a nuisance. 
Plaintiffs Have Acquiesced in the Use of These 
Premises for Industrial Purposes 
In the case at bar, as pointed out, the plaintiffs have 
been actively engaged in assisting or participating in and 
receiving benefits from the operation of this plant. It 
does not n1ake any difference that the brick yard sold out 
and went away, and defendant came. It does not n1ake 
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any difference that upon analysis it can be found that 
the odors produced by the one plant are different from 
the odors produced by the other plant. It may be well to 
examine a fe,Y authorities. 
In the case of Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368, 
36 L. Ed. 738, cited in the K~insman case, the Court said: 
''But it is unnecessary to multiply cases. 
They all proceed upon the theory that laches 
is not like limitation, a mere matter of time; but 
principally a question of the inequity of permit-
ting the claim to be enforced-an inequity founded 
upon some change in the condition or relations of 
the property or the parties.'' 
In quoting from a Pennsylvania case, Justice Gideon 
in his opinion in the Kinsman case approved of the fol-
lowing language : 
''A suitor who by laches has made it impos-
sible for a court to enjoin his adversary without 
inflicting great injury upon him will be left to 
pursue his ordinary legal remedy.'' 
In the case of Chaffee v. Telephone & Telegraph Con-
struction Co., 77 Mich. 625, 43 N. W. 1064, 6 L.R.A. 455 
(1889), the majority of the Court used the following 
language: 
''Failure to protest against a nuisance for a 
long space of time will not prevent an action to 
abate it, upon the principle that each day of its 
continuance is a new nuisance; and 1nany courts 
hold that the right to 1naintain a nuisance can 
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never be gained by prescription. But I can find 
no authority anywhere, and I should doubt its 
being good law if I did find it, that will permit 
a man to build by the side of these telegraph and 
telephone poles and wires, without any protest 
or demur whatsoever against their standing there, 
when they are on his own land, and go on for 
years, without finding any fault whatever, and 
allow a tenant to use one of the wires for busi-
ness purposes in his building, and then, when a 
fire arises, and the poles are found to hinder 
the firemen in their work of extinguishing it, 
charge up to the corporation maintaining these 
poles the loss occasioned by such fire. To do this 
would be to violate one of the plainest principles 
of justice; and the law, in my opinion, will not 
permit it." (Italics ours.) 
In Karcher v. City of Louisville, 213 Ky. 281, 281 
S. W. 1010 (1926) the plaintiff sought to recover damages 
from the City of Louisville for the construction, main-
tenance and operation of a public incinerator in close 
proximity to his residence near Camp Taylor. This 
incinerator was used for the burning and destruction of 
dead bodies and gave off offensive and obnoxious fumes 
and odors, which permeated his home and premises and 
rendered them unfit for residential purposes. It was 
claimed that the plaintiff, for a valuable consideration, 
sold, transferred and conveyed by deed of general war-
ranty to appellee the incinerator plant, to be used by it 
for the burning and destruction of dry and wet garbage, 
including dead animals gathered from the streets and 
public places. The Court held: 
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"If plaintiff, co1nplaining of operation of 
public incinerator on property sold by his wife 
to city through his own efforts, might have fore-
seen injury of which he complained at time of 
making sales, he is not entitled to relief there-
from.'' 
It approved the conclusion of law made by the trial 
Court, reading in part as follows : 
''The owner of property or one having an 
interest therein, who conveys it to another with 
knowledge of the purpose for which it is pur-
chased or the use to which it is to be applied, 
is not in a position to complain that the use of 
the property, bought for a specific purpose, con-
stitutes a nuisance.'' 
The Court cited L. d!; N. R. Co. v. Daugherty, 36 
S. W. 5, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 273 (1896). In this Daugherty 
case it appeared that the railroad company had erected 
a dam along its road some 80 yards from the premises 
of the plaintiff Daugherty, and constructed a large pond 
from which it used water in the operation of its trains. 
There were two actions brought for damages, one by 
Daugherty for himself and one by him and his wife 
Jane. It appeared that Daugherty was active and in-
fluential in the negotiations resulting in the purchase 
by the railroad company of the ground whereon the 
pond was erected. The Court, among other things, said : 
''If the ground on which the pond was con-
structed had been purchased from appellees, and 
used for the purpose for which it had been 
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bought, the vendors knowing that purpose, and 
from the condition of the old dam and previous 
accumulations of decayed matter, had reason to 
believe that such accumulations would continue 
or be increased by reason of the new structure, 
and they yet sold the ground for that purpose, 
and consented to the construction, then no action 
could be maintained at all.'' 
In the case of Mahoney Land Co. v. Cayuga Invest-
ment Co., 88 Wash. 529, 153 Pac. 308 (1915), the Court 
said: 
''The direct encouragement and acquiescence 
shown here as to an alleged private nuisance is 
fatal to equitable as well as legal relief." (Italics 
ours.) 
See Huntington Land Development Co. v. Phoenix 
Powder Mfg. Co., 40 W.Va. 711, 21 S. E. 1037 (1895). 
In Swain v. Semans, 9 Wall. 254, 19 L. Ed. 554, the 
Court said: 
"Where one tacitly encourages an act he 
cannot exercise a legal right contrary to such 
consent to the prejudice of another.'' 
Now, if such is the rule relative to an encourage-
ment which is merely tacit, then with stronger reason 
it applies to those in the situation of some of these 
plaintiffs, who have profited by the industrialization of 
this particular site, in that they have obtained employ-
ment thereon, and have assisted in the building thereof; 
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have benefited by the sale of animals to it and the 
purchase of stock feed from it. They should not now 
be heard to complain that a useful industry is being 
pursued on this site. 
Street, in his work on foundations of legal liability, 
says: 
''And one who has agreed to take part in an 
operation necessitating the production of fumes 
injurious to health, has no cause of action in 
respect of bodily suffering or inconvenience re-
sulting therefrom, though another person residing 
near to the seat of these operations might well 
maintain an action if he sustained such injuries 
from the same cause." 
1 Street's Foundations of Legal Liability, p. 162. 
Whatever may be said of some plaintiff who took 
no part in the industrialization of a community, surely 
no one can believe that another may bring about such 
an event, and even profit by it, and then complain about 
it either in an action at law or in a suit in equity. Under 
such circumstances, with the record in its present con-
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dition, it is submitted that plaintiffs cannot recover 
either jointly or severally. If any plaintiff is free of this 
defense, then there is certainly a misjoinder of parties. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that for each 
of the foregoing reasons, summarized as follows, the 
judgment of the lower court should be set aside and the 
action of the plaintiffs dismissed: 
1. There is no actionable nuisance either pleaded 
or proved in law or equity. 
2. The defendant's plant is properly located in an 
industrial district along a railroad section industrialized 
by plaintiffs themselves and their predecessors in interest. 
3. The defendant's plant is surrounded by improve-
ments placed on plaintiffs' lands by plaintiffs for use in 
industries operated by the plaintiffs, which improve-
ments are included in the damages awarded, in spite of 
the fact that the defendant's industry is allied to the 
industries of the plaintiffs and each is necessary to the 
other. 
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4. The court erred in retaining jurisdiction and in 
failing to require the plaintiffs to establish first the exist-
ence of a nuisance at law. 
5. Plaintiffs' action was brought in equity to invoke 
injunctive relief. Proof of a nuisance was not clear, 
convincing or satisfying as required by equity in actions 
invoking extraordinary equitable relief such as injunc-
tion. No equitable cause of action was proved. In spite 
of the fact that a multiplicity of suits alone forms no 
basis for equitable relief ,and in spite of this failure of 
proof, the court improperly retained jurisdiction of 
eleven separate causes of action of eleven misjoined 
plaintiffs owning in severalty distinct property interests 
and rendered a common law judgment for damages in 
their favor. 
6. Damages were given to these eleven persons upon 
the sole basis of an alleged diminution of their several 
property values. This basis was wrong; a mere diminu-
tion in value of property without irreparable mischief 
will not furnish any foundation for equitable relief. No 
irreparable mischief is alleged or proved. 
7. The only damages pleaded and proved are tem-
porary, although permanent damages are sought in the 
prayer and granted by the court. 
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8. If the action were considered as a suit to re-
cover permanent damages it is barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. 
9. Further error In assessing the damages was 
committed in the following particulars: 
(a) Though the only nuisance claimed was an un-
pleasant odor, the judgment included permanent dam-
ages to the following properties of the plaintiffs which 
for various reasons could not have been damaged by 
the alleged nuisance: water rights, barns, chicken coops, 
granaries, pig pens, stock yards, feed yards, corrals, and 
farm lands without homes or improvements on them. 
(b) The judgment rendered included permanent 
damages to the pl~intiffs John Anderson, Edward Lud-
low and Margaret D. Hansen, although the evidence 
showed that title to the lands claimed to be injured was 
not in these plaintiffs. 
(c) The judgment rendered includes permanent 
damage to plaintiffs who, in varying degrees, acquiesced 
in, encouraged, assisted in, and benefited by the main-
tenance of defendant's business from its inception to 
the date of suit. 
(d) The judgment rendered includes permanent 
damages to the plaintiffs John Anderson, Rufus Ander-
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son, Paul E. Swartz, John Angus, and Ed Selene for 
injury to improvements constructed by these plaintiffs 
since the operation of defendant's plant. 
(e) The judgment rendered was based upon tes-
timony awarding damages for the total difference be-
tween the value of plaintiffs' property with and without 
the defendant's plant, entirely eliminating from consid-
eration the presence of industrial factors such as the 
brick yards and railroads which would be present if 
defendant's plant were not operating. 
(f) The judgment rendered includes permanent 
damages to lands industrialized by the plaintiffs them-
selves and their predecessors in interest, and to improve-
ments placed on the said lands by the plaintiffs for use 
in the maintenance of these industries. 
(g) Plaintiffs neither alleged nor proved damages 
of a different character special and apart from that which 
the public in general sustains. 
10. Whatever the theory used as a basis for the 
damages awarded, these damages are excessive. 
11. The lower court erred in permitting the mis-
joinder of eleven plaintiffs and permitting an improper 
uniting of eleven causes of action. This denied to de-
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fendant its constitutional right of trial by jury, there 
being no basis for equitable relief. 
12. The lower court erred in permitting the plain-
tiffs to split their causes of action: 
(a) By the amended complaint into actions In 
equity for injunctive relief; and 
(b) By the supplemental complaint into actions at 
law for common law permanent damages. 
13. The lower court erred in preventing defendant 
from fully showing by its evidence, expert or otherwise: 
(a) The industrial nature of the community; 
(b) The values at which these lands were appraised 
by the State Tax Commission; 
(c) The incompetency of the expert witnesses on 
values offered by plaintiffs ; 
(d) The entire basis upon which plaintiffs' experts 
predicated their appraisals. 
14. The court's decision IS In conflict with the 
following cases, which should control: Dahl v. Utah Oil 
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Refining Co., 71 Utah 1; Norback v. Board of Directors, 
84 Utah 506; Wasatch Oil Ref. Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah 50. 
Respectfully submitted 
MOYLE, RICHARDS & McKAY, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
/ 
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